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WIELAND AND SHAFTESBURY

BY

CHARLES ELSON, PH.D.

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CALVIN THOMAS.

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MEINEM HOCHGESCHÄTZTEN LEHRER

HERRN PROFESSOR GUIDO C. L. RIEMER

PREFACE

The subject "Wieland and Shaftesbury" was first mentioned to me by my former teacher, Professor Guido C. L. Riemer of Bucknell College. But the idea of writing a dissertation on this subject was not fully decided upon until after I had written a seminar paper on Shaftesbury's relation to German thought in the 18th century, the seminar being conducted by Professor Calvin Thomas of Columbia University. I owe an unpayable debt to Professor Thomas for his encouragement and assistance in the preparation of this study and for excellent training in German scholarship. I also acknowledge my deep obligation to Professor Riemer of Bucknell, who has ever been an inexhaustible source of guidance and inspiration to me. And to Professor John A. Walz of Harvard I express my sincere gratitude for his constant deep interest in my work.

CHARLES ELSON

NEW YORK CITY,
April, 1913.

NOTE: When this dissertation was nearly through the press, there appeared in Stuttgart, Germany, a monograph by H. Grudzinski, entitled "Shaftesburys Einfluss auf Wieland," *Breslauer Beiträge, Heft* 34, 1913.

C. E.

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INTRODUCTION

It has long since been recognized that Shaftesbury was one of the most important teachers of Germany in the 18th century. During the great century of German letters, when there was much speculation about Virtue, Goodness and Beauty, and much interest in the ideal of a versatile and esthetically cultivated personality—it is not at all strange that the German mind should have turned eagerly to a philosopher who, at the beginning of the century, had been advocating the same ideals. Herder was quite right in saying that Shaftesbury "exerted a signal influence on the best heads of the century, on men who honestly devoted themselves to the culture of the true, the beautiful and the good."[1]

Shaftesbury influenced both the men of letters and the philosophers of Germany. As M. Koch observes,[2] he was studied in Germany no less than in England. His works began to appear in German translation—the first English edition of Shaftesbury's "Characteristics" appeared in 1711[3]—as early as 1738. In that year appeared in Magdeburg a translation by Venzky of "Soliloquy or Advice to an Author" under the title "Unterredungen mit sich selbst."[4] Translations of the "Moralists" and the "Inquiry,"[5] entitled respectively "Die

[1] "Briefe zur Beförderung der Humanität" (1794), Suphan edition of Herder's works, XVII, 158.

[2] "Beziehungen der englischen Literatur zur deutschen im 18ten Jahrhundert," Leipzig, 1883, p. 9.

[3] For a list of the English editions of Shaftesbury, some of which Wieland is known to have used, see the bibliography at the end of this book.

[4] For the data of the Shaftesbury translations I am indebted, unless some other authority is mentioned, to P. Ziertmann: "Beiträge zur Kenntnis Shaftesburys," in *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*, XVII (1904), 497 ff.

[5] A French translation of the "Inquiry" by Diderot appeared in Amsterdam, 1745; 2d edition in 1751 in Venice. In 1709, in the Hague, there appeared a French translation of "Letter concerning Enthusiasm;" in 1710, in the Hague, a French translation of the "Essay concerning the Freedom of Wit and Humor."

Sittenlehrer" and "Untersuchung über die Tugend," appeared in Berlin in 1745 and 1747. Both translations are by Spalding.[6] Another translation of the "Inquiry" appeared in Leipzig, 1780. This was translated not from the original but from the French version of Diderot. Ziertmann has no information concerning the author of the translation.[7] The "Letters to a Young Man at the University" appeared in German translation in Halle, 1772.[8] Here again we are not informed as to the translator. In 1768 Wichmann's translation appeared in Leipzig, under the title "Anton Ashley Cooper Grafen von Shaftesbury Characteristics, aus dem Englischen übersetzt." The translation, in spite of its pretentious title, is not complete.[9] In 1776–9 a complete translation appeared in Leipzig: "Des Grafen von Shaftesbury philosophische Werke" in three volumes.[10] According to Hirschling, *Biographische Nachrichten,* Leipzig, XII, 1809, p. 61, H. Vosz translated the second volume and also a part of the first volume, which was begun by Hölty.[11] According to Gizycki,[12] Hölty and Bentzler are the translators.

Judging by this interest of the Germans in Shaftesbury it is quite evident that the investigator will find a very fruitful field in the general topic of Shaftesbury's influence on German thought. Several phases of the subject have already been treated in individual monographs. From its purely philosophical side the subject is approached by G. Zart: "Der Einflusz der englischen Philosophen seit Bacon auf die deutsche

[6] H. Jördens: *Lexikon deutscher Dichter und Prosaisten* (1809), IV, 706, 713. Cf. also Scheffner's letter to Herder, Oct. 27, 1767: "Herder's Lebensbild," I², 281.

[7] A very recent translation of the "Inquiry" by P. Ziertmann appeared in 1905 in *Dürrs philosophische Bibliothek,* CX, Leipzig. Cf. Oscar F. Walzel: "Shaftesbury und das deutsche Geistesleben des 18 Jahrhunderts" in *Germanisch-Romanische Monatschrift,* 1909, p. 420.

[8] See Ziertmann, p. 499.

[9] Gizycki: "Die Philosophie Shaftesburys," Leipzig & Heidelberg, 1876, p. v.

[10] A French translation of Shaftesbury's works and letters, in three volumes, entitled "Les Oeuvres de Mylord Comte de Shaftesbury," appeared in 1769.

[11] Quoted by Ziertmann, p. 498.

[12] "Die Philosophie Shaftesburys," p. v.

Philosophie des 18 Jahrhunderts."[13] Among the other English philosophers Zart also treats, but rather briefly, Shaftesbury's relation to German philosophers, such as Mendelssohn, Eberhard, Sulzer, etc. Shaftesbury's influence on Herder is dealt with by I. C. Hatch in his dissertation: "Der Einflusz Shaftesburys auf Herder."[14] And Shaftesbury's influence upon Haller is treated by Georg Bondi in his dissertation: "Das Verhältnis von Hallers philosophischen Gedichten zur Philosophie seiner Zeit."[15] But above all I wish to mention here Oscar F. Walzel's excellent article: "Shaftesbury und das deutsche Geistesleben des 18 Jahrhunderts," which appeared in *Die Germanisch-Romanische Monatsschrift,* 1909, pp. 416–437. Here Walzel enumerates the more notable works dealing with Shaftesbury's philosophy in general and with his relation to German thought. Besides setting forth what had already been accomplished in the field, the author suggests here and there what is yet to be done. I am indebted to this article for giving me a starting point in my special study and for furnishing me with bibliographical data, of which I made considerable use in my preliminary orientation for the main work.

The purpose of this dissertation is to trace the nature and extent of Shaftesbury's influence on Wieland. This investigation, however, does not pretend to be a pioneering work on the subject, for Wieland's relation to Shaftesbury has more than once been mentioned by critics and biographers. In the aforementioned article O. F. Walzel refers to Wieland's relation to Shaftesbury as belonging "Unter die bekanntesten Partien der deutschen Geistesgeschichte des 18 Jahrhunderts."[16] In his "Beziehungen der englischen Literatur zur deutschen im 18 Jahrhundert" M. Koch remarks that no other philosopher exerted as much influence as Shaftesbury on Wieland's entire philosophy of life.[17] The same statement is repeated in his article on Wieland in "Die Allgemeine Deutsche Bio-

[13] Berlin, 1881.

[14] Published in *Studien zur vergleichenden Literaturgeschichte,* edited by M. Koch.

[15] Leipzig, 1891.

[16] *Germanisch-Romanische Monatschrift,* 1909, p. 430.

[17] Cf. p. 12.

graphie."[18] In his biography of Wieland, J. G. Gruber states that Shaftesbury was Wieland's intimate friend. He tells us that Wieland adopted Shaftesbury's suggestion concerning the importance of self-communion or self-investigation, also that Wieland identified Socrates' *kalokagathia* with Shaftesbury's virtuoso-ideal. Without attempting to prove his statement Gruber also remarks that everything written by Wieland in 1753–5 shows the influence of either Plato or Shaftesbury.[19] And from J. W. Loebell we have the statement that Wieland and Shaftesbury resembled each other in their entire way of thinking, in the method by which they sought for the good and beautiful, in the conviction that happiness has its source in the predominance of noble and benevolent feelings, in the notion that a cheerful mind is a touchstone of a right disposition.[20]

As can readily be seen, no attempt is made in any of these statements to make an actual contribution to the subject. Such an attempt, however, has been made by F. Pomezny: "Grazie und Grazien in der deutschen Literatur des 18 Jahrhunderts"[21] and by E. Ermatinger: "Die Weltanschaung des jungen Wieland."[22] In the fourth chapter, entitled "Wieland's Grazien," Pomezny says that Wieland's *moralische Grazie* comes from Shaftesbury's "moral grace," and that Wieland had learned from Shaftesbury and Plato his conception of spiritual beauty. To illustrate his point he quotes a few passages from the following works, which appeared prior to 1760: "Anti-Ovid," "Erinnerungen an eine Freundin," "Cyrus," "Theages." He also mentions three personal references of Wieland to Shaftesbury. Ermatinger devotes several pages to Shaftesbury's influence on Wieland. He discusses briefly the relation between the Greek *kalokagathia* and Shaftesbury's "virtuoso" and mentions Wieland's relation to both. He also mentions several personal allusions of Wieland to Shaftesbury and points out Shaftesburian views in a few passages from "Timoklea,"

[18] Cf. XLII (1897), 412.

[19] "Wieland geschildert von Gruber," Leipzig and Altenburg, 1815 (in 2 volumes), I, 164–6, 76.

[20] "Die Entwicklung der deutschen Poesie von Klopstocks erstem Auftreten bis zu Goethes Tode," Braunschweig, 1858, II, 142–3.

[21] Edited by B. Seuffert, Hamburg & Leipzig, 1900.

[22] Frauenfeld, 1907.

"Sympathien," "Theages," "Plan einer neuen Art von Privat-Unterweisung" and "Plan einer Akademie zu Bildung des Verstandes und Herzens junger Leute." Shaftesbury's influence on Wieland, however, is but very slightly touched by making a general remark or by quoting a passage here and there from the youthful works of our author. In fact, the great bulk of Shaftesbury's influence comes into Wieland's works after 1760 and abides more or less in his entire literary career. A real investigation of this influence necessitates the careful consideration of Wieland's whole life-work. Such an investigation, as Walzel very properly suggests,[28] is still lacking, and my monograph undertakes to supply this want.

The following general plan has been adopted as the most suitable for this study. The first chapter treats the direct evidence of Wieland's life-long interest in Shaftesbury—the evidence consisting of Wieland's own utterances. The second chapter discusses the principal aspects of Shaftesbury's philosophy. In this chapter I also treat as briefly as possible Shaftesbury's points of contact with other philosophers, both ancient and modern. The remaining chapters are then devoted to tracing Shaftesbury's doctrines in Wieland's poetical and philosophical works and in his letters. Instead of pursuing these doctrines in chronological order it seemed best to me to arrange them in categories. This method, however, at once presents a difficulty, because certain philosophical doctrines almost defy classification into categories. The classification, it must be admitted, is in some cases arbitrary.

For Wieland's works I refer for the greater part either to the Hempel or the Göschen edition. Gruber's edition, however, is more convenient in the case of Wieland's youthful works, such as "Natur der Dinge," "Moralische Briefe," "Briefe von Verstorbenen," etc., because it numbers the verses; and so, for quotations from these works I refer to Gruber's edition. For the same reason I refer for "Musarion" to Pröhle's edition in the "Deutsche National-Literatur." In the case of Shaftesbury the reader is referred to the Baskerville edition (1773) of the "Characteristics."

[28] *Germanisch-Romanische Monatschrift*, 1909, p. 430.

CHAPTER I

Direct Evidence of Wieland's Interest in Shaftesbury

There is abundant evidence in Wieland's own words of his life-long admiration for, and interest in, the writings of Shaftesbury. The earliest datable reference known to me is from the year 1755. On March 15 of that year he conversed with Friedrich Dominicus Ring[1] concerning Shaftesbury and the "Characteristics," and in his diary Ring reports him as saying in effect: that Shaftesbury never misses an opportunity of mocking at religion; that his principle of raillery has been harmful to religion; that the best way to refute him is to accept the notions of virtue taught by him, and to show that the Christian religion is not inconsistent with his own notions. At this early period, therefore,—Wieland was born in 1733—he was already acquainted with Shaftesbury's ideas of virtue and his doctrine of raillery. With regard to the latter subject he afterward changed his mind, as will be seen later when we come to discuss Wieland's treatment of the doctrine.

In the "Plan einer Akademie," written in 1756 but not published until 1758, he refers to Shaftesbury as "der geistreichste und feinste aller modernen Scribenten" and alludes to a specific passage in the "Miscellaneous Reflections," where the "virtuoso" is discussed.[2]

In January, 1758,[3] in a document issued against Nicolai and Uz, Wieland explains his attitude as a poet, declares that Shaftesbury has taught him what it means to be an author,

[1] See *Schnorrs Archiv für Literaturgeschichte,* XIII (1885), 485 ff. Wieland's remarks concerning Shaftesbury occur on p. 496. Ring was a student at Zürich in 1753–5 and kept a diary in which he recorded among other things the substance of several conversations with Wieland. This particular conversation was contributed to *Schnorrs Archiv* by H. Funck in an article entitled "Gespräche mit Chr. M. Wieland in Zürich."

[2] "Prosaische Schriften" (Zürich, 1758), III, 112.

[3] This is the date of the appearance of the document, according to B. Seuffert: "Mitteilungen aus Wielands Jünglingsalter," *Euphorion,* XIV, 228.

and expresses a desire that all German authors should know it.[4]

His thorough acquaintance with Shaftesbury's "Inquiry" and "Moralists" is attested by his praise in a letter to Zimmermann of Sept. 6, 1756, of the method of these works: "Shaftesbury knew what method is. His 'Treatise upon Virtue' and his 'Moralists' are more fit to teach good method than the most detailed treatise on the subject. The 'Moralists,' which *par ironie* he calls a rhapsody, is just as systematic as the 'Inquiry concerning Virtue'; but in the former the systematic treatment is concealed behind an appearance of pleasant negligence."[5]

Wieland's study of Shaftesbury was thorough enough to include even such a minor work as the "Letter concerning Design." In "Theages" (1755–1758) he refers to an opinion expressed by Shaftesbury in the "Letter" aforesaid. "I am of the opinion, says Nicias (one of the speakers in "Theages"), that a moral code consisting of allegorical paintings, in accordance with the idea expressed by Shaftesbury in his 'Letter on the Choice of Hercules,'[6] would be an excellent means to cultivate the taste and heart of young people."[7]

Oct. 18, 1758, Wieland writes to Zimmermann that among his books "there are only a few choice ones which, like bread, do not become intolerable even when all other spiritual food is disgusting. Among these (choice works) are Xenophon, Plutarch, Horace and Shaftesbury."[8] In a letter of July 4,

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 236.

[5] "Ausgewählte Briefe von C. M. Wieland an verschiedene Freunde" (Zürich, 1815, 4 volumes), I, 280.

[6] Shaftesbury's "Letter concerning Design" was occasioned directly by his treatise "A notion of the Tablature of the Judgment of Hercules."

[7] Göschen, XXXIII, 232. Wieland alludes here to Shaftesbury's idea found in the "Letter concerning Design" in the "Characteristics" III, 409, which is expressed as follows: "The picture itself, whatever the treatise proved, would have been worth notice and might have become a present worthy of our court and princes' palace. Such a piece of furniture might well fit the gallery or hall of exercise, where our young princes should learn their usual lessons. And to see virtue in this garb and action might perhaps be no slight memorandum hereafter to a royal youth who should one day come to undergo this trial himself."

[8] "Ausgewählte Briefe," I, 297.

1759, to the same correspondent, he speaks of his difficulty in vying with Shaftesbury, Diderot and Rousseau.[9]

By May 1, 1760, he was planning a translation of Shaftesbury: "Among my other plans," he writes to Zimmermann, "is to give Germany a complete translation of Shaftesbury. Since his 'Inquiry' and 'Moralists' have already been translated by Mr. Spalding there remain only the 'Letter concerning Enthusiasm,' the treatise on 'Wit and Humor,' the 'Advice to an Author' and the 'Miscellanies.'"[10]

In 1782 Wieland makes considerable use of Shaftesbury in the translation of Horace's epistles. In the introduction to the third letter to Piso he says that he will present at once the point of view from which the letter must be considered, and adds that, "following a hint of the excellent Lord Shaftesbury," he has employed the same procedure in all the other letters of Horace.[11] Speaking of the character of Maecenas, he says that, without knowing the characters of Maecenas, Augustus, Florus and the like, one cannot find sufficient relish in the letters written to them, unless he has a tender feeling for the true and the beautiful. This opinion is introduced by the statement, "Ich bin mit Shaftesbury völlig überzeugt," and is concluded by an allusion in a foot-note to the "Characteristics, Vol. III, Misc. I, C. 3."[12] Speaking of Horace, he says that, even if he had not been such a good poet, he would have become Maecenas' friend through the elegance of his mind and morals, through his wit, his pleasant humor—"kurz, durch alles das, weswegen ihn Shaftesbury the most Gentleman-like of Roman poets nennt."[13] And in a foot-note we are referred by Wieland to the "Characteristics, Vol. I, p. 328."[14] Further on he expresses a certain opinion concerning the relation between Horace and Brutus, but he gets the opinion from Shaftesbury, for he says: "Ich glaube mit Shaftesbury nicht zu irren,

[9] *Ibid.*, II, 47.

[10] *Ibid.*, II, 132.

[11] "Horazens Briefe übersetzt" (Leipzig, 1816), II, 187.

[12] *Ibid.*, I, 5. The passage referred to is found in our edition, III, 21.

[13] *Ibid.*, I, 19.

[14] This passage occurs in our edition in exactly the same volume and on exactly the same page (I, 328).

wenn," etc.[15] All these references go to show that Wieland must at that time have had his Shaftesbury constantly before him.

Also twenty years later Wieland has Shaftesbury open before him, for he quotes specific passages from the "Characteristics." In the *Vorbericht* to the translation of Xenophon's "Symposium" he speaks in lofty terms concerning Xenophon and says: "Sehr richtig nennt ihn daher der scharfsinnige und echt classische Shaftesbury in seinem 'Advice to an Author' den philosophischen Menander der früheren Zeit."[16] In a foot-note he refers to the Thurneisen edition of the "Characteristics," Vol. I, p. 218.[17] A little further on we are told that some readers unacquainted with the Greeks of that period will conceive exaggerated notions of Xenophon, but that it is not Xenophon's fault if the readers lack a feeling for—Wieland continues in Shaftesbury's words—"die Göttlichkeit der schönen Einfalt des Liebenswürdigsten und Geist und Herz mehr als irgend ein anderer erhebenden unter allen blos menschlichen Schriftstellern."[18] And in a foot-note we are referred to the passage where these words occur, the Thurneisen edition of the "Characteristics," Vol. III, p. 205.[19]

Dating from the same year, 1802, we have from Wieland's hand a long eulogy of Shaftesbury and a declaration of his indebtedness to him. In his *Neuer Teutscher Merkur* he published a criticism of Herder's "Adrastea," mentioning among others the articles on Locke, Swift and Shaftesbury, and adding the following significant statement, which in spite of its length is worth giving in the original: "Vor allem aber kann ich mir's nicht versagen, Adrasteen meinen wärmsten Dank öffentlich darzubringen für die herrliche Karakteristik des liebenswürdigsten aller neuen Schriftsteller, des Grafen Anton von Shaftesbury, welchem ich selbst einen so groszen Theil

[15] *Ibid.*, II, 18. This opinion is expressed by Shaftesbury in the "Miscellanies," III, 249–50, of our edition.

[16] *Attisches Museum*, IV[1], 72.

[17] In our edition of Shaftesbury this passage occurs in I, 255.

[18] *Attisches Museum*, IV[1], 73.

[19] In our edition these words occur in III, 248 and read as follows: "the divineness of a just simplicity of the most amiable and even the most elevating and exalting of all uninspired and merely human authors."

meiner eigenen Bildung in meinen früheren Jahren schuldig bin und der stärker auf mich gewirkt hat als ich ohne Beschämung sagen kann, da ich demungeachtet so weit hinter ihm zurückgeblieben bin. Dank, herzlicher Dank sei Adrasteen für die Gerechtigkeit, welche sie diesem Edeln und Einzigen widerfahren liesz, in welchem Platons hoher Idealism mit Xenophons Sokratischer Kalokagathie und Sofrosyne und Horazens weisem Frohsinn so schön vereinigt war! Dank für die vortreffliche Apologie dieses (zu ihrer Schmach) von so vielen Britten noch immer verkannten, so oft schief und hämisch beurteilten Wiederherstellers der reinen Sokratischen Lehre gegen seine eigenen Landesleute und ihre Nachlaller unter den Unsrigen! Dank endlich für die zartschonende Billigkeit, womit sie die wenigen Blöszen bedeckt, wodurch Er selbst, nach der höchsten Strenge beurteilt, zu den Miszverständnissen seiner Tadler und Verleumder Gelegenheit gegeben haben mag."[20]

And even as late as July 11, 1808, Shaftesbury is still Wieland's companion. In a letter of that date we are told that in the evening between 5 and 7 he may be found "in the company of a Cicero, Horace, Lucian or Shaftesbury."[21]

Wieland's profound interest in Shaftesbury is also shown by the variety of Shaftesbury-editions used by him. He is not satisfied with merely one certain edition, but knows all the German translations of Shaftesbury and consults several English editions of the "Characteristics." In 1756, speaking of the "virtuoso" in his "Plan einer Akademie," he refers to the "Characteristics," Tom III, Miscellany, III, Chap. I.[22] This must have been some English edition as seen, in the first place, from the English terms "Miscellany" and "Chapter." Secondly, the edition referred to could not have been a German translation, because whatever German translations appeared prior to 1756 did not include the "Miscellaneous Reflections."

In the February issue of the *Merkur* of 1777 there is a review of the German translation of Shaftesbury; "Des Grafen von Shaftesbury philosophische Werke aus dem Englischen

20 *Neuer Teutscher Merkur,* April, 1802, pp. 295–6.
21 "Auswahl denkwürdiger Briefe," II, 118.
22 "Prosaische Schriften," III, 112.

übersetzt. 1er Band, Leipzig, 1776. In der Weigandschen Handlung." The review, which is evidently by Wieland, reads in part as follows: The translation is very good and the author felt the irony of the original. It is a good sign for the condition of religion and literature of the times that it did not seem necessary, as ten years ago, to edit the works of Shaftesbury with notes to counteract the poison of the original. The older translations of a Venzky and a Wichmann contained enough of an antidote in the stiff tone of their pedantic work. Whatever may be said against Shaftesbury's diction or character, he remains for us at all times a model of fine composition, of which our modern authors endeavor to know so little.[23]

This review shows not only Wieland's acquaintance with the original, but also with the German translations of 1738, 1768 and 1776–9. That he at least knew of Spalding's translation of the "Moralists" and "Inquiry" appears from the aforementioned letter to Zimmermann, May 1, 1760.

In his translation of Horace's letters (1782) Wieland mentions that Shaftesbury calls Horace "the most gentleman-like of Roman poets" and refers to the "Characteristics, Vol. I, p. 328." The terms are again English and the reference corresponds volume for volume and page for page to the Baskerville edition of 1773. This would go to show that Wieland made use also of the Baskerville edition.

After 1790 Wieland seems to have confined himself entirely to the English Thurneisen and Legrand edition, which appeared in Basel in 1790. He watches the edition with special interest in its process of going through the press and makes constant use of it after its appearance. Thus, in the October number of the *Merkur* of 1787 there is an announcement by Wieland of the prospective publication by Thurneisen of a series of the best English historians, philosophers and poets, the series containing among other things Shaftesbury's "Characteristics" and Letters.[24] And two years later he expresses his impatience at the delayed appearance of the edition of Shaftesbury.[25] The edition was finally advertised in the September number of

[23] *Teutscher Merkur*, Feb., 1777, pp. 201–2.
[24] See p. cxlvi, ff.
[25] July number, 1789, p. 112.

1792.[26] That Wieland made considerable use of the Thurneisen edition appears from his frequent direct allusions to it. Thus, for instance, the two allusions in the *Vorbericht* to Xenophon's "Symposium" (1802), the allusion in the notes of "Der neue Amadis" (2nd edition, 1794) and the one in the "Sendschreiben an Prof. Eggers" (1792) are all to this edition of Shaftesbury.[27] In the last allusion Wieland states the names of both publishers and the year and place of publication.

These notices are sufficient to prove Wieland's deep and lasting interest in Shaftesbury. In the face of all this evidence it would be strange indeed if the philosopher had not exerted a considerable influence on the poet. Both Shaftesbury and Wieland, however, owed a considerable debt to Greek philosophy, especially to Plato[28] and Xenophon. Hence, in order to see how and when Shaftesbury came into Wieland's intellectual life as a distinct factor, it is necessary to devote a few words to Wieland's early studies of Plato and Xenophon.

Wieland became acquainted with Plato, Xenophon, and through them with Socrates, very early in life. As may be seen from references to Plato in "Die Natur der Dinge"[29] and "Moralische Briefe,"[30] Wieland must have made a study of Plato by 1752. A course in Plato was probably a part of his school curriculum at Klosterbergen (1747–1749). The Platonic influence is quite evident in his earliest works,—his first work "Die Natur der Dinge" appeared in 1752—dating before 1755. But even at this early period Plato is not an independent factor in Wieland's intellectual life, for what he learns from Plato he blends with what is learned almost simultaneously, or a very short time afterwards, from Shaftesbury.

[26] Sept., 1792, p. 102.

[27] Cf. *Attisches Museum*, IV[1], 72 and 73; Göschen, XV, 293; Hempel, XXXIV, 169.

[28] Herder saw enough resemblance between Shaftesbury and Plato to call the former "der liebenswürdige Plato Europas." Cf. R. Haym: "Herder nach seinem Leben und Wirken," Berlin, 1885, II, 268.

[29] Book I, line 10 (Gruber, I, 13); book III, line 120 (p. 77), line 331 (p. 85), line 571 (p. 96).

[30] 1er Brief, line 131 (Gruber I, 229); 2er Brief, line 161 (p. 240); 7er Brief, line 87 (p. 277); 9er Brief, line 214 (p. 303).

As a result of this a good many things in Wieland's earliest works have a pronounced Shaftesburian tinge. In the "Sympathien" (1755) he tells us to learn "Von einem Platon oder Shaftesbury was Natur und Tugend ist."[31] And in the *Vorbericht* to "Theages" he speaks of the leisure which he had *several years ago* to study the works of Plato and Shaftesbury.[32] "Theages" did not appear until 1758, but Wieland had been working on it since 1755. It is impossible to determine the exact time to which Wieland refers, but I am inclined to think that "vor einigen Jahren" refers at least to the beginning of the fifties, when his literary career begins. As it appears from the above-mentioned conversation with Ring, at the beginning of 1755, Wieland was then familiar with Shaftesbury's philosophy as a whole, and it is quite likely that the study of Shaftesbury claimed his attention several years before 1755. In his brief statement concerning Wieland's relation to Shaftesbury, M. Koch even goes so far as to assert that it was through Shaftesbury that Wieland acquired an interest in Plato.[33]

Also with Xenophon Wieland becomes acquainted very early, for already at Klosterbergen (1747–9) Xenophon is his favorite and contributes much to his education.[34] But also Xenophon's influence is manifested aside from the Shaftesburian influence. Thus, "Cyrus" (1759) and "Araspes und Panthea" (1760) are largely the fruits of the study of Xenophon, but in both works Shaftesbury is very much in evidence. In the introductory verses of "Cyrus" he calls upon Truth to point out to him:

"Jene sittliche Venus, die einst dein (Truth's) Xenophon kannte
Und dein Ashley[35] mit ihm, die Mutter des geistigen Schönen."[36]

The character of Cyrus, which is also a prominent feature in

[31] "Sympathien," Göschen XXIX, 25.

[32] "Prosaische Schriften," I, 141.

[33] "Beziehungen der englischen Literatur zur deutschen im 18 Jahrhundert," Leipzig, 1883, p. 12.

[34] Letter to L. Meister, Dec. 28, 1787, "Ausgewählte Briefe," III, 382.

[35] Shaftesbury's full name was Anthony Ashley Cooper, 3d Earl of Shaftesbury.

[36] "Cyrus," 1st Canto, lines 28–9, Gruber, IV, 4.

"Araspes und Panthea," was suggested to him, as he tells us in the *Zuschrift,* by Xenophon's Muse and Shaftesbury's Moral Venus.[37] The episode of "Araspes und Panthea" is also found in Shaftesbury's "Advice to an Author."[38]

The most important result of Wieland's study of Xenophon was the knowledge acquired of Socrates.[39] On several occasions he recommends Xenophon's *Memorabilia* as the best and purest source for a knowledge of Socrates.[40] He was especially impressed by the Socratic ideal of *kalokagathia.* He frequently alludes to this ideal[41] and discusses it on a number of occasions. But as in the case of Plato and Xenophon, so also in the case of Socrates, Shaftesbury comes in for his share of the influence. Wieland blends the Socratic *kalokagathia* with the Shaftesburian "virtuoso."[42]

All this goes to show that Shaftesbury was a prominent factor even in the earliest period of Wieland's literary career—the period which extends roughly to about 1760—and that he was a constant companion of Wieland's Greek favorites, Plato, Xenophon and Socrates. Shaftesbury's influence, however, is much more extensive. He is, as Goethe said, Wieland's "wahrhafter älterer Zwillingsbruder im Geiste."[43] In fact, Wieland's transition to the second period of his career, that epoch-making period which gave us his "Musarion," "Agathon," "Oberon," and the like,—this transition coincided with his more intimate acquaintance with Shaftesbury. It will now be in order to compare these two periods in order that we may

[37] *Zuschrift* to "Araspes und Panthea" (edition of 1760, Zürich), p. vii.

[38] "Characteristics," I, 176 ff.

[39] Wieland refers very frequently to Socrates as early as 1752. Cf. "Moralische Briefe" (Gruber, Vol. I), 1er Brief, lines 72, 184; 4er Brief, line 17; 9er Brief, lines 45, 98, 213, 233, 249.

[40] *Teutscher Merkur,* Dec., 1783, p. clxxviii. Also the foreword to "Xenophons Sokratische Gespräche," *Attisches Museum,* Vol. III.

[41] Letter to Zimmermann, Feb. 24, 1758, "Ausgewählte Briefe," I, 256; to Hottinger, Jan. 30, 1797, *ibid.,* IV, 38; "Der neue Amadis" (1771), Göschen, XV., 135; "Agathon," Göschen, IV, 4; "Socratische Gespräche" in *Attisches Museum,* III[1], 129; "Aristipp," XXIII, 206. In none of these allusions, however, is the doctrine directly discussed.

[42] "Plan einer Akademie," in "Prosaische Schriften," III, 112; also note to "Theages," Göschen, XXXIII, 414.

[43] "Werke," Hempel edition, XXVII[2], 60.

clearly see the part played by Shaftesbury in Wieland's transition from the first to the second period.

Wieland was born at a time (1733) when pietism had made considerable headway in Germany, owing to the efforts of Spener, Francke and others, and was brought up—his father was a minister—in a strictly pietistic atmosphere. He received a similar training at Klosterbergen (1747–9) under Steinmetz and breathed the same general atmosphere in the home of Bodmer (1752–4). His mind became seraphically inclined and began to wander in etherial regions. He acquired a peculiar religiosity, which he combined with his Platonic studies, and became a *Schwärmer*. The sexual nature of man had no part in his philosophy of life at that time, his early love for his cousin Sophie von Gutermann having been a Platonic passion. From the heights of his seraphic aversion to the common herd he glorified those "worthy men who live far from the world in lonely valleys."[44] He was very fond of solitude and often spent entire days and nights in the garden to observe and to portray the beauties of nature.[45] He even entertained the idea of becoming a hermit.[46] His early zeal for religion and piety was without the spirit of tolerance and had rather the nature of fanaticism. This is shown among other things by his condemnation of Ovid, Anacreon, Tibullus[47] and several French and English poets such as Chaulieu,

[44] "Briefe von Verstorbenen an hinterlassene Freunde" (1753), 3d letter lines, 94 ff. Gruber, II, 234.

[45] Letter to Bodmer, 1752, "Ausgewählte Briefe," I, 47.

[46] "Sympathien," Göschen, XXIX, 13. Alcest is here the man desiring to retire into seclusion, but in a letter to Zimmermann of Sept. 6, 1758, we are told that Alcest is none other than Wieland himself. Cf. "Ausgewählte Briefe," I, 285.

[47] In his "Schreiben von der Würde und Bestimmung eines schönen Geistes" (1752) Wieland identifies himself with the cause of "Belehrende und bessernde Dichtung" and attacks the "Priester der Unsinns." Cf. p. xxvii of Sauer's introduction to Uz' "Sämmtliche poetische Werke," Stuttgart, 1890 (in numbers 33–8 of the *Deutsche Literaturdenkmale*, edited by B. Seuffert). In the second edition of the "Schreiben von der Würde," etc., which appeared in 1754 in "Fragmente der erzählenden Dichtart von verschiedenem Inhalte," Wieland attacks directly "the innumerable Tibulluses and Anacreons" of today (cf. Sauer's Introduction, p. xxvii).

Gay and Prior. To this period belongs also the attack upon Uz.[48]

Gradually, however, there came a change in Wieland's view of life, and this change began to manifest itself precisely at the time when he acquired a deeper interest in Shaftesbury. As he enters upon his second period, which may be said to extend from 1760 to 1780, Wieland leaves his seraphic world of pietism. He gets rid of Bodmer's influence, and fanaticism falls away from him. He is no longer an ascetic and begins more and more "to familiarize himself with the people of the low world" (bas-monde).[49] He regrets his former fanatic act of condemning poets like Ovid, La Fontaine and especially Uz. He apologizes for this atack, announces his fondness for Prior and Gay, speaks of Uz as one of the best minds of the nation and characterizes his former attitude to him as "alberne Severität."[50]

This great change which led Wieland to declare "non sum qualis eram"[51] was also noticed by his contemporaries Lessing and Goethe. On the appearance of "Lady Johanna Gray" (1758) Lessing rejoices that "Wieland has left the etherial spheres, and that he wanders again among the children of men."[52] And Goethe speaks of this transition as follows: Wieland's youth passed in realms of the idealistic world, but in his maturity he came out into the real world and has ever since kept the balance between the two.[53]

Among the causes that contributed to this change in Wieland's entire attitude should be mentioned his intercourse with Julie Bondeli during his sojourn in Bern (1759–60) and

[48] The Uz controversy is discussed by L. Hirzel in his "Wieland und Martin und Regula Künzli," Leipzig, 1891, pp. 121–32 and in Sauer's Introduction to Uz' poetical works, pp. xx–lxii.

[49] Letters to Zimmermann, Apr. 26, 1759; Nov. 8, 1762; Mar. 12, 1758; "Ausgewählte Briefe," I, 365; II, 194; I, 259.

[50] "Unterredungen mit dem Pfarrer . . ." (1775), Hempel, XXXII, 225. Letter to Julie Bondeli, July 16, 1764: "Ausgewählte Briefe," II, 241–5; to Zimmermann, March 12, 1758, *ibid.*, I, 260; Gleim, Feb. 4, 1768, *ibid.*, II, 296. Riedel, Jan. 19, 1769, "Auswahl denkwürdiger Briefe," I, 247. Geszner, May 4, 1764, *ibid.*, I, 9.

[51] To Zimmermann, Nov. 8, 1762, "Ausgewählte Briefe," II, 194.

[52] Lessing's "Briefe die neueste Literatur betreffend," 63d letter, Lachmann Muncker edition, VIII, 166.

[53] "Dichtung und Wahrheit," Book 7, Hempel, XXI, 54.

especially his contact with Stadion and La Roche. After a long activity in the service of the Elector of Mainz, Count Friedrich Stadion had retired to his castle at Warthausen near Biberach. He had with him his secretary, La Roche, and Wieland, who was at this time councilor at Biberach,[54] spent very enjoyable and profitable hours at Warthausen. Stadion and La Roche were both men of the world, perfectly virtuous, free from fanaticism, always serene and cheerful. To use in substance Gruber's words: Wieland found at Warthausen religion without superstition, philosophy without empty metaphysics, fun and cheer free from all blemish, love which is without fanaticism and makes life happy.[55] His association with La Roche and Stadion, the latter especially, contributed very much, as Wieland himself reports a quarter of a century later, to the rectification and extension of his knowledge of men and the world.[56]

But this great change in Wieland's life began to manifest itself before his coming into contact with La Roche and Stadion. It is in Shaftesbury's philosophy that he first found the healthy atmosphere of a man of the world, religion without fanaticism, self-communion without asceticism, spiritual refinement without warfare against the sensual nature of man. Wieland's study of Shaftesbury is especially prominent between 1755–60, which is precisely the time when the change begins. His works and letters of this period are full of allusions to the English philosopher. To the allusions discussed above the following may be added.[57] In 1755 he urges Amyntor, the hero of the 13th *Sympathie,* to be "one of the few for whom the wise Shaftesbury has not written in vain his 'Advice to an Author.'"[58] March 12, 1758, he refers to Shaftesbury

[54] He was elected to this position in 1760.

[55] "Wieland geschildert von Gruber," I, 152.

[56] Letter to L. Meister, Dec. 28, 1787, "Ausgewählte Briefe," III, 386. In a letter to Geszner of March 20, 1769, he glorifies the characters of Stadion and La Roche. Cf. "Auswahl denkwürdiger Briefe," I, 94, ff.

[57] The following few allusions and those discussed above by no means exhaust everything said by Wieland concerning Shaftesbury during this period. The allusions that are still left will be treated in connection with the discussion of the various Shaftesburian views in Wieland's works.

[58] "Prosaische Schriften," I, 103, or Göschen, XXIX, 55.

as saying that men are musical instruments.[59] Oct. 18, 1758, he speaks of Klopstock's "Messias" and remarks that Shaftesbury would find *non-sense* in it even if he could read it in German.[60] Nov. 8, 1758, he again criticises Klopstock's "Messias" and adds that these and many other things would have been said by Shaftesbury "tausendmal feiner, sinnreicher und bestimmter."[61] And in the same letter he remarks that what Shaftesbury would have said concerning the "Messias" appears very clearly in the "Advice to an Author."[62]

In the meantime the study of Plato seems to be neglected. References to Plato occur in Wieland's works after 1760,[63] but Nov. 8, 1762, he speaks of having given up his study of Plato.[64] Still earlier, March 12, 1758, he reports that he is not as Platonic as he is considered to be.[65] During this very same year, when Wieland ceases to care for Plato, he seems to have devoted almost his entire attention to Shaftesbury; during 1758 he alludes to and speaks about the English philosopher more than in any other year. As he comes into the new world he finds it necessary to modify his Platonism considerably, and he reports simultaneously of having given up his Platonic studies and of having ceased to be a mystic and ascetic.[66] But just at this time his interest in Shaftesbury is most prominent. "Cyrus" and "Araspes und Panthea" are indicated by him

[59] Letter to Zimmermann, "Ausgewählte Briefe," I, 261; Wieland undoubtedly refers here to the following words of Shaftesbury (I, 274): "Let the authors and poets complain ever so much of the genius of our people, 'tis evident we are not altogether so barbarous and Gothic as they pretend. We are naturally no ill soil and have musical parts which might be cultivated with greater advantage, if these gentlemen would use the art of masters in their composition."

[60] To Zimmermann, "Ausgewählte Briefe," I, 298.

[61] To Zimmermann, *ibid.*, I, 308.

[62] *Ibid.*, I, 306.

[63] See, for instance, "Don Sylvio" (1764), Göschen, I, 86; "Idris und Zenide" (1768), 5th canto, 83d stanza and 99th stanza, Hempel, XVI, 108 and 111; "Der neue Amadis" (1771), 11th canto, 31st stanza, Göschen, XV; "Die Abderiten" (1774–1781), Göschen, XIII, 17; "Agathon," Part III, Göschen, VI, 66; "Aristipp," Part III, Göschen, XXIV, 154.

[64] "Ausgewählte Briefe," II, 195; "Platon a fait place à Horace, Young à Chaulieu," etc.

[65] To Zimmermann, *ibid.*, I, 259.

[66] *Ibid.*, II, 241, 194–5.

as the first fruits of his transition to the second period.[67] But in both these works, as we have seen, Shaftesbury is very much in evidence. Moreover, it is at the same time that he begins to "familiarize himself with the people of this world," to "love the beautiful, the good, the great and the sublime," and —to "aspire to the character of Shaftesbury's virtuoso."[68]

[67] To L. Meister, *ibid.*, III, 385.
[68] To Zimmermann, March 12, 1758, *ibid.*, I, 259.

CHAPTER II

The Salient Features of Shaftesbury's Philosophy

It will be impossible for any one to follow the reflection of Shaftesbury's doctrines in Wieland's works until he has a clear idea of the more fundamental Shaftesburian views. It is necessary, therefore, to devote a chapter to the exposition of those views.

1. *Esthetics and Morality. Art and Virtue*

Shaftesbury was a moral-esthetic philosopher, and the identification of esthetics and morality is the chief feature of his philosophy. The good is beautiful, the beautiful is true. All beauty is truth. True features make a face beautiful, true proportions make the beauty of architecture, true measures the beauty of music. Harmony is the essential feature underlying both goodness and beauty. Harmonious coordination of parts into one whole makes for beauty in the physical world, while symmetry and proportion in our sentiments and actions produce that inner beauty, for which morality is only a synonym.[1] The most delightful beauty pursued by virtuosos and celebrated by poets is the beauty drawn from real life. The most natural beauty in the world is honesty and moral truth. "Who can admire the outward beauties, and not recur instantly to the inward, which are the most real and essential, the most naturally affecting, and of the highest pleasure as well as profit and advantage?"[2] Surely there is *workmanship* and *truth* in actions. "The real honest man has honesty in view, and instead of outward forms or symmetries is struck with that of inward character, the harmony and numbers of the heart, the beauty of the affections, which form the manners and conduct of a truly social life."[3]

[1] Cf. especially "Characteristics," III, 180 ff.
[2] "Characteristics," III, 185.
[3] "Characteristics," III, 34.

And since the harmony of beauty is the model for the harmony of spiritual life, so harmonious development of the individual based upon esthetics becomes Shaftesbury's moral ideal.[4] We should, he claims, seek for the beautiful in everything, and by attaining beauty we shall also attain true wisdom; for whoever contemplates beauty must be good, and a real master of beauty knows that sensuality is ugly and that only in beauty are there reason and order. Such a man may be said to be the architect of his own life and happiness. Virtue and art are closely related. Life is the highest art, and the wise man is the artist of his own life by placing in himself the lasting foundation of order, peace and harmony.

And so nature is conceived by Shaftesbury as an artist every one of whose works is conditioned not by mere arbitrariness but by pure inner adaptation of means to end. The beauty which consists of uniformity amidst variety is found by Shaftesbury in the universe and is also required by him in a work of art. Only he is a true artist who, like the "sovereign artist" or the "universal plastic nature," creates a whole where everything stands in mutual connection and where, in conformance with nature, the individual parts are properly distributed and subordinated.[5]

The same demands are also made of the poet. The true poet, says Shaftesbury, is a "second maker," a "just Prometheus."[6] He also forms a coherent and proportioned whole "with due subjection and subordinacy of constituent parts.

[4] Schiller in his "Aesthetische Briefe," also advocates esthetic culture as a means of advancing morality.

[5] Goethe also attached great importance to the analogy between art and nature. Thus in his "Fragment über die Natur" (1781–2) he says of nature: "Sie ist die einzige Künstlerin. Jedes ihrer Werke hat ein eigenes Wesen, jede ihrer Erscheinungen den isoliertesten Begriff, und doch macht alles eins aus." Goethe's Werke in the *Jubiläums-Ausgabe*, XXXIX, 3.

[6] Goethe was strongly impressed by this notion. In the introduction to the 36th volume of the *Jubiläums-Ausgabe* of Goethe's works, O. Walzel calls attention to this similarity between Shaftesbury and Goethe (cf. p. xxxiii, ff.). Wilhelm Dilthey asserts that Goethe was never a strict *Spinozist* and that he always stood nearer to Shaftesbury than to Spinoza. Cf. "Aus der Zeit der Spinoza-studien Goethes" in *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*, VII (1894), 333.

He notes the boundaries of the passions and knows their exact tones and measures; by which he justly represents them, makes the sublime of sentiments and actions and distinguishes the beautiful from the deformed, the amiable from the odious. The moral artist, who can thus imitate the Creator and is thus knowing in the inward form and structure of his fellow-creatures, will hardly be found unknowing in himself or at a loss in those numbers which make the harmony of a mind. For knavery is mere dissonance and disproportion. And tho' villains may have natural capacities of action, 'tis impossible that true judgment and ingenuity should reside where harmony and honesty have no being." In every writing relating to men and manners the author must understand the "beauty of sentiments, the sublime of characters and that natural grace which gives to every action its attractive charm. If he has no eye or ear for these interior numbers he will not be able to understand any better that exterior proportion and symmetry of composition which constitutes a legitimate piece. And thus the sense of inward numbers, the knowledge and practice of the social virtues, and the familiarity and favor of the *moral graces* are essential to the character of a deserving artist and a just favorite of the muses. Thus are the arts and virtues naturally friends: and thus the science of virtuosos and that of virtue itself becomes, in a manner, one and the same."[7]

Shaftesbury distinguishes between material and spiritual beauty, between the "beautified" and the "beautifying." "Body can no way be the cause of beauty to itself nor govern nor regulate itself. Must not that, therefore, which regulates and orders it, be the principle of beauty to it? And what must that be? Mind, I suppose; for what can it be else?"[8] Beauty as an expression of inner spiritual greatness is a dominant thought with Shaftesbury. He distinguishes three orders of beauty: First, dead forms having neither action nor intelligence, such as are formed by man or nature; secondly, forms that have action and intelligence and may be called forming forms, such as love and honesty and the like; thirdly, the order

[7] "Characteristics," I, 207–8, 336–8.
[8] *Ibid.*, II, 404–5.

of beauty which fashions minds and contains all the beauties fashioned by these minds. This third order is the original fountain of all beauty, the divine beauty.

Some of the doctrines just described were also held by Socrates as represented by Xenophon, Plato, Plotinus, the famous expounder of Neo-Platonism, and Bruno. Socrates considers all manifestations of virtue as good and beautiful[9] and emphasizes the superiority of spiritual to physical beauty.[10] Plato identifies the good with the beautiful and distinguishes three orders of beauty, physical, intellectual and spiritual.[11] In Plotinus we have the following parallels to Shaftesbury's philosophy: the relation of inward to outward beauty;[12] the beauty of virtue and the enthusiasm with which this beauty inspires one;[13] finally, the well-known doctrine of the three orders of beauty.[14] The connection between morality and the harmony manifested in the universe,[15] the superiority of spiritual beauty[16] and the distinguishing of three orders of beauty[17] are also found in Bruno. The harmony of beauty and the harmony of morality are brought into close connection also by Schiller. Schiller's ideal of the "schöne Seele," his esthetic view of life, his notion of the moral grace of the harmonious man,—all these are doctrines which unite Schiller with Shaftes-

9 "Xenophons Erinnerungen an Socrates," German translation by C. E. Finkh (in a series entitled "Griechische Prosaiker in neuen Übersetzungen," Stuttgart, 1827), I, 547–8.

10 "Xenophons Gastmahl," Wieland's translation in the *Attisches Museum*, IV1, 136, 137, 141.

11 Plato's "Banquet," Vol. III of the works of Plato (English translation by George Burgess, London, 1859), pp. 518, 530–1, 537–8, 553. See also Robert Zimmermann: "Geschichte der Aesthetik als philosophische Wissenschaft," Wien, 1858; I, 5, 30, 82–4.

12 "Select works of Plotinus," English translation by Thomas Taylor, 1909, pp. 76–7 (ninth book of the 2d Ennead).

13 "Les Ennéades de Plotin," French translation by M. N. Bouillet, Paris, 1857–61 (in 3 volumes). See Vol. I, the 6th book of the 1st Ennead, pp. 104 ff.

14 Bouillet, III, 110 ff. (8th book of the 5th Ennead) and Taylor, pp. 183–4.

15 Bruno's "Heroic Enthusiasts" (1585), English translation by L. Williams (in 2 parts: Part I, London, 1887; Part II, London, 1889). See Introduction, pp. 20, 22 and Part I, 163.

16 *Ibid.*, Part I, 71–2, 75–6.

17 *Ibid.*, Part II, 7–8, Part I, 134.

bury, while at the same time they part the ways of Schiller and Kant.

2. *Moral Sense*

After discussing the import and power of beauty the next question is, whence the notion of beauty comes. According to Shaftesbury it is grounded in our nature and constitutes a very essential part thereof, for without this "imagination" or "conceit" the world would be but a "dull circumstance" and life a "sorry pass-time." "The gallant sentiments, the elegant fancys, the belle-passions, which have this beauty in view, would be set aside, and leave us probably no other employment than that of satisfying our coarsest appetites at the cheapest rate."[18]

We have an innate sense of beauty, which makes us appreciate a beautiful form the moment we see it, and which makes even the child prefer the symmetrical round ball to the irregular figure. Our inward eye distinguishes between the fair and unfair, between the lovely and detestable. "Nothing is more strongly imprinted on our minds or more closely interwoven with our souls than the sense of order and proportion. What a difference there is between harmony and discord! Between an organized body and that which is ungoverned and accidental!"[19]

Inasmuch, however, as the good and beautiful are one and the same, so the faculty that judges of beauty is at the same time the faculty of moral approbation.[20] Shaftesbury makes no distinction between an esthetic sense and a moral sense.[21]

[18] "Characteristics," III, 31.

[19] *Ibid.*, II, 284.

[20] In his "Moralische Vorlesungen" Gellert professes belief in a moral sense. Our heart, he says, discloses to us the disgraceful and the praiseworthy, for "wir haben in unserer Natur nicht nur das Licht der Vernunft, das uns nötigt ein göttliches Gesetz der Tugend zu erkennen, sondern wir besitzen in unsrem Herzen auch ein Vermögen, durch welches wir empfinden können, ob etwas edel oder unedel ist, erlaubt oder strafbar." Gellert's Sämmtliche Schriften (1867), VI, 33.

[21] Shaftesbury's "moral sense" is severely atacked by Berkeley in his "Alciphron, or the Minute Philosopher in 7 Dialogues" (the first American edition 1803, from the 4th London edition). Alciphron represents Shaftes-

"Is there a natural beauty in figures? and is there not as natural a one in actions? No sooner the eye opens upon figures, the ear to sound, than straight the beautiful results, and grace and harmony are known and acknowledged. No sooner are actions viewed, no sooner the human affections and passions discerned, than straight an inward eye distinguishes and sees the fair and shapely, the amiable and admirable apart from the deformed, the foul or the despicable."[22] Sanction of custom and religion cannot alter the immutable and independent nature of worth and virtue. A man "avoids being nasty even when nobody is present."[23] He is honest because his nature abhors dishonesty, because he has a proper sense of what is becoming him as a human being. The force of nature can by no means be denied. Every one is a virtuoso in a higher or lower degree. Every one pursues a grace and courts a Venus of some kind or other. The *Venustum,* the *Honestum* and the *Decorum* of things will force its way.

This innate moral and esthetic faculty is also described by Shaftesbury as a "taste" or "relish." Most of our pleasures in life could not be relished, he says, if it were not for this "taste." Without it we should be unable to admire a poem, a picture, a charming shape. Without it love would be the lowest thing in nature. If brutality, he adds, is a taste, so is humanity a taste, and who would not choose the amiable in preference to the odious?

3. *Man is a Social Creature. Virtue is Natural and is the Highest Good*

In close connection with his "moral sense" Shaftesbury develops the doctrine that man is by nature virtuous,[24] that he

bury's view and Berkeley makes him remark again and again that man must not stop to examine or to inspect things, that he has a moral sense, a *je ne sais quoi,* something not to be inquired into. Euphranor, one of the speakers, then condemns the ideas of moral sense and moral beauty as "mere bubble and pretense." Cf. 3d dialogue, pp. 124, 138.

[22] "Characteristics," II, 414.

[23] *Ibid.,* I, 124.

[24] Also to Goethe morality is "Angeschaffene und angeborene schöne Natur," Boucke: "Goethe's Weltanschaung auf historischer Grundlage," Stuttgart, 1907. See p. 417.

is a social creature joined with society neither by force nor by self-interest, but by pure natural affection. This part of Shaftesbury's philosophy may fairly be considered as a protest against Hobbes' views of society and government.[25]

Hobbes' philosophy of society is rooted in thorough-going self-interest. Religion, sociability and virtue are deduced by him from the baser side of human nature. Religion he bases upon ignorance, fear and superstition. He claims virtue to be the effect of mere self-interest and regards fear as the chief passion inducing men to observe the laws. A strong organized power is according to him the chief means of holding society in peace. The state of nature, he says, is a state of constant warfare of everybody against everybody else, a state in which the notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice, have no place whatever.[26]

How different are Shaftesbury's views on human society! "There are certain moral species so striking and of such force over our natures that when they present themselves they bear down all contrary opinion and passion. Of these virtue is the chief since it is the most naturally and strongly affecting."[27] Shaftesbury then identifies morality with genuine nature. "If eating and drinking be natural, herding is so too. If any appetite or sense be natural the *sense of fellowship* is the same."[28] Every creature has a constant relation to his species. Parental kindness, care for posterity, love of company,—all these are just as natural as it is for the lungs to breathe or for the stomach to digest. Man, therefore, is by nature sociable[29] and

[25] Hobbes (1588–1679) began in 1642 the publication of his philosophical rudiments concerning government and society with a Latin treatise on the citizen. In 1650 he published a treatise on human nature and on the body politic. In 1651 he summed up his teachings in the "Leviathan."

[26] "Leviathan" (3d edition, 1887), London, Glasgow and New York, No. 21 in Morley's *Universal Library*, pp. 58, 78, 75, 65, 137, 138, 99, 124, 72, 64–6.

[27] "Characteristics," III, 33.

[28] *Ibid.*, I, 110.

[29] That man is a social animal, that he derives more convenience than injury from social life, that he cannot lead a solitary life—all this is also upheld by Spinoza. See Ethics, Part IV, Prop. XXXV, Schol. And yet, strange to say, Spinoza's doctrine of the state of nature is similar to the one advanced by Hobbes. Spinoza also argues that in the state of nature

he was not forced into a social state against his will. Deprived of his natural affection and separated from his fellow-men he cannot properly be called man. The preservation and raising of the child establishes a strong union between husband and wife. Man cannot live in such fellowship with his partner and offspring without the art of storing and building and other kinds of economy. If a whole household is thus naturally developed the next natural step is the development of the household into a tribe and then into a nation; thus "out of society and community man never did nor ever can subsist."[80]

It is quite natural to expect that Hobbes' views should meet nothing but resentment on the part of Shaftesbury. Several times he refers sarcastically to Hobbes,[81] and certain passages in the "Characteristics" are directed specifically against him. It is ridiculous, says Shaftesbury, to think that man is obliged to act honestly only while he is under a formal government. Our modern philosophers, he continues, claim that society was founded on a compact and that every man promised then to surrender his private right. Yes, but this very promise was made in the state of nature, and that which could make a promise obligatory in the state of nature must make all other acts of humanity as much our real duty and natural part. Faith, justice, honesty must have been as early as the state of nature, or they could never have been at all. He who was free to any villainy before his contract will make as free with his contract when he thinks fit. The *natural knave* has the same reason to be a *civil one*. There can be no human state which is not social, "for sooner may you divest the creature of any other feeling or affection than that toward society and his likeness." Which state shall we call nature's own? Man in his development has gone through many changes and each change was as natural as the other. Hence, many different states of nature must be reckoned "or if one,

every man thinks only of his own advantage, that in the state of nature there is nothing that corresponds to justice or injustice. This doctrine is developed fully in the "Tractatus Politicus" and is treated briefly in the "Ethics," Part IV, Prop. XXXVII, Schol. II.

[80] "Characteristics," II, 317–19.

[81] "Characteristics," I, 88–9, 119; II, 319–20.

it can only be that in which nature was perfect and her growth complete. Here where she rested and attained her end, here must be her state or nowhere. Could she then maintain and propagate the species, such as it now is, without fellowship or community?"[82]

In closest connection with Shaftesbury's sociableness of man and the naturalness of virtue, we find the doctrine that virtue is the highest good,[83] that to be wicked is to be miserable, that an establishment of right affection and integrity is an advancement of one's own interest.[84] To Shaftesbury individual interest is inseparable from common welfare, and the discharge of public duties identical with the advancement of personal benefit. There are (1) "natural affections" leading to the public good, (2) "self-affections," which concern only the private individual and (3) "unnatural affections," tending neither to public nor private good. A person lacking the natural affections cannot be happy, for if his mind is turned away from love and kindness he is filled with aversion, ill-humor and fear. The greatest misery is often caused by ill-temper; vicious acts make the person a real sufferer. "Through certain humors or passions and from temper merely a man may be completely miserable, let his outward circumstances be ever so fortunate."[85]

The pleasures of the mind are superior to the pleasures of the body. Mental enjoyments are either the very natural affections themselves in their immediate operation, or they proceed from these natural affections as their direct effects. In the first place, we conceive great pleasure when our mind is under an affection of love, pity or anything else of a social

[82] *Ibid.*, I, 109; II, 312, 313, 316.

[83] The same doctrine is also emphasized by Spinoza. See "Ethics," Part II, Prop. XLIX, Schol.; Part IV, Prop. XXIV and LXIII; Part V, Prop. XIX and XLII.

[84] Socrates also taught that it is better to suffer injustice than to inflict it, that sin is a mistake, that happiness is the necessary consequence of virtue. (Cf. Windelband's "Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie," 4th edition, 1907, pp. 64–6.) Plato expresses a similar thought in his "Banquet." The good, he says is produced by justice and temperance and procures for us every kind of happiness. Cf. Plato's works, English translation by Burgess, London, 1859, III, 506.

[85] "Characteristics," II, 84.

character. Secondly, we have a natural feeling of joy when we see or hear of the happiness of others. The consciousness of merited esteem is another great enjoyment which proceeds from the natural affections. Even the most selfish person receives the greatest satisfaction from admiration and esteem which he feels to have been honestly deserved. And so "out of participation in the pleasures of others and belief of meriting well from others arise more than nine tenths of whatever is enjoyed in life."[86]

Nature demands of us the exercise of our faculties. Without action the body is weakened, without its natural exercise the mind is diseased. Men living in luxury and other indulgences of sense are made to pay for such a life; their failure to apply themselves to any occupation, either common labor, or science, or public affairs, is directly followed by a settled idleness, by an inactivity which produces total disturbance and irregularity in their systems. Nothing else is as necessary as exercise, and no other exercise is as essential as that of natural or social affection. A creature which is so dependent upon society must be very unfortunate when it loses that social feeling, which "is implanted in our natures, interwoven with our other passions and essential to that regular motion and course of our affections on which our happiness and self-enjoyment so immediately depend."[87]

All this applies in a negative way to what Shaftesbury calls "self-affections" and "unnatural affections." Thus, excessive love of life leads to cowardice, and cowardice leads to excessive fear, which oppresses the individual even when no dangers threaten. The pursuit of luxury becomes in the course of time an unnatural appetite, which increases the impatience of abstainment and lessens the pleasure of indulgence. An immoderate passion for praise renders a person incapable of sustaining the slightest disappointment. Excessive love of rest and indolence results immediately in ill humor and languor, which destroy all enjoyments. Anger and resentment, while necessary in a moderate degree for self-defense, become injurious

[86] *Ibid.*, II, 109.
[87] *Ibid.*, II, 139.

when carried to an extreme. They fill the mind with a desire for revenge, which in the course of time becomes a sort of disease.

Equally injurious are the "unnatural affections," such as taking pleasure in the calamity of others, a gay delight in injuring others, malice, envy, treachery, ingratitude, a general hatred of mankind. All these are entirely groundless passions. Agitated by such passions, man knows neither rest nor comfort, encounters hatred everywhere, finds horror wherever he goes. Such a mind is a real desert. If banishment from one's country is so terrible a thing, "what must it be to feel this inward banishment, this real estrangement from human commerce; and to be after this manner in a desert even when in the midst of society? What must it be to live in this disagreement with everything, this opposition to the order and government of the Universe?"[38]

Shaftesbury warns nevertheless against excessive "natural affection," and emphasizes the necessity of a moderate degree of "self-affection."[39] The former, when excessive, and the latter, when too weak, are both injurious. Whenever a "natural affection" is strong enough to make a person neglect other equally important affections, it defeats its own end. Religion, when it becomes such an excessively dominating passion, prevents a man from discharging his earthly duties; in such a case religion is a vicious affection. An excessive love for the child may destroy the mother and, consequently, the child. A person must not be too self-forgetful. By failing to preserve himself, man injures society, just as an eye, when failing to close itself against an imminent danger, injures the entire body. Self-preservation becomes in this respect self-love after the truest manner. "'Tis the height of wisdom to be rightly selfish, and to value life, as far as life is good, belongs as much to courage as to discretion."[40]

[38] *Ibid.*, II, 171.

[39] So Spinoza emphasizes the necessity of self-preservation. "Ethics," Part IV, Prop. XXI and XXII.

[40] "Characteristics," I, 121.

4. *Deism. Virtue and Religion. Culture as a Means of Developing Character. Philosophy as the Problem of Daily Life*

Although condemned by contemporaries and successors as an unbeliever, Shaftesbury was nevertheless filled with a profound religious feeling. The question now comes up as to his relation to the movement of so-called deism. There is a great variety of opinion on this question. Thus, Alfred Biese, in his "Deutsche Literaturgeschichte,"[41] considers Shaftesbury only as the leading propagator of the doctrines of deism. Hermann Hettner, on the other hand, considers A. Collins, W. Lyons and J. Toland as the leading deists and discusses Shaftesbury under a different head.[42] Diderot strongly objects to classing Shaftesbury with the Asgils, Tindals, and Tolands, to whom he refers as "mauvais protestants et misérables écrivains."[43] T. Fowler calls Shaftesbury "a deist of the right, who was fully as much occupied in presenting the positive as the negative parts of his doctrine, the latter being rather insinuated than openly avowed."[44] A. Wolfstieg, in his article "Englischer und französischer Deismus und deutsche Aufklärung," examines the English movement chiefly from its negative side and characterizes it as consisting of "shallow rationalism," "short sighted naturalism" and "gross free-thinking." He considers Shaftesbury as a prophet of the movement, as the one who directed the movement into the right channel.[45] We may consider Shaftesbury as a deist, if we accept G. V. Lechler's definition of deism as "an elevation, by means of free investigation, of natural religion to the standard of positive religion."[46] Certain it is that Shaftesbury represented the very best side of the movement, which had good and bad elements; for, while

[41] München, 1907, I, 432.

[42] "Geschichte der englischen Literatur" (5th edition, Braunschweig, 1894), Book II, Chapter 3.

[43] *Discours préliminaire* to his translation of Shaftesbury's "Inquiry." Oeuvres Complètes (by J. Assézat), I, 15.

[44] "Shaftesbury and Hutcheson," New York, 1883, p. 162.

[45] *Monatshefte der Comenius-Gesellschaft*, XVII, 141 ff.

[46] "Geschichte des englischen Deismus," Stuttgart and Tübingen, 1841, p. 460.

he was strongly opposed to theological subtleties, he never declared open war against religion.

Believing as he did that virtue has its own peculiar force, Shaftesbury also maintained that man "is not only born to virtue, friendship and honesty, but also to religion, piety, adoration and a generous surrender of his mind to whatever happens from that supreme cause, which he acknowledges entirely just and perfect."[47] The conception of God, he says, as the best model of excellence leads to a stronger affection for virtue; belief in the constant guidance and omnipresence of God increases the shame of a wrong act and enhances the glory of a good act. The hope for future reward and fear of future punishment have their advantages. By starting out to practice virtue for the sake of reward one may finally come to the point of practicing virtue for its own sake. We cannot have a powerful feeling of virtue, unless we are aware of the presence of goodness and beauty in the world; if, like the atheist, we consider the universe a pattern of disorder, we cannot believe virtue to be naturally good and advantageous. "And thus the perfection and height of virtue must be owing to the belief of a God."[48]

But if virtue is strengthened by religion it is by no means the product of religion. Virtue, Shaftesbury asserts, is independent of and prior to religion. Our natural sense of right and wrong, which we have a long time before acquiring a religious belief, cannot be affected either by theism, or atheism, or polytheism, or demonism.[49] Any one doing good out of the hope for reward or fear of punishment is not virtuous, but merely goes through a servile obedience. Theologians have often injured the cause of religion by making future reward

[47] "Characteristics," III, 224.

[48] *Ibid.*, II, 76. Spinoza expresses a similar thought: True belief in God increases the inclination to virtue, etc. See "Ethics," Part IV, XXVIII.

[49] Shaftesbury defines these four terms as follows: To believe that everything is governed for the best by a good and permanent mind, is to be a theist. To believe that everything is governed by chance and not by design, is to be an atheist. To believe in several superior minds is to be a polytheist. To believe that the governing mind or minds are not necessarily good but can also act from mere fancy, is to be a demonist. "Characteristics," II, 11.

and punishment an essential element thereof. Before arriving at the conception of supreme goodness, which is in God, a clear idea must first be obtained concerning goodness itself; before coming to the idea of the reward of virtue we must first have a clear notion of the merit of virtue. "We begin surely at the wrong end when we would prove merit by favor and order by a deity."[50] First of all it must be shown that "virtue is really something in itself and in the nature of things: not arbitrary nor constituted from without, or dependent on custom, fancy or will, not even on the supreme will itself, which can no way govern it: but being necessarily good, is governed by it and is ever uniform with it."[51] Man should not be referred all the time to the hereafter. Belief in a future state must come as a result of satisfaction with the present state. It is in such a process that men must be won to the belief in God and hereafter. "Being thus far become proselytes, they might be prepared for that divine love which our religion would teach them, when once they should embrace its precepts and form themselves to its sacred character."[52]

There is certainly nothing in all this that savors of atheism.[53] Nevertheless, Shaftesbury's refusal to base religion upon the idea of future rewards and punishments[54] has been misinterpreted by his opponents as a denial of the hereafter.[55] His deduction of the belief in God from the strength of virtue and the harmony of the universe has been taken as an attack on Christianity.[56] Among the divines of the 18th century there

[50] *Ibid.*, II, 267.

[51] *Ibid.*, II, 267.

[52] *Ibid.*, II, 279.

[53] Herder defends Shaftesbury against the accusations of atheism. See letter to Merck, Sept. 12, 1770. "Herders Lebensbild," III[1], 110–11.

[54] Some of the leading passages in which Shaftesbury speaks of future rewards and punishments are: I, 97, 127; II, 55, 57, 60, 63–66, 120, 175–76, 272, 279.

[55] John Leland defends the doctrine of future reward and punishment and claims that Shaftesbury's ideas on the subject tend to have a dangerous influence. See Leland's "View of the principal Deistical Writers" (in several letters to a friend), 3d edition, London, 1757, Letter V, 49–52, 54–5; VI, 66–70.

[56] In his "Dedication to the free-thinkers" Warburton attacks Shaftesbury as a free-thinker and speaks of his "hatred of Christianity." Mande-

was a tendency, caused probably by fear of deism, to consider as irreligious any moral system which appealed to other sanctions than those of the opinions of society or future rewards and punishments. W. Paley even defines virtue as "the doing of good to mankind, in obedience to the will of God, and for the sake of everlasting happiness."[57] Likewise Berkeley emphasizes the necessity of the belief in future rewards and punishments on the basis that the mere beauty of virtue is insufficient to induce ordinary men to practice virtue.[58]

In spite of the fact that man is by nature social and virtuous, although virtue has its own peculiar source and is independent even of religion, nevertheless Shaftesbury emphasizes again and again the necessity of culture and learning as a means of advancing the cause of morality. It cannot be denied, he says, that the perfection of grace and comeliness in action can be found mainly among people of a liberal education. Art, science, and learning in general should have the development of character as their chief aim. Our studies and exercises are useless unless their object is our duty to mankind or obedience to our Creator.[59]

This and nothing else is Shaftesbury's criterion of good learning.[60] This explains why his philosophical activity was confined to ethics, esthetics and religion, and why he had no taste for metaphysics, logic or even for psychology, except

ville also attacks Shaftesbury as an enemy of Christianity. "Shaftesbury," we are told, "attacked the bible itself, and by ridiculing many passages of Holy Writ he seems to have endeavored to sap the foundation of all revealed religion with design of establishing Heathen virtue on the ruins of Christianity." In the 5th edition (1729) of the "Fable of the Bees," II, 6th dialogue between Horatio and Cleomenes, p. 432.

[57] "Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy," I, 43.

[58] In his "Alciphron" Berkeley severely attacks Shaftesbury as an unbeliever. He also declares that Shaftesbury considered Providence, immortality of the soul and future rewards and punishments as fraudulent impositions. 3d dialogue, p. 120 ff., 140 ff. In all these statements, however, Shaftesbury is grossly misrepresented by Berkeley.

[59] "Letters to a young man at the University," Letter I.

[60] Shaftesbury's influence appears in Gellert's lecture "von dem Einflusze der schönen Wissenschaften auf das Herz und die Sitten," V, 63 ff., in Sämmtliche Schriften, 1867, and in Herder's essay "Über den Einflusz der schönen in die höheren Wissenschaften," Suphan edition, IX, 289 ff. Both argue that the object of learning is the development of character.

in so far as it affords a basis for ethics. He speaks with bitter contempt of metaphysics and advocates the study of it only for the purpose of discovering that no wisdom is to be learned from it. The metaphysicians he considers as "moon-blind wits who may be said to renounce daylight and extinguish the bright visible outward world by allowing us to know nothing beside what we can prove by strict and formal demonstration."[61] Philosophy is to him a problem of daily life and is defined by him as the "study of inward numbers and proportions," exhibiting in life the beauty of virtue and "symmetry" of morals.[62] Philosophy is "the study of happiness"; hence, every man philosophizes in some manner or other. "Every deliberation concerning our interest, every correction of our taste," every choice of the good and the proper,—all this belongs to the province of philosophy. To philosophize is but to elevate good breeding or manners of life. "The sum of philosophy is to learn what is just in society and beautiful in nature. The taste of beauty and the relish of what is decent, just and amiable perfects the character of the gentleman and the philosopher, and the study of such a taste or relish will be ever the great employment and concern of him who covets as well to be wise and good as agreeable and polite."[63] The pretender to philosophy who cannot determine this affair "remains in respect to philosophy what a clown or coxcomb is in respect to breeding and behaviour."[64]

And so Shaftesbury laments the fact that nowadays philosophy is not active in the world. In ancient times, he says, reason and wit were studied not merely in schools but in the world. Philosophy was then a subject of discussion in public affairs as well as in private conversations. Nowadays, however, philosophy has been confined to places of learning, and only empirics and pedantic sophists are her pupils. Mere scholastics are concerned with moral inquiries, and it is con-

[61] "Characteristics," III, 210–11.

[62] *Ibid.*, III, 184.

[63] *Ibid.*, II, 438 and III, 161–2.

[64] *Ibid.*, III, 162. Herder was very much impressed by Shaftesbury in his capacity as a reconciler of philosophy with humanity. See "Herders Lebensbild," I8, 211.

sidered improper to bring such discussion into ordinary conversations. Shaftesbury speaks contemptuously of pedantry[65] and laments the failure of university learning to meet the demands of real culture. Our modern education, he says, is far from being a liberal education, because it does not "unite the scholar-part with that of the real gentleman and man of breeding." Exercises necessary for the development of a liberal character are neglected, and letters are "confined to the commerce and mean fellowship of bearded boys."[66] Consequently "to be a virtuoso is a higher step towards the becoming of a man of virtue and good sense than the being what in this age we call a scholar."[67]

5. *Eudemonism. Virtuoso*

Shaftesbury always set up the intrinsic worth of virtue as the only reason for embracing it, its natural grace and invitedness as the only proper cause for practicing it. A virtuous act should be the result not of a conquest of an evil passion but rather of the absence of that passion. A man overcoming temptations and evil propensities is undoubtedly virtuous; his virtue, however, is all the greater if he is entirely free from these propensities. A man may subdue here and there his evil desires, but the presence of an appetite for evil will certainly influence his conduct. "A good creature is such a one as by the natural temper or bent of his affections is carried primarily and immediately to good and against ill."[68] The height of morality is to be carried to virtue as to something sweet and pleasant, to conceive of virtue as the greatest happiness, to constitute its practice not as a matter of stern duty or self-denial, but as a real pleasure.

[65] Bruno also attacks pedants and ascetics, points out the absurdity of their systems and speaks sarcastically of their vain and pretentious aspirations. "Heroic Enthusiasts," Part II, p. 58.

[66] In the 5th dialogue of his "Alciphron" Berkeley resents Shaftesbury's attitude to university learning. He exaggerates Shaftesbury's view by letting Alciphron-Shaftesbury condemn the universities as seats of corruption and prejudice. He also mentions, through the mouth of Crito, that Shaftesbury considered the "learned professors" as bearded boys. See pp. *222* and *227*.

[67] "Characteristics," I, 333.

[68] *Ibid.*, II, 26.

This doctrine was attacked by Mandeville and Schleiermacher. The former characterizes it as a doctrine opening the way to hypocrisy,[69] the latter refers to it as a "Lustphilosophie."[70] The most powerful and most systematic protest against Shaftesburian eudemonism is found in Kant's categorical imperative, which makes morality a matter of stern duty and sets up self-denial as the essence of virtue.[71] Schiller, although a disciple of Kant, recognizes the rigorism of the categorical imperative.[72] The practice of virtue out of pure inclination becomes Schiller's moral ideal, and under Shaftesbury's influence he develops some of the leading doctrines of his philosophical essays.[73] Schiller finally arrives at his ideal of the completely developed and esthetically-moral man, the "schöne Seele," which he defines as follows: "In einer schönen Seele ist es also, wo Sinnlichkeit und Vernunft, Pflicht und Neigung harmonieren, und Grazie ist ihr Ausdruck in der Erscheinung."[74] This "schöne Seele" establishes a close alliance between Schiller and Shaftesbury, for the former's ideal corresponds in general to the latter's "virtuoso."

Shaftesbury's virtuoso-ideal may fairly be considered the culmination of his moral-esthetic philosophy. In Miscellany III, Chap. I, we have the following definition of the virtuosi. "The virtuosi are the real fine gentlemen, the lovers of art and

[69] Mandeville's: "Search into the nature of society," in the 5th edition of the "Fable of the Bees," I, 380.

[70] "So erscheint die anglicanische Schule des Shaftesbury, wieviel auch dort immer von der Tugend die Rede ist, dennoch als gänzlich der Lust ergeben." See "Grundlinien einer Kritik der bisherigen Sittenlehre," in the edition of his works, Berlin, 1846, XXIV, 41.

[71] Kant's *Categorical Imperative* is discussed briefly in "Kritik der reinen Vernunft" (edition of Kehrbach), pp. 613–15, "Kritik der Urteilskraft" (Kehrbach ed.), 338, 346. An elaborate treatment of the doctrine is found in "Kritik der praktischen Vernunft" (4th edition, Riga, 1797). See especially pp. 36–8, 40–5, 49–57, 64–7, 105, 112, 128, 130, 135, 142–8, 150–1, 166–7.

[72] Letter to Goethe, Aug. 17, 1795: "Schillers Briefe," edited by F. Jonas, IV, 236.

[73] The essays, where Shaftesbury is especially in evidence, are: "Über den moralischen Nutzen aesthetischer Sitten," "Über Anmut und Würde," "Über das Erhabene," "Briefe über die aesthetische Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts."

[74] "Über Anmut und Würde," Goedeke edition, X, 104.

ingenuity; such as have seen the world and informed themselves of the manners and customs of the several nations of Europe, searched into their antiquities and records; considered their police, laws and constitutions; observed the situation, strength and ornaments of their cities, their principal arts, studies, architecture, sculpture, painting, music, and their taste in poetry, learning, language and conversation."[75] Shaftesbury's virtuoso, however, stands for a much broader concept than the one conveyed by this definition. The "virtuoso" is not merely the lover of art and culture but the one who through his culture and love of art has become a life-artist. If, Shaftesbury asks, we strive to attain proficiency in other arts, why should we not work for the same end in the highest of arts, namely, life? The "virtuoso" lives out to the very fullest extent his whole personality, develops all his faculties, practices virtue out of pure natural instinct. He is the harmonious and esthetically-developed man, the good and beautiful individual.

Shaftesbury's virtuososhiip corresponds in general to the Greek *kalokagathia* especially developed by Socrates;[76] to Bruno's "heroic enthusiasm," which consists of a passionate love for truth and of "a natural fervor excited by the love of the divine"[77] and to Goethe's ideal of the totality of moral and esthetic education.[78]

6. *Soliloquy. Wit and Humor. Enthusiasm. Raillery*

While Shaftesbury was a great advocate of social intercourse, he attached great importance to what he calls "soliloquy." By means of "soliloquy" or self-investigation, he says, we practice upon ourselves the art of advising and thinking. By virtue of "soliloquy" man becomes two distinct persons:

[75] "Characteristics," III, 156.

[76] To be discussed later in connection with Wieland's "Virtuoso."

[77] "Heroic Enthusiasts," Part I, 70 and 130.

[78] This similarity between Shaftesbury and Goethe is pointed out by O. Walzel in his introduction to Schiller's philosophical writings ("Säkular-Ausgabe" of Schiller's Works, Vol. XI), p. x, and by E. A. Boucke in his "Goethes Weltanschauung auf historischer Grundlage" (Stuttgart, 1907). See especially pp. 423, 427, 430.

he becomes a preceptor and pupil, teaching and learning at the same time. All great minds have used this practice; all great poets, philosophers and orators are frequenters of woods and river-banks, where they let their "fancies evaporate."[79] "It is the hardest thing in the world to be a good thinker without being a strong self-examiner and thorough paced dialogist in this solitary way."[80] According to the old doctrine each man had within himself a demon or guardian-spirit as a constant companion. This old demon-conception meant nothing else than this: "that we had each of us a patient in ourself, that we were properly our own subjects of practice, and that we then became true practitioners, when by virtue of an intimate *recess* we could discover a certain *duplicity* of soul and divide ourselves into *two parties*."[81] One of these two parties is the governor and inspector of our fancies and opinions, while the other has nothing else to do but to render obedience to this counselor and inspector. It must, however, be borne in mind that "soliloquy" or self-discourse "is wholly impracticable without a previous commerce with the world; and the larger the commerce is, the more practicable and improving the other is likely to prove."[82] It is for this reason that a mystic, or a recluse religionist, or a hermit, can never truly be by himself. None of these is capable of soliloquizing, because he is without social intercourse.

"Soliloquy"[83] attains the desired end because man has real reverence for himself. When he is in the company of his inspector, or guardian-spirit, when he appears before his close companion, he cannot endure to be a rascal. In company a man frequently uses a certain tone of pleasantry, and sometimes he even defends vice; but he never dares do this when he

[79] "Characteristics," I, 161.

[80] *Ibid.*, I, 168.

[81] *Ibid.*, I, 169.

[82] *Ibid.*, III, 155.

[83] In his "Alciphron" Berkeley ridicules Shaftesbury's "soliloquy." "Shaftesbury," we are told, "hath found out that a man may argue with himself: and not only with himself but also with notions, sentiments, and vices, which, by a marvellous prosopopoeia, he converts into so many ladies; and so converted, he confutes and confounds them in a divine strain." 5th dialogue, pp. 225–6.

is by himself. The moment he begins to question himself, his better nature triumphs. He asks himself whether he is really honest or only a mere pretender; whether he is justified in promoting his own interest at the expense of others, provided he can do it with impunity. This question is answered by another question: "What reason has the greatest rogue in nature for not doing thus? Am I not then at the bottom, the same as he?" And then comes the conclusion: "If interest points me out this road, whither would humanity lead me? Quite contrary."[84]

And just as "soliloquy" is not inconsistent with social life so is "freedom of wit and humor" not only consistent with, but even essential to the cause of good government, religion and morality. Shaftesbury is essentially a cheerful philosopher, and in all phases of life he fights against the harsh, stern, gloomy and melancholy. The interference of government with religion, he says, has been detrimental to the cause of religion, and if government should meddle with science and philosophy they would become just as bad as our present theology. Also in government itself severity defeats its own end. The magistrate should have a gentler hand and instead of "incisions and amputations" he should use the "softest balms." He should sympathize with the people's passion and endeavor to cure it by cheerful means.

Good humor is the best foundation of piety and religion. Ill-humor is the cause of atheism, for it leads to ill thoughts of the Supreme Being. Of God we must think with good humor. There was a time when martyrdom was considered the highest manifestation of religion, but we have now come to the conclusion that the spirit of love and humanity is far above that of martyrdom, which makes religion a melancholy affair. Nowadays one would hardly be considered a good Christian, who when living among the Turks should disturb in any way their worship. A Protestant who would interrupt a Catholic service would now be considered a rank enthusiast or a fanatic. Treated in such a melancholy way, religion becomes a panic and a real tragedy. Because we have been taught religion in

[84] "Characteristics," I, 172–3.

a gloomy manner, we give our attention to it only when we are in adversity. In such a condition we cannot look calmly into ourselves, much less into a Being who is far above us. In such a melancholy mood we are likely to find nothing but anger and terror in God. Even the question of the existence of God should be a matter of free inquiry and familiar treatment. The acceptance of Providence on weak grounds is merely flattering God. The denial of reason and affectation of belief are the results of the stern and gloomy treatment of religion; such belief makes mere "Sycophants in religion," mere "parasites of devotion."

It is mere bigotry to suppose that important matters, such as religion and morality, cannot be treated with frankness and good humor. Recognizing the natural power of "wit and humor," the founders of religion have employed "wit and humor" as proper means of advancing true faith. For this reason the book of Psalms, Job, Proverbs, etc., contain many humorous images and much jocular wit. Some of the old heathen priests were melancholy and approached the divine service with mean grimaces and crouchings, but thereby they displayed their base thoughts of divinity. Even in those older times this kind of "sycophantic" service was despised and suspected as "knavish." Morals, grave as they are of their own nature, should be presented with an air of pleasantry. It is for that reason that the first morals were delivered to the world in parables, tales and fables; and the most consummate teachers of morals were "great tale-tellers and retainers to honest Aesop."

On the basis of this contrast between the melancholy and the cheerful, between the gloomy and good-humored, Shaftesbury distinguishes two kinds of enthusiasm, a false or melancholy and a true or good-humored enthusiasm. The passions they raise are much alike, for in a state of excitement the mind fixes itself upon any real object or mere spectre of divinity. But the former is the cause of all horror, religious persecution and superstition; the latter is at the basis of all the great and noble performances of heroes, statesmen, poets, orators, musicians and philosophers. The former is mere fanaticism, the

latter is real divine inspiration.[85] Virtue itself consists of this noble enthusiasm for everything great and beautiful.

Closely connected with his "freedom of wit and humor" is Shaftesbury's doctrine of the use of raillery as a test of truth. Just as Descartes recommends the test of doubt for the recognition of truth, so Shaftesbury urges the test of ridicule as a means of ascertaining the essentially earnest. Freedom of wit, he claims, must always be connected with freedom of raillery, which is the best remedy for all extravagances and "splenetic humors." Anything that can be shown only in a certain light is questionable; but "truth can bear all lights." The common opinion is that grave matters must be treated only in a solemn way; but we must first discover whether a thing is really grave. Very often gravity is nothing but imposture; very frequently modes, fashions and opinions, ridiculous as they are, are nevertheless kept up by gravity and solemnity. The only means of distinguishing true gravity from the false, the truly serious from the ridiculous, is to apply the test of ridicule and see whether the test will be borne. We are mere "cowards in reasoning" if we fear to submit ourselves to the test of ridicule. If we fear to apply this test to *any* thing, we have no security against the imposture of false gravity in *all* things.

It must, however, be borne in mind that raillery does not imply vulgar jest or mere buffoonery. There is, to be sure, a gross and offensive kind of raillery; but the difference between this and true raillery is as great as the difference "between hypocrisy and fair dealings, or between the most scurrilous buffoonery and the genteelest wit."[86] True raillery does not consist of mere mockery, of laughing at everything. "There is a great difference between seeking how to raise a laugh from everything and seeking in everything what justly may be laughed at. For nothing is ridiculous except what is deformed; nor is anything proof against raillery except what is handsome and just. And therefore 'tis the hardest thing in the world to deny fair honesty the use of this weapon, which

[85] Bruno also distinguishes two kinds of enthusiasm. Some, he says, display mere blindness and irrational impetuosity, others are divinely inspired. "Heroic Enthusiasts," Part I, p. 70.

[86] "Characteristics," I, 63.

can never bear an edge against herself, and bears against everything contrary."[87]

7. *Optimism*

Shaftesbury was above all an optimist and he persistently maintained that there is no positive sin or evil in the world. The inner kernel of our nature, he claims, is good. No man is entirely vicious; even the rascal refusing, out of a sense of honor, to betray his companions has some principles of virtue. "As it seems hard to pronounce of any man that he is absolutely an atheist, so it appears altogether as hard to pronounce of any man that he is absolutely corrupt and vicious."[88]

Nature never errs even when she seems to be perverse. "'Tis good which is predominant; and every corruptible and mortal nature by its mortality and corruption yields only to some better, and all in common to that best and highest nature, which is incorruptible and immortal."[89] Every creature is related to every other of its kind, it is a part of a species, the species a part of a larger system, every system a part of a whole universe. No creature can be considered wholly good or wholly ill except with reference to its relation to the entire system. Every individual imperfection disappears in the perfection of the universe; every individual discord vanishes in the harmony and order of the world.

That there is such harmony and order in the world any man with a clear vision can readily see. On examining every part and organ both in plants and animals and on clearly seeing the

[87] *Ibid.*, I, 128. Shaftesbury's opponents have utterly failed to take cognizance of his just-mentioned point of view. They misinterpreted and exaggerated his doctrine and attacked him as a mere scoffer and railleur. See, for instance, Berkeley's "Alciphron," 3d dialogue, pp. 145–6; Mandeville's "Dialogues between Horatio and Cleomenes," 5th edition of the "Fable of the Bees," II, 1st dialogue, p. 32; Leland's "View of the principal Deistical Writers," Letter V, pp. 59–64; Warburton's "Dedication to the Free-thinkers," pp. xii–xxiii. But we also have a defense of Shaftesbury's "raillery" and his general doctrine of the freedom of wit and humor. This defense comes from Herder, Shaftesbury's excellent interpreter and exponent, and is found in the "Adrastea": Suphan edition, XXIII, 143 ff., 153 ff.

[88] "Characteristics," II, 39.

[89] *Ibid.*, II, 216.

relation of the parts to the whole, one must also perceive uniformity in the whole universe. It would certainly be very strange that products of nature should have order and perfection, which nature herself lacks. The individual systems are all united into one system according to one consistent and uniform design. All things in the world are united: the branch with the tree; the tree with the earth, air and water; these elements are united with the various animals, by means of wings for the air, fins for the water, feet for the earth. The earth in its turn is united with the other planets and the sun. And thus a coherent and harmonious universal system must be acknowledged.[90]

The only objection that on the face of the matter may be raised against the recognition of such a harmonious universal system is man's apparently unfavorable condition as compared with the lower animals. Man is subject to more diseases and does not live as long as some of the wild animals. The latter are protected by nature against the injury of weather, are relieved of labor, are more vigorous in old age, more protected in infancy than man. But is this a defect? Is man any worse for it? It is owing to his physical weakness that man has to depend on society for help. Conjugal affection, love of parents, duty to magistrates, love of community and country are the results of this so-called defect. The excellence of man is different from that of the brute, and he must strive to attain manly qualities. He has been endowed with powers suitable enough for the exercise of his reason but inadequate for other purposes. It seems that by design man is hindered from aspiring to what is misbecoming his character. "Such is the admirable distribution of nature, her adapting and adjusting not only matter to shape and form but shape and form to the circumstance, place or element: all managed for the best with perfect frugality and just reserve, profuse to none but bounti-

[90] Plotinus was also filled with enthusiasm for the harmony of the universe. He must be exceedingly dull, says Plotinus, "who, on seeing all the beautiful objects in the sensible world, all this symmetry and great arrangement of things, is not from this view mentally agitated, and does not venerate them as admirable productions of still more admirable causes." Select works of Plotinus (T. Taylor, p. 74).

ful to all, never employing in one thing more than enough but with exact economy retrenching the superfluous and adding force to what is principal in every thing."[91]

There is a great resemblance between this optimism of Shaftesbury and that of Leibniz. The latter maintained that owing to the power and wisdom of God this is the best possible universe, that there is no absolute evil in the world, and that whatever evil exists is a concomitant of larger and greater good.[92] The optimistic systems, however, found respectively in Shaftesbury's "Moralists" and Leibniz' "Theodicée," were developed independently of each other. But Shaftesbury's "Moralists" or "Philosophical Rhapsody" preceded Leibniz' "Theodicée" by a whole year. This fact is very strongly emphasized by Lessing.[93] Leibniz himself expressed his admiration for Shaftesbury's philosophy, found in it many of his own doctrines; but above all he was impressed by the "Philosophical Rhapsody," in which he "found almost all his *Theodicée.*"[94]

Spinoza was also an optimist of the type of Shaftesbury and Leibniz. He claims that sin and evil have no positive existence, that perfection is absolute and grounded in the very nature of God, hence, in the nature of all things, inasmuch as they proceed from God.[95]

[91] "Characteristics," II, 306.

[92] "Essais de Theodicée sur la bonté de Dieu, la liberté de l'homme et l'origine du mal" (Nouvelle edition, par M. le Chevalier de Jacourt, Amsterdam, 1747). See especially: Part I, 79, 84 ff., 96, 105 ff., 131; Part II, 12 ff., 24 ff., 29, 51; Part III, 144, 152, 239.

[93] Shaftesbury's "Rhapsody," says Lessing, was issued in 1709 and Leibniz' "Theodicée" appeared at the end of 1710. Then he adds: "Ein englischer Philosoph, welcher Dinge gedacht hat, die Leibniz erst ein ganzes Jahr nachher gedacht zu haben zeigt, sollte Dieser von dem Letzteren nicht ein wenig sein geplündert worden"? See "Pope ein Metaphysiker" in Lachmann-Muncker edition of Lessings Works, VI, 442.

[94] Letter to T. Burnett, Aug. 23, 1713: "Die philosophischen Schriften von Leibniz," edited by C. J. Gerhardt, Berlin, 1877, III, 381; letter to Grimarest, June 4, 1712: "Leibnitii opera omnia," Dutens edition, Geneva, 1768, V, 67; letter to Coste, May 30, 1712: Gerhardt edition, III, 421. Leibniz' remarks on Shaftesbury's philosophy are found in the same volume, pp. 423–31.

[95] Letter to Blyenbergh, Jan. 5, 1665, in "Chief Works of Spinoza" (translated by Elwes), II, 332; "Ethics," Part I, Propos. XXXIII and Schol. I and II.

8. *The Doctrine of a Supreme Being*

Shaftesbury's proof for the existence of the Supreme Being is known as the teleological proof. Since, he argues, this is a coherent and harmonious universe, there must be a designing mind. The existence of such a mind can be denied only on the supposition of disorder in the world. The tree, for instance, has all its parts interrelated and sympathizing, so to speak, with one another; all these parts serve to one purpose, namely, the preservation of the whole mechanism. This substance, which has the form of a tree, has a peculiar nature, a soul, by virtue of which it lives and flourishes. In man we also find various parts cooperating for a common end; and so man also has a peculiar "genius" or a soul, by virtue of which he is a man. How, then, can we fail to recognize a universal and sovereign genius in view of the existence of a human genius? Does each man think for himself, while the world has no such power? Is nature never the wiser for all the art and wisdom it breeds?

Man is related to the whole of nature, and this clearly shows that there is a uniting principle in nature. "If so, how are you then a self and nature not so? How have you something to understand and act for you, and nature who gave you this understanding nothing at all to understand for her and advise her? Has the world such ill-fortune in the main? Are there so many particular understandings and active principles everywhere? And is there nothing at last which thinks, acts and understands for all? Nothing which administers or looks after all?"[96] The more we are convinced of the existence of our own self, the more it follows that our own self is derived from a principal and original self. This "original self," this "designing principle," this "governing mind," or "sovereign beauty," or "universal genius," or "World-soul," is God.

Kant rejects the teleological proof and substitutes the ontological proof, which is a pure "Vernunftsbegriff." With Kant the existence of God and immortality are postulates of pure reason.[97] Descartes starts with the reality of thought, with

[96] "Characteristics," II, 357.

[97] "Kritik der reinen Vernunft" (Kehrbach ed.), pp. 468, 615; and "Kritik der praktischen Vernunft" (4th ed. 1797), pp. 219, 220, 224, 226.

his *cogito ergo sum,* as the foundation for the proof of God and the material world. He has a notion of two substances, thought and extension, radically different from and independent of each other.[98] Leibnitz opposes Descartes' dualism; he considers force as the essential factor in the world, thinks of it as divided into a great number of monads or living self-active forces in various degrees of development, and conceives of God as the original monad, of which all the others are productions.[99] And Spinoza conceives of God as the immanent cause of the world, as the only infinite and indivisible substance, of which all finite existences are modes or limitations.[100]

9. *Shaftesbury's School*

A discussion of Shaftesbury's philosophy would be incomplete without an account of the Shaftesburian School, the most prominent adherents of which were the Scotch moral philosophers, Reid, Ferguson and Hutcheson. They were all inspired by Shaftesbury and served as a medium for the spread of his philosophy. Like Shaftesbury, Reid considers man as an essentially social creature. The wise author of nature, he says, intended us to be social creatures; for this purpose he implanted in us the disposition to trust others and a proclivity to speak the truth. Truth is the natural issue of the mind, while lying does violence to our natures. "Speaking truth is like using our natural food, but lying is like taking physic, which is nauseous to the taste and which no man takes but for some end which he cannot otherwise attain."[101]

But that which above all links Reid with Shaftesbury is the former's emphasis of the "common sense," which he construes as the immutable judgment of the good, the expression of the

[98] Descartes "Meditations" (translated by J. Veitch from Latin to English, Chicago, 1901), Medit. VI, p. 91; III, 61; IV, 64; VI, 93.

[99] For Leibniz' monad-doctrine I consulted his: "La Monadologie," edited by Henri Lachelier, Paris, 1909.

[100] See "Ethics," Definitions III, IV, V, VI; letter to Oldenburg (Elwes ed.) II, 277; "Ethics," Part I, Propositions V, XIII, XIV, XV, XVIII, XXV and Corollary, XVII and Corollaries I and II; Part V, Prop. XXIV; letter to Oldenburg (Elwes ed.), II, 301.

[101] Thomas Reid: "An inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense," 6th edition, 1810, p. 420.

inner voice of reason. A fine taste, he claims, is implanted in our natures. Even the savage has in himself the seeds of logic, good breeding and virtue; these seeds, however, must be developed by culture. Philosophy has no other root than the principles of "common sense." The common concerns of life and the general conduct of men are governed by certain common principles, and the attempt on the part of some philosophers to reject these principles is as futile as the attempt of the giants to dethrone Jove. Hobbes, for instance, says Reid, endeavored to demonstrate that there is no difference between right and wrong. Such a philosophy, however, appears ridiculous even to those who cannot point out its fallacy. "Common sense and reason have both one author; that almighty author in all whose other works we observe a consistency, uniformity and beauty, which charm and delight the understanding: there must, therefore, be some order and consistency in the human faculties as well as in other parts of His workmanship."[102]

Ferguson also advocates Shaftesburian doctrines, i. e., that virtue is the advantage of the individual and the public, that man has a moral sense, that he is essentially a social creature. Beauty, he claims, is an indication of wisdom and goodness. On the other hand, folly and malice are deformities of the mind. "There is reason to believe that beauty when real may be resolved into excellence and that deformity may be resolved into defect."[103] Virtue is the best state of which an intelligent being is capable. Wisdom, goodness, temperance, fortitude constitute the excellence of human nature; while its deformity and misery consist of folly, malice, debauchery and cowardice.

It is improper to consider virtue as consisting of external performances enjoined under the sanction of rewards and punishments. If the virtuous are destined to be happy in the future, they are certainly happy in the present state through the practice of virtue; "and it were absurd to conceive that a person must not prefer the good which he may now enjoy but

[102] *Ibid.*, p. 132.

[103] Adam Ferguson: "Principles of Moral and Political Science," Edinburgh, 1792, II, 30.

for the sake of a good which he is to enjoy hereafter."[104] It is unfortunate to suppose that anything else can amuse us better than the performance of duty. "It is unhappy to conceive beneficence as an effect of self-denial or to conceive that we lay our fellow-creatures under great obligations, by the kindness we do them."[105] If I have done a kindness to my fellowmen, he says, it is also my benefit. Some people remind you of the service they rendered you; others, although not reminding you of it, keep it in their minds; still others do not seem to know what they have done. The latter are like the vine which produces its grapes and *has done,* when it has yielded its proper fruit.

Virtue, says Ferguson, is universally approved regardless of its outward utility. A person dying in the mere attempt to save a friend or to preserve his country is just as much an object of moral approbation as the most successful adventurer in either cause. The power by which man distinguishes between right and wrong is what we call the moral sense. As in the case of different animals nature has superadded to the other principles of sensitive life some peculiar faculty for seeing, smell or touch, as in the lynx's eye, the hound's nostril, or the spider's touch; so to the mind of man, in addition to his other powers, the Creator has given a faculty of judging concerning the merit or demerit of character. "Hunger and thirst or any other incitement to self-preservation is not more essential to the animal frame than the preference of what is perfect to what is imperfect is to the constitution of the mind."[106] Mr. Hobbes, Ferguson continues, denies the existence of any right prior to convention, but Hobbes' opinion is unjust to human nature. There is certainly a clear perception of right and wrong prior to convention. Man is formed for society, and he is happy only in so far as he has the qualifications of an associate and friend. "He is excellent in the degree in which he loves his fellow-creatures; he is defective in the degree in which he hates them or is indifferent to their welfare."[107]

[104] *Ibid.*, p. 92.
[105] *Ibid.*, p. 90.
[106] *Ibid.*, p. 130.
[107] *Ibid.*, p. 41.

But of the entire school Hutcheson is the one who stands in closest connection with Shaftesbury. He systematizes Shaftesbury's leading doctrines into a comprehensive system. According to H. Ritter,[108] Hutcheson has the same relation to Shaftesbury as Wolff to Leibniz. The analogy between beauty and virtue, the function of the moral sense, benevolence as an original part of our nature,—these are the fundamental points of resemblance between the two philosophers. Hutcheson's[109] main difference from Shaftesbury consists of his distinguishing between an esthetic and moral sense, while Shaftesbury includes the perception of beauty and morality under the same sense.

The superior faculty of perceiving beauty, says Hutcheson, may properly be termed a sense, because the perception of beauty[110] comes to us immediately without any former resolution on our part; and uniformity amidst variety is the most essential principle of beauty. Such a condition we find in nature, not a single part of which could have been produced by chance. The more complex the combinations of nature are, the more we must ascribe them to design.[111] The sense of beauty is universal. The followers of Mr. Locke, says Hutcheson, while considering the external senses natural and antecedent to custom and education, deny naturalness to the esthetic sense and make it depend upon prospect of advantage, custom or education. And yet, Hutcheson continues, the esthetic or

108 "Geschichte der Philosophie," Hamburg, XII (1855), 291.

109 Francis Hutcheson's chief work is: "Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue," 1720. The edition of Glasgow, 1772 (printed from the 4th edition of 1738), was consulted. The work was translated into German by J. H. Merck, Frankfurt, 1762.

110 Hutcheson distinguishes between original or absolute and comparative or relative beauty. By the former he means the beauty of the works of nature; by the latter he means the beauty of such objects as are imitations of other objects. "Inquiry," etc., pp. 13–14.

111 Hutcheson considers miracles as contrary to design, and his view on miracles is the same as Shaftesbury's: "However miracles may prove the superintendency of a voluntary agent, yet that mind must be weak and inadvertent which needs them to confirm the belief of a wise and good Deity; since the deviation from general laws must be a presumption of inconstancy and weakness, rather than of steady wisdom and power, and must weaken the best arguments we can have for the sagacity and power of the universal mind." *Ibid.*, p. 62.

internal sense is just as real and natural as any of the external or physical senses. "The internal sense is a passive power of receiving ideas of beauty from all objects in which there is uniformity amidst variety. Nor does there seem anything more difficult in the matter than that the mind should receive the idea of sweet when a sweet form enters the tongue or to have the idea of sound upon a quick vibration in the air."[112] The sense of beauty is antecedent to custom, education and example. None of these can be of any avail, unless we first have a natural faculty of perceiving beauty and harmony.

Nature, Hutcheson continues, has also given us a moral sense[113] and has endowed us with affections that are the springs of virtuous acts. The moral sense is free from all notions of personal advantage. If this were not so, we should have the same love for a fruitful field as for a generous friend in as far as both are of equal advantage to us; nor should we admire the virtuous act of a person of a distant land and of a former age, provided his influence does not reach us, any more than the mountains of Peru, when we are not interested in the Spanish trade. But "we have a distinct perception of beauty or excellence in the kind of affections of rational agents; whence we are determined to admire and love such characters and persons. Were there no moral sense or had we no other idea of actions but as advantageous or hurtful, I see no reason why we should be delighted with honor or subjected to the uneasiness of shame; or how it could ever happen that a man who is secure from punishment for any action should ever be uneasy at its being known to all the world."[114] The moral sense, he claims, is universal and antecedent to religion, custom and instruction.

Summary

We found the identification of the good with the beautiful as the starting point of Shaftesbury's philosophy. Striving after beauty, he claims, leads to virtue; in fact, beauty itself is

[112] *Ibid.*, p. 72.

[113] Gerhard Keussler considers the origin of the "Popularaesthetik" as consisting of Shaftesbury's and Hutcheson's "inner sense" and of Reid's "common sense." See "Die Grenzen der Aesthetik," Leipzig, 1902, p. 121.

[114] Hutcheson's "Inquiry," etc., pp. 101, 205.

nothing else than an expression of inner spiritual harmony. Out of this Shaftesbury develops his "moral grace" and the three orders of beauty: material, spiritual, and divine. The notions of beauty and morality, he asserts, are grounded in human nature. Man has both an esthetic and a moral faculty. Man is essentially a social creature, and society is his natural state. Virtue is the advantage and vice the disadvantage of everybody; public welfare and private interest are inseparable. Virtue has its own peculiar source and, although it may be strengthened by religion, it is independent of the latter and prior to it. The notion of future rewards and punishments is not, as theologians claim, essential to the advancement of the cause of morality. The cause of morality, however, is advanced by culture, and the development of character is, according to Shaftesbury, the chief aim of all learning. He attacks pedants and scholastics, speaks contemptuously of metaphysics and condemns an education which fails to "unite the scholar part with that of the real gentleman and man of breeding." Philosophy is to him a problem of daily life; it consists of "elevating good breeding or manner of life." The height of morality consists of conceiving virtue as the greatest happiness and of making its practice not a matter of stern duty or self-denial but a real pleasure, which is in thorough accord with the natural propensities. The "virtuoso" is the esthetically developed individual, who through his broad culture becomes the artist of his life.

Shaftesbury advocates self-investigation or "soliloquy" as a means of becoming a good thinker and an honest man. But since he is an opponent of solitary life he emphasizes the impracticability of "soliloquy" without "commerce with the world." He is a cheerful philosopher, opposes the gloomy and melancholy in all phases of life and emphasizes the freedom of "wit and humor" as essential to the cause of good government, religion and morality. On the basis of the contrast between the gloomy and cheerful he distinguishes between a false and a true enthusiasm, between mere fanaticism and real divine inspiration. In connection with the freedom of "wit and humor" he develops the doctrine of the use of raillery as a test of truth.

"Truth can bear all lights." The application of the test of ridicule is the best means of distinguishing the truly serious from the ridiculous. But the application of raillery, we are told, does not imply vulgar jest or mere buffoonery. Shaftesbury is above all an optimist. He claims that there is no positive sin or evil in the world and is filled with enthusiasm for the order and beauty of the universe. Of God he conceives as the genius of nature or the world-soul.[115]

[115] This exposition does not include Shaftesbury's more technical contributions to art-criticism as contained in the "Notion of the Tablature of the Judgment of Hercules" and in the "Letter concerning Design." The former to a certain extent influenced Lessing's "Laokoon." Hugo Blümner in his book on Lessing's "Laokoon" discusses briefly the relation between Lessing's work and Shaftesbury's "Judgment of Hercules." See Blümner: "Lessings Laokoon," introduction, p. 24 ff. G. Spicker in his "Philosophie des Grafen von Shaftesbury" (Freiburg, 1872) analyzes Shaftesbury's "Judgment of Hercules" and quotes corresponding passages from Lessing's "Laokoon." See pp. 207 ff.

CHAPTER III

SHAFTESBURY'S MORAL-ESTHETIC PHILOSOPHY IN WIELAND

1. *The Good and the Beautiful. Spiritual Beauty and Moral Charm*

If we were to look for one comprehensive term which should convey the concept for which Shaftesbury's moral-esthetic philosophy stands we could hardly find a more fitting term than Shaftesbury's "Moral Grace" or "Moral Venus." That Wieland's moral-esthetic philosophy came from Shaftesbury appears from his frequent allusions, always commendatory, to the Shaftesburian "Moral Grace," "Moral Graces" or "Moral Venus." In the aforementioned document directed against Uz in January, 1758, he declares that a poet is not expected to be morose and gloomy;[1] that virtue lies between the two extremes, frivolity and gloom; that Uz should be familiar with "the moral Venus and the moral Graces about which Shaftesbury speaks"; that "had he known these *Graces* he would have been an amiable author."[2] His appeal to Shaftesbury's "Moral Venus" in "Cyrus" and the professed use of the same "Venus" in the character of Cyrus have already been discussed.[3]

In a letter to F. J. Riedel, Oct. 26, 1768, he praises Jacobi's poems "Vestale" and "Venus im Bade," because these poems

[1] This is a rejoinder to verses 37–40 of Uz' epistle "Schreiben des Verfassers der lyrischen Gedichte an einen Freund," which was issued in 1757 in reply to Wieland's previous attack. The epistle is found on pp. 377–84 in Sauer's edition of Uz' poetical works (*Deutsche Literaturdenkmale*, 33–8). The verses in question read as follows:

> Welch schwacher Geist hört' ich die Muse sagen,
> Will von Parnasz die Grazien verjagen?
> Ist niemand weis als wer nur immer weint,
> Ein finstrer Kopf, dem Schwermut Tugend scheint?

[2] See Seufferts: "Mitteilungen aus Wielands Jünglingsalter," *Euphorion*, XIV, 235.

[3] Cf. Chapter I, pp. 13–14, notes 36 and 37.

"reach the highest ideal which a poet inspired by the sight of the Shaftesburian Venus is capable of thinking, feeling and contemplating."[4] In June, 1769, he appeals to Jacobi to remain a favorite of the Graces, a painter of ideal beauties and a cheerful poet; and he assures him that by producing that kind of work he will deserve well of all those "whom nature has given a fine feeling for that which Shaftesbury calls the 'moral Venus' and the 'moral Graces.'"[5]

At the beginning of the next year he identifies the Graces that deck the goddess of beauty and dance with the Muses on the summit of Parnassus with the "moral Graces" of Shaftesbury.[6] Feb. 22, 1770, he praises a certain play of Jacobi as having beautiful simplicity, the beautiful ideal of moral sentiments, in brief "the moral Graces of Shaftesbury."[7] In January, 1775, he denotes the ideal of moral beauty as that "which Shaftesbury calls the moral Venus."[8] August 26, 1794, he identifies the "holy Virgin-mother of the Graces" with the "moral Grace" of Shaftesbury.[9] In 1802 he finds in the relation between Lykon and his son, in Xenophon's "Symposium," a "gentle and lovely blossom-fragrance," or something "which the noble Shaftesbury understands by his *moral Graces.*"[10] And in 1803 he praises the exceptional beauty of the scene in which Euripides introduces the character of Ion, and finds the character so admirable that the idea of further beautifying it would not occur to any one "whom heaven endowed with a feeling for genuine beautiful nature and for *Shaftesbury's moral Venus and moral Graces.*"[11]

The Shaftesburian ideas of spiritual beauty and moral charm

[4] "Auswahl denkwürdiger Briefe," I, 225.

[5] "Ausgewählte Briefe," letter to Jacobi, II, 318.

[6] "Auswahl denkwürdiger Briefe," I, 144, to Sophie La Roche. The letter is undated, but it belongs probably to the end of 1769 or the beginning of 1770.

[7] To Jacobi, "Ausgewählte Briefe," II, 349.

[8] January number of the *Merkur*, 1775, p. 92, footnote.

[9] To Sophie Reinhold, in "Reinhold und Wieland," by Robert Keil (Leipzig and Berlin, 1885), p. 199.

[10] "Versuch über das Xenofontische Gastmahl," in *Attisches Museum*, IV^2, 116.

[11] Note 6 in "Erläuterungen" to Euripides' "Ion," *Attisches Museum*, IV^3, 144.

are constantly reflected in Wieland's works. Thus he asserts that virtue appeals largely through the charm bestowed upon it by love. Much more beautiful than rosy cheeks and lily-white skin is a soul adorned by the splendor of innocence. True beauty will seldom deceive us, for it is reflected in the eyes, just as in a mirror; only the beauty of the soul wins lovers.[12] A great thought of an immortal mind is more beautiful than all the glitter of lifeless matter. The most beautiful marble Venus is nothing compared with the soul, the daughter of heaven, which keeps on blooming even after all the stars and all the beauty of the sky fade away. Wisdom is essential to real beauty.[13] Nothing else can inspire love as much as virtue veiled in beauty. It has always been the function of wisdom to adorn beauty with spirit and to provide it with graces which do not fade with the cheeks. Man is an image of divinity, an angel in animal form which is beautiful by the indwelling spirit.[14] The charms of the body are bestowed upon it by the soul; for this reason, while the man with an ignoble mind is swayed by mere sensual passion, the noble man beholds much higher beauties looking forth from under the splendid veil (the body) of a girl's soul.[15]

For the same reason, Cefise, Timoclea's friend, is not as beautiful as she might be, for instead of giving a wise answer she merely laughs and displays her pearly teeth; and upon hearing of a virtuous act she remains as indifferent as a statue. On the other hand, the lovely Pasithea pleases all who see her, and every wise man is bound to love her. When she speaks, her words are as harmonious as her voice, her sentiments upright and innocent as her looks, her manners comely. "If the Graces accompanying virtue should wish to assume human

12 "Anti-Ovid" (1752), lines 91 ff. Gruber, II, 21; lines 311 ff., *ibid.*, II, 30; "Moralische Briefe" (1752), 9 Brief, lines 89 ff., Gruber, I, 298.

13 "Briefe von Verstorbenen an hinterlassene Freunde" (1753), 1ter Brief, lines 109–10 (Gruber, II, 190); 2ter Brief, lines 74 ff.; 150–1 (pp. 208 and 213).

14 "Erinnerungen an eine Freundin" (1753), Göschen, XXVI, 283 and 281. "Platonische Betrachtungen über den Menschen" (1754), Göschen, XXIX, 110.

15 "Sympathien" (1755), Göschen, XXIX, 9 and "Prosaische Schriften," I, 112.

form they would assume thine, O Pasithea!" No girl is justified in considering herself beautiful unless she resembles this Pasithea. The art of becoming beautiful has for its prime essential a good heart. By leading an irregular and corrupt life a person will lose the beauty which he may have formerly possessed. Physical beauty is closely connected with physical health, and the latter depends immediately upon spiritual health, which consists of virtue. Complete beauty, therefore, requires both the soul, the noblest part, and the body to be each in its natural condition of health. To be sure, a treacherous soul may sometimes dwell in a strong and beautiful body, but vice so disguised will ultimately have its fatal effect. The effect of a beautiful soul is especially manifested in a charming personality; hence the person with a good upright character never fails to possess charm.[16]

The Graces painted by Theages suggest so much spiritual beauty as to deserve the name of moral Graces and to be described as the reflection of the inner goodness of a human soul; without them beauty is incomplete and lifeless; through them even a withered face becomes lovely.[17] Wisdom, virtue and moral Venus are used as identical terms;[18] and on another occasion beauty is described as the body of virtue, charm as its visible reflection.[19]

The notions of inner beauty, spiritual grace and moral charm, which are very common, as we have just seen, in Wieland's works of the first period of his literary career, occur also in his works after 1760. We read, for instance, that virtue, understanding and other such gifts are more charming in a beautiful form, but that even a homely maiden will attract our love if she only possesses spiritual beauty.[20] In the course of the general corruption which comes upon Scheschian during the reign of Isfandiar the women loose their bashfulness and inno-

16 "Timoklea. Ein Gespräch über scheinbare und wahre Schönheit" (1755), Göschen, XXXIII, 205–6, 209 ff., 212 ff.

17 "Theages: Über Schönheit und Liebe," Göschen, XXXIII, 234.

18 Letter to Zimmermann (1759), "Ausgewählte Briefe," II, 105.

19 "Araspes und Panthea" (1760), Göschen, XXVII, 11.

20 "Der neue Amadis" (1771), 18th Canto, first two stanzas, Göschen, XV, 269.

cence and all other qualities which enhance physical beauty and make up for the lack of it.[21] Refined persons who are not ruled by mere passion find beauty only in souls; even a Medusa, provided she possesses a beautiful soul, would to such persons become a Venus.[22] And Democritus of Abdera understands by beautiful eyes such as reflect a beautiful soul.[23]

Wieland praises Jacob Heinrich Meister's work[24] and finds it so charming and attractive especially on account of the author's *moral grace,* which breathes in all his sentiments and is conveyed to his composition.[25] As the beautiful Danae is impersonating Daphne in a dance, Agathon is so enchanted by her that he imagines he really sees before him the moral Venus with all her spiritual Graces.[26] And speaking of a certain impropriety on the part of Aristophanes, Wieland characterizes it as a transgression against the moral Graces.[27] Inasmuch as the soul has an immediate influence upon the body Menander is assured that his beloved maiden will never lose her physical beauty as long as the beauty of her soul remains the same.[28] The face of Psyche, Agathon's first lover, reflects the beauty of her soul. Melanippe claims that there is also a spiritual beauty which inspires a much purer and much more constant love than the beauty which only attracts the physical eye. And Hipparchia loves Krates on account of the beauty of his soul, the worth of his character and the graces of his social bearing and conduct.[29]

Aside from his spiritual beauty Shaftesbury develops his other well-known doctrine of divine, or prime, or original

21 "Der goldne Spiegel" (1772), Göschen, VIII, 57.

22 "Psyche unter den Grazien," *Teutscher Merkur,* May, 1774, pp. 121–2.

23 "Die Abderiten" (1781), Göschen, XIII, 35.

24 "Von der natürlichen Moral," German translation by Schulthesz from the French original of Meister. Edited by Wieland. I did not see the book in question.

25 "Moral der Natur" (1789), Hempel, XXXII, 153.

26 "Agathon," Göschen, IV, 163.

27 "Erläuterungen" to Aristophanes' "Wolken" (1798), *Attisches Museum,* III[3], 104.

28 "Sympathien," Göschen, XXIX, 213. "Menander und Glycerion" (1803), Letter X, Hempel, X, 23.

29 "Agathon," Göschen, V, 27. "Krates und Hipparchia" (1804), Letters IX and XXIX. Hempel, X, pp. 94 and 144.

beauty, which is the source of every other beauty. This notion is also very prominent in Wieland's works. God is to him the "first beauty," near and visible to everybody. Divinity is described as the "substance of all beauty," the "eternal beauty," the "everlasting prototype of the beautiful."[30] Nothing else can be considered more beautiful than divinity. So he calls upon beautiful nature to point out to him the divine beauty.[31] God alone is beauty, every joy proceeds from this fountain-head, from it flows every beauty which is admired by angels and by which men are charmed.[32] Everything that we love and admire, this splendor of nature, this harmony of things, whatever we call noble and great and comely in human manner and actions—all this is just an emanation of a pure original source of perfection, order and beauty, which in other words we call the supreme divinity.[33]

Everything that we see is only a vain shadow of the "first essential beauty," of that which is divine and ideally-beautiful.[34] Whatever enjoyment man has, he still feels that he cannot attain the perfect happiness for which he longs; and so he looks up to an intransitory good, to that which is the prototype and source of all that is good and beautiful, to God."[35] "Perfect beauty is the divinest thing in nature."[36] Peregrinus Proteus aspires to live the life of a spirit, which consists of rising from one stage of beauty to the other and of finally attaining the contemplation and enjoyment of that "highest original beauty, that heavenly Venus, which is the source and essence of all other beauty and perfection."[37] And Agathon, while contemplating in the moonlight the beauty of slumbering nature, comes to consider how happy must be the state of the spirits who

[30] "Hymne auf Gott" (1753), Hempel, VI, 75. "Briefe von Verstorbenen an hinterlassene Freunde" (Gruber, Vol. II): 4 Brief, lines 34–5; 6 Brief, line 220; 8 Brief, line 108.

[31] "Gesicht des Mirza," (1754), Göschen, XXIX, 72. "Empfindungen eines Christen" (1755), Göschen, XXVI, 221.

[32] "Empfindungen eines Christen," *ibid.*, pp. 223, 249.

[33] "Araspes und Panthea" (1760), Göschen, XXVII, 54.

[34] "Musarion" (1768), lines 824 ff. Pröhle edition I, 39 (Vol. LI of the "Deutsche National-Literatur").

[35] "Der goldne Spiegel," Göschen, VIII, 93.

[36] "Aristipp" (1800–2), Göschen, XXII, 137.

[37] "Peregrinus Proteus" (1791), Hempel, XXI, 61.

spend milleniums "in the contemplation of the essential beauty, the intransitory, eternal and divine."[38] Also Hipparchia feels on one occasion irradiated by the "divine archetypes of all the beautiful and good."[39]

Throughout his entire literary career Wieland emphasizes the identification of the good or the moral with the beautiful. Virtue is beautiful, the moral world is the most beautiful part of creation, the noblest part to which everything else is subservient.[40] Virtue is a real divinity, the moral order is an invisible veiled beauty.[41] When virtue appears in its beauty everybody is bound to love it. It is the superior beauty which makes man the supreme creature; if innocence, truth and virtue were to rule the world it would acquire thereby a more beautiful appearance. Morality is the beauty of mankind: what, therefore, can be more beautiful than the virtuous man?[42] The kind of paintings which Aspasia, one of the characters of "Theages," has in her gallery confers a great honor upon her, for, judging by these paintings, "she considers the beautiful and the good as inseparable."[43]

Moral beauty is used as a synonym for goodness and innocence. Tigranes is filled with admiration for the character of Cyrus, since he is "mightily aroused by the beauty of virtue"; and Araspes tells Panthea that her husband might suspect that she has fallen into the hands of a barbarian who is "without feeling for the higher beauty of virtue."[44] Aglaia, one of the Graces, while commending the dance of the daughters of Arcadia, orders that only the best one among them should receive the prize of beauty. Addressing his people, the wise lawgiver, Psammis, tells them that love and sympathy make

[38] "Agathon," Göschen, IV, 63.

[39] "Krates und Hipparchia," Letter XXXII, Hempel, X, 149.

[40] "Briefe von Verstorbenen," 1 Brief, line 119; 6 Brief, lines 122–3.

[41] "Gesicht des Mirza" (1754), Göschen, XXIX, 72. "Gesicht von einer Welt unschuldiger Menschen" (1754), "Prosaische Schriften," I, 247.

[42] "Die Prüfung Abrahams" (1753), Gruber, III, 34, lines 409–11. "Timoklea," Göschen, XXXIII, 216, 217–8. "Sympathien," *Ibid.*, XXIX, 22. "Betrachtungen über den Menschen," *Ibid.*, p. 108.

[43] "Theages," Göschen, XXXIII, 229.

[44] "Sympathien," *Ibid.*, XXIX, 4; "Cyrus," 3d canto, lines 363–4, Gruber, IV, 86; "Araspes und Panthea," Göschen, XXVII, 61.

for beauty; that every irregular passion or malevolent thought disfigures our features, poisons our looks and degrades the beautiful human figure into similarity with the lower animals; that as long as their hearts shall remain good they will be the most beautiful among the children of men.[45]

On another occasion virtue is called the "goddess of beautiful souls."[46] On leaving Smyrna Agathon is determined to take up an activity having the real general welfare as its aim, for more than ever he is now "convinced of the beauty of virtue."[47] Aristippus, whom Agathon meets in Syracuse, loves pleasure because he is a lover of the beautiful, and for the same reason he also loves the good.[48] And in Tarentum Agathon becomes so wise as to devote himself entirely to "the highest beauty, to virtue."[49] Lais reports to Aristippus that she has learned the following truths: that without virtue beauty and love cannot attain either duration or perfection, that the beautiful and the good are one and the same thing and that virtue is nothing else than a love of the beautiful and the good, a love which like a flame strives ever upwards, is not satisfied with anything imperfect and does not rest until it rises by degrees to the enjoyment of the highest beauty. Aristippus himself is a young man with excellent qualities, for as a lover of beauty he also loves virtue.[50]

Not only the good but also the true is beautiful and charming. This Shaftesburian doctrine is also represented in Wieland. Truth, says Wieland, in its first source is charmingly beautiful and pure. Aristippus loves the beautiful and good and in both the true. Truth is the "heavenly goddess of

[45] "Die Grazien" (1770), Göschen, III, 114; "Der goldne Spiegel," Göschen, VII, 74.

[46] "Vorbericht zum Anti-Cato," *Teutscher Merkur,* Aug., 1773, p. 108.

[47] "Agathon," Part II, Göschen, V, 174–5.

[48] "Agathon," Part III, Göschen, VI, 15. In a letter to Sophie and Reinhold (his daughter and son-in-law) Wieland mentions that his estate in Oszmanstätt has been "improved and—inasmuch as the good may also be called beautiful—beautified." Cf. Robert Keil: "Wieland und Reinhold," p. 243. (The letter is undated but Keil puts it as belonging to 1798.)

[49] "Agathon," Part III, Göschen, VI, 271.

[50] "Aristipp," Part I, Göschen, XXII, 189–90, 194.

beauty."[51] On the 12th of Sept., 1756, Wieland calls Zimmermann's attention to the Shaftesburian doctrine: "Hätte euch Shaftesbury nicht lehren sollen, dasz nur das Wahre, the true, schön ist?"[52]

Shaftesbury's identification of the good and true and beautiful encountered very strenuous opposition on the part of Kant, and Wieland's sympathy with Shaftesbury's doctrine is further illustrated by his objection to this particular part of Kantian philosophy. Kant very clearly and emphatically separates the realms of morality, logic and esthetics. The beautiful, he claims, represents an object merely in relation to the senses, but in order to be called good the object must pass through the conception of some purpose and be subjected to the principles of reason. The good always refers an object to a definite purpose, and is independent of the idea of the beautiful, inasmuch as esthetic judgment is based upon mere formal adaptation of means to end (*formale Zweckmäszigkeit*). Perfection wins nothing from beauty and vice versa. The beautiful is a matter of taste, while the good is a matter of reason; hence, it is wrong to identify the one with the other. Some philosophers, Kant continues, consider an interest in beauty as a sign of a good moral character. This doctrine, however, he says, has very properly been refuted by others who show from experience that virtuosi of taste are usually given over to destructive passions.[53]

All this, as we see, is a direct contrast to Shaftesbury's doctrine. Wieland's attitude to the Kantian doctrine is best seen from his criticism of Herder's "Kalligone," which is directed against Kant's "Kritik der Urteilskraft," the very work in which Kant draws his sharp distinction between the good and the beautiful. In this criticism, which appeared in August, 1800, in the *Neuer Teutscher Merkur,* Wieland praises Herder's work

[51] "Natur der Dinge" (1751), Book VI, lines 33–4, Gruber, I, 168. "Aristipp," Part I, Göschen, XXII, 41. "Briefe von Verstorbenen," 4 Brief, line 3, Gruber, II, 247.

[52] "Ausgewählte Briefe," I, 218.

[53] Kant's "Kritik der Urteilskraft" (1790), edited by Karl Kehrbach (text of the edition A of 1790). Cf. especially pp. 44–5, 47–9, 51, 73, 75, 78, 124, 163.

strongly and recommends that it be read and reread by everybody "that has at heart the truly beautiful and good," adding that his own views on Herder's book are contained in the book itself.[54] Instead of giving his own views, Wieland then quotes passages from the "Kalligone," and the following passage, which is given here in substance, is of special significance, since it clearly states Wieland's attitude with regard to the separation of esthetics from morality. The good men of all times, says Herder-Wieland, endeavored to present the beautiful as the good and true, but we are coldly and deliberately trying to separate that which nature has gently intertwined in us, and we rejoice over the doctrine that "the beautiful must be neither true nor good" (these are, of course, Kant's words). "If," he adds, "this is not desecration of the noblest part of humanity, of the arts, of feeling, of reason, I do not know of any."[55]

2. *Esthetic and Moral Sense. Morality and Nature*

Like Shaftesbury, Wieland also argues for an esthetic and moral sense. In 1759 he compliments his friend Zimmermann on his "*sensus veri, pulchri et boni, or that which Shaftesbury calls the sensus communis.*"[56] The doctrine occurs in Wieland's works as early as 1752 and as late as 1812. "Deep within the sanctuary of our soul lies the fountain of love, the bent towards the good and beautiful." The feeling of the beautiful is a peculiar characteristic of man. Even the most barbarous people always seek to improve and to beautify their condition. It may go slowly at the beginning, but the "bent for the more beautiful and the better" (*der Trieb zum Schönern und Bessern*) gradually increases. The human race is provided by nature with everything that is necessary to notice, to observe, to compare and to distinguish things. With satisfactory certainty we always know what is beautiful or ugly, right or wrong. There is no folly or vice the incongruity or injuriousness of which cannot at once be detected. There is "in our breast the voice

[54] See p. 260.
[55] *Ibid.*, p. 268.
[56] "Ausgewählte Briefe," II, 6.

of God, which gives its approval when we act justly and nobly."[57]

This moral sense, or *sensus communis,* or good taste, is a "tester" (*Prüfer*) of the beautiful and noble. It is a readiness to perceive the beauty of nature and art, but especially the beauty and nobility of sentiments, actions, manners and characters. This least of all deceivable feeling for the true and the good, this inner consciousness of the just, this feeling granted by nature to all men, can best tell us how to act.[58] The tender feeling for the beautiful and perfect is the foundation of everything great and admirable that man can do, the genuine mother of heroism and virtue. As a result of luxury there ensues a weakening of the soul or a "dulness of the inner sense for true greatness."[59]

The soul which has developed its sense for the true, great and beautiful is not confined to the pleasure coming merely from indispensable things; it also enjoys, for instance, the pleasure of knowledge for its own sake and other noble sentiments. A wise and virtuous man has among other qualities a spirit that is sensitive to the beautiful. It is the love of beauty on the part of his people that forms a good foundation for the wise lawgiver, Psammis, to give the people wise laws and to make them happy thereby.[60] A man with an esthetic sense is bound to be amiable; such a man is Hermotimus, the friend of Leontion and Glycera. And so Athens is the foremost city in the world, because it is the chief seat of the arts and the Muses and possesses the "finest sense for all that is beautiful and great."[61] The Greeks were able to attain such a high stage of culture, because they realized how closely sound reason, regularity of

[57] "Anti-Ovid," 2d Canto, lines 1–2, Gruber, II, 18. "Aristipp," Part I, Göschen, XXII, 394. "Danischmend" (1775), Göschen, IX, 60–1, 239.

[58] "Cyrus" (1759), 3d Canto, line 73, Gruber, IV, 67. "Plan einer Akademie," in "Prosaische Schriften," III, 140. "Agathon," Part III, Göschen, VI, 169.

[59] "Araspes und Panthea," Göschen, XXVII, 51. "Uber die vorgebliche Abnahme des menschlichen Geschlechts" (1777), Göschen, XXIX, 327.

[60] "Über weibliche Bildung" (1785), Hempel, XXXV, 235. "Ausgewählte Briefe," I, 296, to Zimmermann, Oct. 18, 1758. "Der goldne Spiegel," Part I, Göschen, VII, 66.

[61] "Menander und Glycerion," Hempel, X, 65–6. "Aristipp," Part II, Göschen, XXIII, 362.

temper and politeness of manners were connected with good taste, or that fine capacity to perceive by an inner sense the harmonious and beautiful. Before young people are taught any system of morality their moral sense should be developed and sharpened. It is necessary that the teacher himself should possess the "moral-sense" (Wieland employs this English term) in a high degree.[62]

And so this esthetic and moral sense comes to stand for everything that is noble and uplifting, while that which is inhuman and unrefined is described as a transgression against this sense. Herder's "Adrastea," we read, is such an admirable book that it should be in the hands of all those that have the "sense for the true and beautifully-good" (*das Schön-Gute*). The treachery committed by Helena against the King of Faros is described as an act offensive to our moral-esthetic sense (*der moralische Schönheitssinn*). The priest Strobylus of Abdera is represented as a shallow and uncouth man, in brief, as a man without an esthetic sense. And the emperor Domitian is cruel and inhuman, since he has a "Stumpfsinn für alles Schöne und Gute."[63]

And now we can readily understand why Wieland emphasizes more or less the esthetic-moral sense in several of his characters. Isaac describes his friend Abiasaf as being his equal as far as the taste for beauty is concerned.[64] Cyrus has a natural propensity for the good and beautiful, an inborn

[62] "Plan einer Akademie," in "Prosaische Schriften," III, 111–12, 141–2.

[63] *Neuer Teutscher Merkur*, April, 1802, p. 277. *Neues Attisches Museum*, II², 74. "Abderiten" (1781), Göschen, XIV, 33. "Agathodämon" (1799), Hempel, XXIII, 147.

[64] "Die Prüfung Abrahams" (1753), 2d Canto, lines 210–2, Gruber, III, 50. One of the most important qualities of Madame de Staël appears to Wieland under the form of susceptibility to the true and beautiful (letter to his daughter, Sophie Reinhold, Jan. 16, 1804; see "Wieland und Reinhold," by R. Keil, p. 267). March 12, 1772, he compliments his friend Ring on his love of the good and the beautiful. (Heinrich Funck: "Beiträge zur Wieland-Biographie, aus ungedruckten Papieren," Freiburg and Tübingen, 1882, p. 16.) Still earlier, Dec. 12, 1753, he writes to Sophie that her new union (with La Roche) will not take away the gentle sympathy existing between their souls, the sympathy which is grounded in the true love of the good and beautiful. (Gruber, "Wieland's Leben," Gruber edition, L, 170).

feeling of what is right and noble. The image of beauty and order which nature has impressed upon his soul, is the only law to which he subjects himself.[65] Peregrinus Proteus' love of beauty is as characteristic of his nature as breathing is of his lungs. Menander's comedies surpass those of his contemporaries on account of his innate love of beauty, which is transmitted to his work. When Narcissus and Narcissa are brought together, the latter becomes aware of her sense of beauty and goodness, the sense which has hitherto slumbered or was blunted by vanity and selfishness.[66] We have it emphasized again and again that Cicero had a fine esthetic-moral sense (*Sinn für das Sittlichschöne*), and we are told that Socrates had an esthetic sense because his wisdom was of the highest kind.[67] Eros, Aristippus' friend, is swayed by an irresistible impulse toward the good and the beautiful, and he finds no rest until, united with the good and beautiful, he produces noble sentiments and deeds. Aristippus himself possesses such an esthetic-moral sense.[68] Dion, with whom Agathon comes in contact in Syracuse, has a character that delights the *moral sense*. Agathon, Wieland's chief hero, is a man with a fine moral sense. Sensitive as his eyes are, they are not more so than his *moral sense,* and an object which offends the latter cannot impress the former favorably. There are many things in Hippias' home that offend his moral sense. He belongs to the class of lovers who by the fineness of their feeling are capable of judging of the physical pleasures of love and by their *inner esthetic-moral sense* (*innere Sinn für das sittliche Schöne*) are competent to judge of the moral pleasures of love.[69]

In Shaftesbury's manner Wieland then elaborates the beneficial effect of the love of beauty. The lover of beauty is him-

[65] "Agathon," Part III, Göschen, VI, 263. "Araspes und Panthea," *Ibid.*, XXVII, 112.

[66] "Peregrinus Proteus," Hempel, XXI, 48. "Menander und Glycerion," *ibid.*, X, 24. "Das Hexameron von Rosenhain" (1805), *ibid.*, XIII, 35.

[67] "Ciceros sämmtliche Briefe, übersetzt und erläutert von Wieland" (in 7 volumes; the last two volumes by Gräter), IV, (1811), introduction, p. xxii; V (1812), 530 and 533. "Versuch über das Xenofontische Gastmahl," *Attisches Museum,* IV², 117.

[68] "Aristipp," Göschen, XXIII, 273 and 6.

[69] "Agathon," Göschen, V, 195; IV, 79, 60, 204.

self beautiful, for the object of his love transmits its splendor to him. When your soul is filled with ideals of beauty and perfection, you look down with inner rest and freedom upon human evil passions; and while others try to satisfy their insatiable hunger by animal indulgence, you feed on the pure ambrosia of the gods, on beauty, harmony and perfection. A man with a natural disposition for the noble and beautiful is easily convinced that the entire universe is to be considered as a single state, and the whole human race as one large family in this *City of God,* which is ruled by the eternal laws of nature and reason; that in accordance with this order grounded in the nature of things men cannot enjoy any welfare, unless they are governed by the same natural and rational laws which keep the entire universe in eternal order.[70] It is by virtue of the love of beauty that man is able to be what he actually is. Without the love of beauty, without the sympathetic affections, man would have nothing else to do but to eat and sleep and propagate his species, like every other animal. He would be nothing else but the king of the apes, and even this privilege would be disputed by a stronger and more courageous animal.[71]

Owing, however, to the superiority of human nature to that of the lower animals, man is endowed with a taste for harmony, beauty and charm; hence the greater his love of beauty, the more perfect man is, the more like himself. Man enjoys pure pleasure in the contemplation of beauty, which in this respect is like unto the contemplation of virtue; both are just as much a necessity for man's spiritual nature as food for his animal part. Through the power of detecting the rule of the beautiful and pleasant man is enabled to extend almost to the infinite the bounds of his pleasure. All arts and sciences owe their growth and development to man's innate love of beauty and perfection, which makes him the master over the lower animals, subjects to him the earth and sea, and finally enables him to transform nature and to create a new world for himself. He ennobles his physical needs and impulses, which he has in common with

[70] "Aristipp," Göschen, XXIII, 281; "Peregrinus Proteus," Hempel, XXI, 62. "Agathodämon" (1799), *ibid.,* XXII, 142.

[71] "Koxkox und Kikequetzel" (1770), *ibid.,* XXXI, 47–8.

the lower animals. He invents art after art, which contribute to the security and enjoyment of his existence; and thus he rises incessantly from the indispensable to the comfortable, and from the comfortable to the beautiful. After attending to his first needs he strives to beautify his condition, and thus villages are changed to large cities, places of art and commerce, international centers and the like. In the same proportion as he improves and beautifies his outward condition he also develops his feeling for moral beauty, submits to laws of justice and equity, checks his shortcomings, controls his passions and shows his better side. "Through all these he finally rises to the highest possible perfection of his spirit, to the great conception (*Begriff*) of the whole of which he is a part, to the ideal of the good and beautiful, to wisdom and virtue, and to the worship of the inscrutable primitive power of nature, the common father of spirits, the recognition and observance of whose laws is at once their greatest prerogative, foremost duty and purest pleasure."[72]

Closely connected with all this is the ideal of esthetic culture advocated both by Shaftesbury and Wieland. A beautiful object, says Aristippus-Wieland, bestows its beauty upon the contemplator and lover of it. It is, therefore, necessary that everything seen and heard by us from our childhood on should be beautiful. We should accustom our eyes to the beauty of nature and out of her manifold beautiful forms fill our mind (*Phantasie*) with ideas of beauty. The ear should be accustomed to gentle melodies, such as breathe beautiful feelings, gently agitate the heart and rock the slumbering soul into sweet dreams.[73]

The close connection between virtue and art, to which Shaftesbury so frequently calls attention, is again and again emphasized by Wieland. The fine arts, he says, should be the "playmates and handmaids of truth and virtue." They encour-

[72] "Platonische Betrachtungen über den Menschen" (1754), Göschen, XXIX, 105. "Über das Verhältnis des Angenehmen und Schönen zum Nützlichen" (1775), Hempel, XXXII, 36–9.

[73] "Aristipp," Göschen, XXIII, 281. "Abderiten," Göschen, XIII, 14. "Der goldne Spiegel," Göschen, VII, 74 and 75.

age virtue and beautify life and manners.[74] In consequence of the great artistic activity during the reign of one of the kings of Scheschian, the feelings and morals of the people are refined. The people become gentler and more sociable, learn to enjoy contact with one another, to participate in common joys and to feel all the happier, the greater the number of happy folk they see round about them. During the reign of Tifan the works of the Scheschian artists surpass those of other lands, because in their artistic work they unite beauty with goodness.[75] Art prevents men from becoming rough, for through it they become acquainted with gentler, finer and nobler pleasures. And so the Greeks looked upon the fine arts as sources of decent and modest enjoyments and as the best means of rendering the mind and heart tender and tractable; so a man who was not a favorite or connoisseur of the muses was considered by them rough and uncouth.[76] Agathon's early experience in Delphi impresses upon him the idea how greatly the fine arts contribute to the development of the moral man and how wise the priests were to have deified the Muses and Graces, whose favorites have rendered the Greeks such great services. Also, later on, after a long experience in life, Agathon is convinced that, when directed by wisdom, the arts beautify, cultivate and ennoble man; that art is half of human nature, and that without it man is the most wretched of animals.[77]

The poet is also called upon to work in the same direction, and Wieland makes of him exactly the same demands as Shaftesbury. The muses, we are told, are never more beautiful than when they are in the service of virtue. The purpose of poetry is to portray virtue in all its beauty; to relate divine deeds; to inspire man with a taste for the noble, great and sublime; to lure the spirit away from sensual things and to accustom it to heavenly things.[78] The poet himself should have

[74] "Theages," in "Prosaische Schriften," I, 163. "Der goldne Spiegel," Göschen, VIII, 215. "Cyrus," 4th Canto, lines 74–5, Gruber, IV, 99. "Aristipp," Göschen, XXIII, 340.

[75] "Der goldne Spiegel," Göschen, VII, 44 and VIII, 190.

[76] "Danischmend" (1775), Göschen, IX, 101. "Plan einer Akademie," in "Prosaische Schriften," III, 111.

[77] "Agathon," Göschen, V, 5 and VI, 329.

[78] "Sympathien," Göschen, XXIX, 26. "Theages," *ibid.*, XXXIII, 222.

a love of the beautiful and sublime, abhor every evil act, admire every noble deed, possess a sociable attitude and a "zärtlichste Lebhaftigkeit der sympathetischen Neigungen." Instead of pleasing the reader for just a short time the poet must captivate the reader's whole soul, set into play all his feelings, enchant his imagination and "furnish his heart with the sweet enjoyment of his best sentiments, of his moral sense, his feeling for the joys and sorrows of others and his admiration for everything that is noble, beautiful and great in humanity."[79]

And life in general is conceived as an art both by Shaftesbury and Wieland. Wieland regrets that there are so few who apply their talent to the *art of living,* the art, which he describes as "the first, the most necessary, the most beautiful of all arts."[80] "The wise man, he writes to Zimmermann, cultivates all his inner and outer senses, exercises all his faculties, enjoys the whole of nature; he alone knows truly *the art of living.*"[81] And his Aristippus strives to make great progress "in der Kunst zu leben."[82]

Aside from the innate love of beauty and its beneficial effect, Wieland also develops the other well-known Shaftesburian doctrine, *i. e.,* that virtue is natural and universal, and that man is by nature a social creature. Since God made our souls susceptible to the beautiful and sublime, since the love not only of material but also of moral beauty is essential to our nature, so uprightness, innocence, faithfulness, gratitude, magnanimity, patience, courage, and other virtues inspire us with esteem and love, wherever, whenever and in whomsoever they are observed, regardless of all utility they have or might have for us. Our own *ego* comes so little into consideration, that if we were told of a virtuous deed performed ten thousand years ago by a man in the moon, the idea of that deed would impress us just as much as if it had been performed in our midst only a few days ago. And so Agathon, as a result of his extensive travels,

[79] "Sendschreiben an einen jungen Dichter" (1782), Göschen, XXXIII, 270, 289.

[80] "Sympathien," *ibid.,* XXIX, 57; "Die Züricher Abschiedsrede" (1759); *Vierteljahrschrift für Literaturgeschichte,* 1889, II, 587.

[81] Letter of March 12, 1758: "Ausgewählte Briefe," I, 260.

[82] "Aristipp," Part I, Göschen, XXII, 276.

comes to the conclusion that virtue is honored by all peoples, the wildest barbarians as well as the cultured and refined Greeks, and that no community, were it even a group of Arabian robbers, can exist without some degree of virtue.[83]

We have it emphasized, therefore, that man is by nature social. It is wrong, Wieland claims with Shaftesbury, to base the social order upon the notion of a contract, for the social order is a law which is grounded in human nature and conditions man's whole progress and development. Since sociability is instinctive in man, there is no truth in Rousseau's doctrine that the present state of society is a state into which men have passed from an opposite state, *i. e.*, the state of nature. Even in the state of nature man is a social creature, and so our modern society is not the result of a transition from one state to its opposite, but a mere continuance of the same state.[84] Only as a member of society man is in his natural position; without society he is out of place. Agathon, therefore, on fleeing from Athens, decides to seek only a place where a virtuous man should enjoy the happiness belonging to him, while staying in the midst of society. Alcestis, who on account of his disgust with mankind decides to retire into seclusion, is ridiculed and warned that in so far as he will have nobody to whom he may communicate his observations, nobody to approve of his actions or to love him, he will soon grow weary of his hermit-life. And Brother Lutz, the hermit, loses very much in consequence of his hermit-life. The high-steward (*Seneschal*), in the very midst of society, lives a much more virtuous life than the hermit in his seclusion; such is the fatal effect of withdrawing from society.[85] This entire doctrine of the naturalness of man's virtue and sociability can best be summarized in the following words of Wieland: From our general experience, from incontestable evidence, from all ends of the

[83] "Sympathien," in "Prosaische Schriften," I, 105. "Aristipp," Göschen, XXIII, 286, 101. "Agathon," Göschen, VI, 327.

[84] "Lustreise ins Elysium" (1787), Hempel, XXXIII, 263. "Beiträge zur geheimen Geschichte des menschlichen Verstandes und Herzens" (1770), Leipzig edition, 1770, II, 42.

[85] "Agathon," Göschen, IV, 40. "Sympathien," *ibid.*, XXIX, 13–14. "Die Wasserkufe" (1795), *ibid.*, XII, 99–100, 124–5.

earth, we have the truth "that man is made for sociableness; that the united forces of superstition, barbarism and oppression have ever been unable to destroy this costly jewel of social virtue, this sympathy which, with a sweet authority, compels man to love himself in other men."[86]

3. *The Inherent Worth of Virtue*

Wieland upholds most emphatically the well-known Shaftesburian doctrine that virtue has its own peculiar source; that it has an inherent worth which makes it independent of custom, vogue and even religion. Virtue, says Wieland, may sometimes be hindered, it may become dormant, but it will ultimately have its proper course. A beautiful soul endowed by nature with the gentlest sense of the good and beautiful, and with an innate ease in the practice of every social virtue, may by unfavorable circumstances be hindered in its development, but it can never cease to be a beautiful soul. Just as soon as the mist is dispelled the beautiful soul once more recognizes the divinity of virtue. The love of virtue, the desire to model itself after the divine ideal of moral beauty, takes possession of all its proclivities and becomes a passion.[87]

Shaftesbury frequently defends his doctrine against such philosophers as Hobbes and Locke by first stating their point of view and then attacking it. Wieland uses the same method, for he also condemns or refers sarcastically to the opposite doctrine. Whence, he exclaims, comes this reluctance to believe that one can do good for its own sake; that friends can love each other without being influenced by any other considerations than *their love of the good and beautiful?*[88] And so the wise Kador stands up for the cause of virtue in the face of the opposition from those who assert that only a fool believes in virtue as such; that virtue has no intrinsic worth; that what people call virtue consists of a number of arbitrary signs which differ in the various lands; that inasmuch as each land puts a

[86] Beiträge zur geheimen Geschichte des menschlichen Verstandes und Herzens," I, 228.

[87] "Agathon," Göschen, VI, 188–9.

[88] "Gedanken über eine alte Aufschrift" (1772), Hempel, XXXII, 57.

different stamp upon notions of virtue, just as upon its coins, there is little real difference betwen the pliant European, the haughty Persian, the pious Armenian and the rude Kamchadale.[89] Further on Danischmend[90] condemns Eblis' system of philosophy. Eblis asserts that truth varies according to various views; that beauty and deformity depend upon our special temper, mood or point of view; that virtue is merely an arbitrary agreement on the part of some pedantic heads to inspire the crowd with respect and confidence by means of some arbitrary semblance of justice and mangnanimity; that there always have been fools who endeavored to practice the virtue preached by those pedants; that he must be a threefold fool who at his own expense wishes to make a friend happy or to live for others, when he can compel others to live for him. All this is condemned by Danischmend as an "abscheuliche Moral."[91] These protests may be regarded as a reflection of Shaftesbury's opposition to Hobbes and Locke.

Wieland's adherence to Shaftesbury is in this connection further shown by his opposition to Mandeville. Mandeville's purpose is, as he himself states,[92] to set himself into direct opposition to Shaftesbury. His philosophy, therefore, which from beginning to end is grounded in pure materialism and drenched in outrageous cynicism, is a direct attack on Shaftesbury's doctrine. Shaftesbury's views, Mandeville declares, are a high compliment to mankind; but they are inconsistent with daily experience, for man is by nature neither social nor virtuous. Whatever virtue man practices originates entirely

[89] "Der goldne Spiegel," Göschen, VIII, 16–18.

[90] Danischmend is the adviser of Schach-Gebal in "Der goldne Spiegel" and the hero of the work: "Geschichte des weisen Danischmende." Just before Wieland came to Weimar at the call of Duchess Amalie the young prince, Carl August, wrote to Wieland (July 23, 1772) expressing his joy that the latter has consented to come to the ducal home as philosopher and "leib Danischmende" (*Vierteljahrschrift für Literaturgeschichte*, edited by B. Seuffert, 1890, III, 611.) Also among his friends Wieland was called Danischmend (M. Koch: "Chr. M. Wieland" in *Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie*, XLII, 415). This can be accounted for by Wieland's resemblance to his hero.

[91] "Der goldne Spiegel," Göschen, VIII, 20–21.

[92] Mandeville: "Search into the Nature of Society" (in the 5th edition, 1729, of the "Fable of the Bees"), I, 372.

from self-interest and his fondness for praise and flattery. Man loves company for his own sake and not out of natural affection for mankind. "The sociableness of man arises from the multiplicity of his desires and the continual opposition he meets with in his endeavors to gratify them." Man cannot always detect the *pulchrum* and *honestum* in morality and nature, because great uncertainty exists in the works of nature and in the moral world. Man loves and hates for himself. "Every individual is a little world by itself," and his own happiness seems to be the whole purpose of his life.[93]

From the very beginning, Mandeville claims, we are taught to be hypocrites, for if our thoughts were laid open to others we should be unable to endure one another. "There is no difference between will and pleasure in one sense, and everywhere motion made in spite of them must be unnatural and convulsive. Since then action is so confined and we are always forced to do what we please, and at the same time our thoughts are free and uncontrolled, it is impossible we could be sociable creatures without hypocrisy."[94] It is a mistake, he asserts, to consider the social and praiseworthy qualities of man as beneficial to the public. For instance, the fewer desires a man has the more loved he is, and yet the lack of many appetites on the part of the individual cannot promote the wealth, power, and glory of a nation. We need the "sensual courtier," the "haughty duchess," the "lavish heir," and the "covetous villain," in order to have the great variety of labor and to procure a livelihood for the vast multiude of the working poor. Envy and avarice keep the members of society at work; pride, sensuality and sloth promote art and science. Vice, he argues, is necessary for the prosperity of a state, and only fools can believe in the possibility of enjoying the charms of the earth and being at the same time virtuous.[95]

Wieland's attitude to this greatest opponent of Shaftesbury is one of disapprobation. He refers to Mandeville as a depre-

[93] Mandeville: "Search into the Nature of Society," I, 372 ff., 376 ff., 390 ff., 396; "Inquiry into the Origin of Moral Virtue," I. 27 ff. Also 4th dialogue between Horatio and Cleomenes, II, 196.

[94] "Search into the Nature of Society," I, 401 ff.

[95] *Ibid.*, 409 ff., 424 ff. Also "Fable of the Bees," I, 23–4.

ciator of mankind and speaks of him as one who certainly has not rendered the best service to virtue by preaching its falseness.[96] The conversion of everybody to genuine Christianity would according to Mandeville be detrimental to society; for then no wars would be waged, manufacture would be ruined, the ship industry and commerce in general would suffer very much.[97] Here we have Wieland's direct attack upon the main theme of the "Fable of the Bees."

To a certain extent Wieland also maintains Shaftesbury's doctrine concerning virtue's independence of religion, but like Shaftesbury he emphasizes the necessity of religion.[98] Even the best and happiest man can through religious belief become still better and happier. Religion promotes morality, but it loses its effect the moment manners become corrupt; and so Agathon, after a long experience in life and as a result of extensive travels, comes to the conclusion that individuals as well as whole peoples may sometimes have religion without virtue, but that when they are already virtuous they become all the better through religion.[99] According to this, therefore, virtue is prior to religion, and the latter exerts its beneficial influence only when the former is already on hand.

On the whole, however, Wieland urges, religion grounded in reason is a moral necessity of mankind. It is so deeply rooted in human nature that, in order to uproot it, it would be necessary to uproot human nature itself. Such religious belief is not only beneficial but to a certain extent indispensable, in so far as it is free from superstition or demonism;[100] and that by demon-

[96] "An Psyche," *Teutscher Merkur*, April, 1774, p. 32. "Vorbericht zum Anti-Cato," *ibid.*, Aug., 1773, p. 119.

[97] "Anna Maria von Schurmann" (1777), Hempel, XXXV, 348–9.

[98] Unlike Herder, Lessing considers Shaftesbury as an enemy of Christianity and objects to Wieland's frequent praise of the Englishman. He hopes that Wieland's frequent praise of Shaftesbury will be taken into consideration by the theologians before they become interested in Wieland's poetry. Shaftesbury, Lessing adds, is the "most dangerous enemy of Christianity, because he is the finest." See: "Briefe die neueste Literatur betreffend." 12 Brief. Lachmann-Muncker edition, VIII, 27.

[99] "Gebrauch der Vernunft in Glaubenssachen" (1788), Hempel, XXXII, 282. "Der goldne Spiegel," Göschen, VIII, 215. "Agathon," Göschen, VI, 328.

[100] "Gebrauch der Vernunft in Glaubenssachen," p. 314.

ism Wieland means exactly the same as Shaftesbury Wieland himself elsewhere states. The idolatry, he says, which has affected the majority of the human race, consists of what Shaftesbury calls demonism, namely, idolatrous worship of a number of infernal deities, protective spirits, good and bad demons, and of the superstition connected with the images of these gods.[101]

In connection with the inherent worth of virtue, Shaftesbury advances the doctrine that virtue should be conceived as a real pleasure and not as a matter of stern duty or self-denial. The practice of virtue out of pure natural propensity is with Shaftesbury the height of morality; and so it is with Wieland. Virtue, he says, would be ever so much more lovable if instead of being forced upon us as a matter of duty it were to be practiced out of voluntary inclination. It is very important, therefore, that one should easily dispense with that which is forbidden by duty.[102] And so in a state of love, when we have a higher sense of beauty, a loftier stage of general sympathy, and more than a usual impulse toward the sublime—in such a state we also possess a stronger impulse to practice virtue.[103] The most virtuous man has not only a fine taste for beauty, but also a noble proclivity to virtue. That is why it is the pleasure of beautiful souls to practice virtue joyfully, "aus Neigung, nicht aus Pflicht."[104] As an example of a highly desirable class of people Danischmend sets up those that have no temptations, that are incapable of doing evil, are true to other men and to nature, feel the true and do the good without finding any difficulty in all this.[105]

Under the influence of Musarion, Phanias learns the "charming philosophy" which dictates the practice of virtue out of natural taste. That the Scheschian priests under the reign of

[101] "Anmerkungen über A. Dow's Nachrichten von der Religion der Braminen" (1775), Hempel, XXXV, 50. Shaftesbury's conception of demonism, to which Wieland alludes, is found in the "Characteristics," II, 11.

[102] "Der goldne Spiegel," Göschen, VIII, 5. "Die Wasserkufe," Göschen, XII, 105.

[103] "Der goldne Spiegel," Göschen, VIII, 89.

[104] "Betrachtungen über den Menschen," *ibid.*, XXIX, 118. "Traum ein Leben" (1771), *ibid.*, III, 238.

[105] "Danischmend," *ibid.*, IX, 75.

Tifan are able to become the worthy teachers of the nation, patrons of good manners and models of virtue, is due among other things to the moral charm that has spread itself through their lives and to the ease and readiness with which they fulfilled every duty.[106] Krates has a very noble and sublime character, because it is his earnest purpose to bring his propensities into the purest harmony with duty.[107] Chariklea, or the former Danae, is all the more esteemed, the more natural she finds virtue and the fewer the sacrifices she seems to be bringing to it. Aristippus, with whom Agathon comes into contact in Syracuse, is a lover of the kind of virtue the practice of which makes him happy and does not impose upon him any stern duties. Archytas recommends very highly the Pythagorean philosophy, because it renders every virtue easy and natural. And Archytas himself, the moment he perceives his full worth as a human being, as a "citizen of the city of God," finds the practice of every virtue easy.[108]

4. *The Relation of Beauty and Virtue to Harmony*

According to Shaftesbury harmonious coordination of parts into one whole makes for beauty in the outside world, while harmony in our actions and sentiments produces that inner beauty for which morality is only a synonym. This doctrine is also reflected in Wieland. Beauty, he says, consists of the mutual relation of the various parts and of their combination into harmonious unity of the whole. A beautiful object pleases us chiefly because of the harmony of all its parts when surveyed in a single moment. There must be uniformity amidst variety, and the manifold must be combined through harmony into one whole by the total impression of which we are to be pleased. This alone produces in us the idea of beauty. If, instead of seeing but fragments of a boundless whole, we could in one glance survey all of nature, we should see before us the true archetype of all beauty. The wonderful and the divine

[106] "Musarion" (1768), lines 1426–7, 1439–40, Pröhle (in "Deutsche National-Litteratur"), I, 57. "Der goldne Spiegel," Göschen, VIII, 208.
[107] "Krates und Hipparchia," Hempel, X, 144.
[108] "Agathon," Göschen, VI, 325, 15, 321, 315–6.

in nature, that by which she is so far superior to human art, consists of the fact that each one of her smallest parts contains a world full of harmonious variety, and that all these various parts are most intimately connected into a single uniform body.[109]

Wieland especially emphasizes the close connection between virtue and harmony. Without virtue, we are told, there is no true harmony; even the love of God is nothing else than the love of order. In his vision Mirza sees virtue in her heavenly form accompanied by a most beautiful nymph who, as his guide tells him, is none other than Harmony, the sister of Virtue.[110] The most virtuous men are, therefore, endowed with an harmonious disposition, and this harmony must be manifested in the total nature of man.[111] Body and soul, he claims, must always be in perfect harmony. The suppression of the physical side of man is inconsistent with human nature.[112] So Dioclea points out to Peregrinus Proteus how unnecessary and unnatural this suppression is. The senses, she emphasizes, are not to be destroyed but ennobled, refined and harmonized with the spiritual nature of man.[113] If, instead of living in mutual harmony, body and soul ever come to be treated as two distinct forces of different interests, fatal results are bound to ensue. Man is then no longer the noble creature which he is intended to be, for he then separates that which God has joined together, and there arises in him an unnatural conflict between animal and spirit, each one asserting its right at the expense of the other.[114] Archytas describes the establishing of a complete harmony between these two natures as the highest perfection of humanity.[115]

The same harmony should also exist between the moral and intellectual natures. The dissonance between the heart and

109 "Aristipp," Göschen, XXIII, 79, 97–100.

110 "Sympathien," in "Prosaische Schriften," I, 7, 109. "Gesicht des Mirza," Göschen, XXIX, 72–3.

111 "Betrachtungen über den Menschen," *ibid.*, XXIX, 118.

112 "Timoklea," *ibid.*, XXXIII, 214. "Theages," *ibid.*, p. 249.

113 "Peregrinus Proteus," Hempel, XXI, 83.

114 "Philosophie als Kunst zu leben und Heilkunst der Seele betrachtet" (1754), Hempel, XXXII, 31–2.

115 "Agathon," Göschen, VI, 307–8.

head, Wieland claims, becomes greater and more dangerous the longer we fail to examine carefully our moral notions with the view of establishing harmony between the parts and the whole. First of all, therefore, Archytas undertakes to bring Agathon's head into permanent accord with his heart.[116] A human character, asserts Aristippus, is to be called beautiful only in so far as it presents a completed whole in harmony with itself. "Das Schönste in dieser Art wäre also unstreitig ein ganzes Leben, welches, aus lauter schönen Gesinnungen und Thaten zusammengesetzt, uns das Anschauen der reinsten Harmonie aller Triebe und Fähigkeiten eines Menschen zu Verfolgung des groszen Zwecks der möglichsten Selbestveredlung und der ausgebreitetsten Mitteilung gewähren würde."[117]

Such a character is Archytas, for he possesses that happy serene temperament, that complete harmony of all human faculties and movements, that harmony wherein wisdom and virtue flow together.[118] Such a character is Musarion, for she also possesses that remarkable equilibrium between the spirit and the senses and holds the happy medium between Platonism and cynicism. She cautions Phanias against mere sensual love and declares that she loves him

> mit diesem sanften Triebe,
> Der, Zephyrn gleich, das Herz in leichte Wellen setzt,
> Nie Sturm erregt, nie peinigt, stets ergötzt.[119]

Such a character Agathon strives to be. At first he lacks that inner harmony, that equilibrium, for he cannot attain it so long as he leads the life of a recluse in Delphi and is surrounded by a mystic and Platonic atmosphere. Neither can he become at one with himself in consequence of his contact with Hippias' materialistic and cynical doctrines, which are

[116] *Ibid.*, V, 174 and VI, 284.

[117] "Aristipp," Göschen, XXIII, 102.

[118] "Agathon," Göschen, VI, 147. To a certain extent Clarisse, one of the heroines in "das Hexameron von Rosenhain," meets the requirements of such a character. She is an enemy of exaggeration and "Unnatur." She enjoys an indestructible inner rest, her entire nature is calm, moderate and in harmony with itself, Hempel, XIII, 102.

[119] "Musarion," lines 1197 ff. (Pröhle, I, 51), lines 1152–4 (p. 49).

almost an exact parallel of Mandeville's philosophy. He finally realizes that neither idealistic Platonism nor materialistic Hippias-Mandevillism is worthy of becoming a permanent guide in life; that the truth must lie somewhere between the two extremes. He finds this truth in the happy harmony of the character of Archytas, and under the latter's influence he begins to become the Agathon that he ought to be.

And such a character Wieland actually was. He went through the same development as his Agathon, and in the career of his hero he portrays, as he himself says,[120] his own career. Wieland attains the ideal of inner equilibrium and thus he becomes a living example of the Shaftesburian doctrine he preaches.

To this effect we have above all the testimony of his contemporary and friend, Goethe. Goethe was deeply impressed by Wieland's "schönstes Naturell"[121] and recognized him as a genuine type of that equilibrium and harmony which Goethe himself considered essential to genuine wisdom. "Equanimity and activity," he says of Wieland, "were so beautifully counterbalanced in him; and so with the greatest tranquility he has exerted an infinitely great influence upon the intellectual development of our nation. I have recapitulated to myself his activity; it is highly remarkable and the only one of its kind in Germany."[122]

Further testimony to the same effect we have again from Goethe in his "Maskenzug" of 1818. Here he puts into the mouth of Musarion the following verses, which contain the essence of Wieland's philosophy of harmony:

> Warum das Leben, das Lebendige hassen?
> Beschaue nur in mildem Licht
> Das Menschenwesen, wiege zwischen Kälte
> Und Überspannung dich im Gleichgewicht.[123]

[120] Letter to Zimmermann, Jan. 5, 1762, where he speaks concerning the project of the novel. "Ausgewählte Briefe," II, 164.

[121] "Dichtung und Wahrheit," Book 7, Hempel edition, XXI, 54.

[122] Letter to C. F. V. Reinhard, Jan. 25, 1813, Weimar edition, "Briefe," XXIII, 208.

[123] Goethe's "Maskenzug" (1818), lines 270–3, Weimar edition, XVI, 288.

And Wieland's harmonious life, which is a true realization of his teaching, is summarized by Goethe as follows:

> Wieland hiesz er! Selbst durchdrungen
> Von dem Wort das er gegeben,
> War sein wohlgeführtes Leben
> Still, ein Kreis von Mäszigungen.
>
> Geistreich schaut' er und beweglich
> Immerfort auf's reine Ziel,
> Und bei ihm vernahm man täglich:
> Nicht zu wenig, nicht zu viel.[124]

[124] *Ibid.*, lines 237–44 (p. 264–5).

CHAPTER IV

Virtue, Happiness and Culture

1. *Virtue and Happiness. Vice and Misery*

The well-known Shaftesburian doctrine that virtue is self-rewarding; that happiness is its natural consequence; that vice, on the contrary, is immediately connected with misery; that by working for the welfare of others one is really promoting his own interest,—all this finds the most emphatic, clearest, and most systematic expression in his "Inquiry concerning Virtue and Merit." This main theme of Shaftesbury's "Inquiry" is very clearly reflected in Wieland's works. As early as 1756 Wieland expresses his enthusiasm for the "Inquiry," for he then recommends it as "eines der besten und scharfsinnigsten Systeme der Sitten-Lehre."[1]

Virtue, we are told, is the source of happiness, the mother of the purest pleasure. Virtue always attains the bliss destined for it, the practice of it grants us new pleasures of which we may well be proud. Virtue divinely rewards its lovers and converts earth into heaven. Happy is the man whose heart has in his early youth perceived the charm of wisdom and the power of virtue.[2] Perfection is the source of delight, and by an infallible contrivance of nature the human race keeps on approaching the ideal of perfection and the happiness arising therefrom. The enjoyment of our existence is strengthened by "everything which appears under the friendly form of the good and beautiful."[3] It is a misfortune if, out of timidity or sloth, one fails to seek his entire honor and happiness in virtue,

[1] "Plan einer Akademie," in "Prosaische Schriften," III, 136.

[2] "Briefe von Verstorbenen," 1 Brief, lines 119–20; 2 Brief, lines 216–18, 368–9; 3 Brief, lines 91–2 (Gruber, II). "Moralische Briefe," 9 Brief, lines 1–2 (Gruber, I).

[3] "Moralische Briefe," 4 Brief, line 52. "Das Geheimnis des Kosmopoliten-Ordens" (1788), Göschen, XXX, 420. "Aristipp," Göschen, XXIV, 118.

which is the only thing that constitutes human perfection. Only then would our earth be what it ought to be if, true to the dignity of his soul, man would seek his happiness in virtue.[4] Virtue strews roses upon our pathway; and so Tifan declares that "without virtue and morals no happiness is possible."[5]

Convinced of the same truth, Timoclea desires to become through the help of Socrates "as good and beautiful as is necessary to be capable of genuine happiness." But before virtue can constitute man's highest happiness under all circumstances it must control the whole life of man and claim all his aims and efforts. Just as a deformed body cannot be beautiful, even if beautiful traits are scattered here and there, so separate pieces of virtue scattered here and there in a human life are just like splendid patches in a ragged coat. To deserve its noble name virtue must be complete.[6] In the same way Shaftesbury argues for the insufficiency of a virtue which is not thorough and absolute. Partial affections, says he, are inconstant. Partial virtue is of necessity variable, depends upon caprice and humor and passes frequently from love to hatred, from inclination to aversion. An inclination which is only casual cannot be trusted, an affection which is merely accidental and changeable cannot be depended upon. In consequence of the least compromise of virtue, it is quite possible for a person to be drawn into all kinds of villainy, such as he at first dreaded to think of.[7]

Wieland carries through Shaftesbury's distinction between "natural affections" and "self-affections." Upon analyzing the good and the bad, he says, we always find the former resolving itself into pleasure, and the latter into pain. The sensual joys attracting the deluded man are so transient and vain that they always disappoint his expectations. Such joys tire out even the most sensual person and teach him that his soul is not intended to feed upon the same material with the

4 "Timoklea," "Prosaische Schriften," III, 197, and Göschen, XXXIII, 217.

5 "Combabus" (1770), Göschen, X, 92. "Der goldne Spiegel," Göschen, VIII, 135.

6 "Timoklea," Göschen, XXXIII, 207, 209, 216–17.

7 "Characteristics," II, 110 ff.

lower animals.[8] Without moderation even the most natural desires become sources of pain; through excess the purest joy becomes a poison. Moderation is wisdom, and the wise man enjoys to the full the cup of pure delight, which nature pours for everybody. The wise man will often renounce a present pleasure because through proper abstainment his enjoyment is ultimately increased.[9] Lust and luxury are injurious. Can any one actually believe that a lustful judge can perform his duties conscientiously, or that a luxurious general can lead a successful campaign? The proud, the greedy and the cruel are loved by no one, and therefore they are the most wretched. There is no safety for any one who robs others to get it, and no one can be happy who is indifferent to the happiness or misery of others.[10] Very many physical ills are produced, nourished and aggravated by a wounded heart or an affected mind. Genuine happiness should, therefore, be sought not in the pursuit of artificial joys, but in preserving in an incorrupt state "die gröszte der Wohlthaten der Natur, die Empfindung."[11]

Like Shaftesbury, Wieland also advocates exercise and activity in order to preserve the health both of the body and soul. Activity, he says, keeps up our taste for the delights of nature and our ability to enjoy them. Nature's immutable law is that work and activity should be the condition of our happiness and the means of maintaining and sweetening our existence.[12]

While advocating the need and benefit of public or "natural affection," Shaftesbury also warns against carrying it to an excess and even emphasizes the necessity of "self-affection" in a moderate degree. Neither does Wieland fail to call attention to the same point. He recommends, for instance, meekness as one of the highest virtues, but he warns against carrying this virtue to an extreme. When carried to an extreme meekness becomes a lack of courage, a failure to know your

[8] "Nachlasz des Diogenes" (1769), Hempel, XXIV, 75. "Empfindungen eines Christen" (1755), Göschen, XXVI, 224.

[9] "Der goldne Spiegel," Göschen, VII, 72.

[10] *Ibid.*, 89. "Danischmend," *ibid.*, IX, 90.

[11] "Danischmend," p. 18. "Der goldne Spiegel," VII, 65.

[12] *Ibid.*, 64, 72–3.

abilities. Humility must not exclude the consciousness of our power or the endeavor to reach a higher stage of excellence. Likewise modesty, when carried to an extreme, becomes a non-virtue, which is all the more to be censured, because it is not only injurious to ourselves but prevents us also from rendering service to others.[13]

Besides "natural affections" and "self-affections" Shaftesbury also speaks of "unnatural affections," or "such as are neither of any advantage to the species in general or the creature in particular"; such, for instance, as a delight in the distress of others, treachery, ingratitude, envy, and the like. Such vices are likewise described by Wieland as "unnatural." Whoever finds joy in the sorrows of others, or fails to enjoy the happiness of others, is a monster, an "unnatural miscreant." Faults are frequently found in excellent persons for no other reason than that these censurers are anxious to find faults and look upon them through the magnifying glass of jealousy. It has long been observed, he adds, that the inferior classes rejoice in the misfortunes of the great. The joy in the discovery of faults in others also comes from the same source, namely, envy, which is "one of the most unnatural passions"; for what does any one gain by depreciating the merits and excellences of others?[14]

The greatest stress, however, is laid upon "natural affections" and the happiness they bring. Nature, we are told, has supplied man with the requisite means of becoming healthy and happy, and it demands of us to enjoy life. The Supreme Being wishes us to be happy, and makes our happiness depend upon the harmony and moderation of our various natural bents. Joy is the supreme wish of man and is of the same importance to him as air and sunshine to plants. It must, however, be borne in mind that the richest and purest sources of joy are love and benevolence. Through multiplied sociability the sphere of man's pleasures is enlarged and his capacity to enjoy life increased. The greatest pleasure is the conscious-

[13] "Sympathien," Göschen, XXIX, 46–7. "Reflexionen" (about 1800), Hempel, XXXII, 570.

[14] "Der goldne Spiegel," Göschen, VII, 72. "Gedanken über eine alte Aufschrift" (1772), Hempel, XXXII, 56–7.

ness of a well-employed life.[15] Wholesome in mind and temperament, says Diogenes to his friend Bacchides, how can I fail to be happy? Is not all nature mine, in so far as I enjoy it? What a source of enjoyment lies merely in the "sympathetic feelings!"[16]

Love is the soul of life and the source of the most beautiful inspiration. When you are filled with love, joy and innocence, each one of your movements, the tone of your voice and your very speech, become musical. Love establishes a sort of immediate connection between the soul and everything that is divine.[17] God has combined with the highest pleasure the sentiments which further the great end of man's existence. With the extension of our knowledge, with the proper use of our faculties and with every virtuous deed, He has combined such a sweet and lasting joy in order that we may be encouraged in our aspiration to perfection and be brought ever nearer to it. Virtue is the health of the soul and to such an extent is it interwoven with our happiness, that even God himself is unable to render anyone happy who fails to subject himself to the divine laws.[18] In reply to the highly materialistic philosophy of Hippias, Agathon asserts that he knows pleasures which are superior to those that man has in common with animals; such pleasures as come, for instance, from promoting the welfare of others. So also at the close of his career Agathon is convinced that the more wisdom and virtue a man has, the happier he is; that wisdom and virtue are always the right measure both of public and private happiness.[19]

Wieland then arrives at the well-known Shaftesburian conclusion, namely, that public welfare and individual interest are identical. The two, he claims, are so closely interwoven with each other that it is impossible to separate one from the other without destroying both. Love is the admirable instinct ap-

[15] "Moral der Natur" (1789), Hempel, XXXII, 151. "Der goldne Spiegel," Göschen, VII, 70, 45, 72.

[16] "Nachlasz des Diogenes" (1769), Hempel, XXIV, 63.

[17] "Der goldne Spiegel," VII, 75, VIII, 89.

[18] "Koxkox and Kikequetzel" (1770), Hempel, XXXI, 22. "Timoklea," in "Prosaische Schriften," III, 197 and Göschen, XXXIII, 217.

[19] "Agathon," Göschen, IV, 127 and VI, 329.

pointed by nature as the moving-spring of private and general happiness. Through love man receives the noble name of husband and father; love concentrates his sympathetic inclinations upon a wife and children, in whom his own life is rejuvenated and multiplied. No man can ever incur any injury by helping his friend, because his friend's happiness constitutes his own gain. On considering the wonderful order, in which the entire universe with the infinite number of its various parts is sustained, we come to the conception of a special purpose for every particular species, and of a general purpose for the entire system. All of nature unites her powers to sustain the existence of man, but, nevertheless, man must force nature's services from her. Without his labor and diligence the earth would soon become a wilderness to him. But how can individual men be equal to such a task? The whole species must be united in order to be able to assert its mastery over the earth; consequently, everybody finds his individual security in the perfect and happy state of the entire species.[20] Tlantlaquakapatli declares a similar truth when he says: As a result of suppressing a selfish impulse, in consequence of drying the tears of an unfortunate person or restoring joy to the distressed individual, I feel the divine flame spreading with an inexpressible rapture through my entire system, and I am convinced that no other delight is so gratifying as the delight coming from the performance of a noble deed.[21]

The man with a true interest in his fellow-men naturally abhors scenes and accounts of evil and corruption. With eagerness he seeks for scenes of peace and innocence; and if he does not find them in the historical accounts of the human race, he resorts to imaginative worlds, beautiful ideals, which, however, are real to him, since they transport him into a pleasant dream of happiness. And he is inspired with the feeling that, whenever it is a question of how long we have lived, only those moments are to be taken into consideration during which we have been wise and virtuous; only such moments as are devoted to the performance of noble deeds, to

[20] "Der goldne Spiegel," VIII, 87, 21, 91–2.
[21] "Koxkox und Kikequetzel," Hempel, XXXI, 22–23.

friendship, love, wise enjoyment of pure and innocent pleasures. So Psammis, the wise lawgiver, urges the following precept upon his people: "Multiply your personality by accustoming yourself to love in every man the image of your own nature. Relish as often as you can the pure divine pleasure of making others happy; and thou, unfortunate one, whose heart does not begin to swell at the mere thought of this, flee thou forever from the habitations of the children of nature!"[22]

As usual, Wieland then offers several specific instances, by which the doctrine is illustrated. Thus we are told of a certain troglodyte race nearly all of which perishes on account of selfishness and base disregard for each other's needs. The few that remain start a new epoch in the history of their people, for they begin to realize that their individual happiness becomes all the greater by considering the good fortune of others as an increase of their own, and by contributing their own to the common welfare; that in order to prosper, love and benevolence must be the dominating impulses of their souls, and that duty must at the same time be the source of their happiness.[23] Perisadeh, Danischmend's wife, feels her own happiness so closely interwoven with that of her husband and children, that their happiness is an absolute necessity to her. And the happiness of Danischmend himself depends entirely upon the purity of morals in Jemal. Danischmend can hate no man, and whenever he sees anyone committing an unworthy act, he feels just as intense a pain as if he himself committed that act. It is to such an extent that he identifies the welfare of others with his own and makes the cause of others his own cause.[24]

2. *Culture and Character. Philosophy and Life*

Although man is endowed with a moral and esthetic nature, he must, nevertheless, train his natural abilities and develop the faculties granted to him by nature; culture, therefore, is an absolute necessity. This Shaftesburian doctrine is also emphasized by Wieland. It is not sufficient, Wieland argues, to have

[22] "Der goldne Spiegel," VII, 204–5, 77.
[23] "Geschichte der Troglodyten" (1790), Hempel, XXXV, 267.
[24] "Danischmend," Göschen, IX, 50, 145, 186.

brought with us to the world the necessary instruments by which we can distinguish between the beautiful and ugly, the right and wrong. These instruments must be polished and developed.[25] The esthetic feeling is born with us, but it remains dormant until it is gradually awakened by science and knowledge. In the state of barbarism a people lacks the enlightenment of the understanding and the development of their human faculties.[26] Wieland opposes Rousseau's attack upon culture and his advocacy of the primitive state. Such a state, Wieland declares, is very undesirable, because it can never give rise to great men such as Palladio, Raphael, Erasmus, Galileo, Corneille, Metastasio, Locke, Montesquieu, Newton, Shaftesbury. And who is so ignorant as to deny the great advantages brought by these men to whole nations and in the course of time to the whole world?[27]

In Shaftesbury's manner Wieland then declares the development of human character to be the only criterion of true culture. Only then can learning be considered beneficial when it immediately aims to render us wiser and more virtuous. This doctrine comes into evidence as early as 1753.[28] We boast nowadays, he says, of the Newtons and Leibnizes, and yet the benefit brought by modern science is very insignificant. Sciences should enlighten and warm the soul, and their failure to do so is due to our present school-methods and the condition of our universities. Ought we not to expect our youths to possess orderly hearts, fine tastes and decent manners? We should

[25] "Gedanken über eine alte Aufschrift," Hempel, XXXII, 51.

[26] *Teutscher Merkur,* Nov., 1779, p. 105; April, 1774, p. 104 (probably by Wieland).

[27] "Beiträge zur geheimen Geschichte des menschlichen Verstandes und Herzens," II, 224.

[28] In a document entitled: "Plan einer neuen Art von Privat-Unterweisung," printed by L. Hirzel in *Schnorrs Archiv für Literaturgeschichte,* XI, 378–84. The document is here dated Feb. 12, 1754; but B. Seuffert reports of an older separate print dating from the year 1753. After Haller's return to Bern (March, 1753), the first print was sent to Haller and others. The anonymity which Wieland wished to keep at first had to be given up in April, 1753, since Heidegger, the burgomaster of Zürich, had then divined the author of the "Plan." See Wieland's letter to Zimmermann, Feb. 20, 1759: "Ausgewählte Briefe," I, 337; and *Schnorrs Archiv,* XI, 377, 384–5.

expect our youths to have acquired a fine taste for the good and beautiful, which to the great discredit of our present morals we miss very much. Our youths should have a predilection for order and public welfare. The notions of the good and true are perfectly natural to man, and he has in himself the seeds of all virtues. These seeds, however, are to be developed by a wise connoisseur of the human soul by means of questions, intercourse, conversation and the like. "In the case of every truth taught, I shall show that it is practical or of moral use." Among the best subjects to be taught Wieland considers the science of harmony and fine arts. In this science he purposes to teach the art of properly harmonizing the lower spiritual faculties (*untere Seelenkräfte*), the art of bringing the imagination into order. In the same science he also aims to develop the sentiments of the good and beautiful. The youths, he continues, must be taught to feel virtue as pleasant and vice as unpleasant. They must be taught to distinguish properly between the good and the bad by means of the mere taste; and before their reason reaches its maturity, their natural proclivities must be placed in the proper relation to whatever things are to be loved or hated. These are the tasks to be accomplished by a system of education; in fact, this is the only system of education which deserves its name as such.[29]

Three years later Wieland emphasizes the same thought in his "Plan einer Akademie zu Bildung des Verstandes und Herzens junger Leute."[30] Here he extols the Greek system of education for the reason that it meets the requisites of proper education. The object of the Greeks, says Wieland, was to train their young citizens in what they called *kalokagathia,* a word by which they understood all the qualities and perfections enabling man to play a noble part in life. To accomplish this purpose, which is alone worthy of human nature, the Greek youths were inspired as early as possible with the taste for the good and beautiful. It is from this point of view that they were taught Homer and the other poets who were both

[29] "Herrn Wieland's Plan von einer neuen Art von Privat-Unterweisung," *Schnorrs Archiv,* XI, 378 ff.

[30] The genesis of the work is discussed at length by Heinrich Funck: "Beiträge zur Wieland-Biographie," p. 5 ff.

the teachers and philosophers of the Greeks. When the youths grew older, they were placed in company and under guidance of wise men, and from associating with these men they learned what is noble or ignoble, just or unjust, wise or foolish, what duties are required of us by religion, human society and the particular state in which we live. To moral and social philosophy the fine arts, elocution especially, were added. In brief the Greeks required of a noble and well-bred youth to become a *kalos kai agathos* or "a virtuoso, as the most ingenious and finest of all modern authors, Shaftesbury, expresses it." While a great general or speaker was not common even among the Greeks, *virtuosi* were not rare among them, since virtuosoship was the result of their education. Just as a good taste, *sensus communis,*[31] noble sentiments and fine manners, were the natural results of the education of the ancients, so pedantry, rusticity and "learned stupidity" are the regular fruits of our present system of education. Whereas the Greek system was practical, our system separates the head from the heart. It is, therefore, not a matter of surprise that a Greek youth at sixteen usually excelled in dexterity and in virtue, while among us the majority of students are at sixteen only children in understanding and barbarians in taste and manner of life.[32]

On this general basis Wieland then outlines a somewhat more specific plan, which from beginning to end reminds us of Shaftesbury. It is above all necessary, he claims, that teachers should not be pedants and that the youths should be taught only those subjects by which they may become intelligent, ingenious, noble-minded and virtuous. It should be emphasized that all important truths were given to us in order to influence our lives with the view of making them more virtuous and happier. The authors especially recommended for reading are Euripides, Homer, Xenophon, Isocrates, Cicero, Horace, Tacitus, Demosthenes, Caesar, Virgil, Pliny. Among the books especially recommended for study is "Shaftesbury's treatise on virtue as one of the best and most clear-sighted systems of morality." That the young men may be inspired with good

[31] Note the use of the Shaftesburian term.

[32] "Plan einer Akademie," in "Prosaische Schriften," 102–4, 111–12,

taste, their attention should be called to all the material and spiritual beauties of nature. It should be pointed out to them that every creature has a special purpose for which it is constituted in a certain way; that the beauty and perfection of each creature arise from harmony with its purpose, and that its welfare is closely connected with the purpose for which it is intended; that everything is joined to everything else; that for this reason there is admirable order in the universe. In such a way the young man learns the basis of beauty in art and acquires a philosophic knowledge of nature. Such an instruction by a skillful teacher becomes at once a system of morality and religion, a system intended, to be sure, more for the heart than for speculation, but for this very reason all the more profitable. Fables, accounts of virtuous acts, moral pictures of manners and characters, are best fitted to develop and to sharpen the students' moral sense. The teacher himself should possess a well-developed moral sense. He must refrain from dry treatises and abstract investigations. He should employ the Aesopic and Socratic systems, which procure for truth the easiest access to our souls.[83]

This Shaftesburian doctrine is further elaborated in "Der goldne Spiegel" (1772), which established Wieland's reputation as an educator and was also the occasion of his call to Weimar as tutor of the princes.[84] Here, for instance, the education of the Scheschian prince Azor is directed entirely with a view of cultivating his wit and refining his taste. He is, therefore, taught only those arts the value of which consists of serving as ornaments of more essential perfections. Education, Wieland declares further on, is "die wahre Schöpferin der Sitten," for its purpose is to develop our esthetic feeling and to train us in order and virtue. Education should be a matter of great importance to the state, for if education be brought into good condition, everything else will take care of itself. We must not, to be sure, despise the studies which have no immediate tendency to make us wiser and better, but of such

[83] "Plan einer Akademie," III, 125, 128, 134–6, 140–2.

[84] Wieland's call to Weimar is discussed in detail by B. Seuffert in the *Vierteljahrschrift für Literaturgeschichte* (edited by Seuffert), 1888, I, 342–435: "Wielands Berufung nach Weimar."

studies very little should be taught. Inasmuch as a cultivated sense of beauty and goodness is an essential element of wisdom, special attention should be paid to the development of a fine taste. The school must have a close connection with ordinary daily life. The chief aim of education is to train everybody in the virtues of social and political life.[35]

And from exactly the same point of view Wieland treats philosophy. As to Shaftesbury, so to him, philosophy is worthless unless applied to practical life. In fact, philosophy is referred to as the "Kunst zu leben."[36] Like Shaftesbury, he also opposes pedantry and scholasticism. No man, he declares, is wise unless he fulfills the purpose for which he is intended. Men, however, frequently miss their purpose. Thus a poetic genius destined to be a Pindar becomes an Anacreon; and a man intended to be a real teacher of young people and to cure their moral defects becomes a mere pedant and stoops to "scholastic subtleties and to squabbles over problems settled long ago."[37] The close connection between philosophy and daily life is emphasized again and again. Present philosophers, he declares, merely point out to us that our thoughts and acts are wrong and that our mode of living should be different from what it is. By doing this they merely convince the sick man of his sickness; the important point, however, is to restore his health.[38] Their sphere of activity is confined to very narrow limits. But the business of philosophers is to fight against abuses of a "von der Natur abgelerntes Verfahren," to contend for truth and worldly wisdom.[39]

Like Shaftesbury, Wieland finds this ideal realized among the Greeks. The instruction of the youths, says Wieland, in the duties of religion, state and society was called by the Greeks philosophy and was considered as the most essential part of the system of education. Philosophy, he continues, was with the Greeks not a matter of speculation but of bringing up vir-

[35] "Der goldne Spiegel," VII, 109; VIII, 215, 226, 216.

[36] "Ciceros sämmtliche Briefe, übersetzt und erläutert von Wieland," V (Zürich, 1812), p. 137.

[37] "Sympathien," Göschen, XXIX, 50–2.

[38] "Nachlasz des Diogenes," Hempel, XXIV, 119.

[39] "Agathodämon," *ibid.*, XXIII, 207, 47, 36.

tuous citizens for the state; it was considered a study necessary for everybody, since everybody had notions to be cleared up, proclivities to be directed to the best purpose, faults to be mended and virtues to be enhanced. Philosophy was so practical that the training in citizenship and statesmanship was attended to by philosophical societies. These societies had certain mental exercises, by which young men were accustomed to the most necessary virtues, such as moderation, patience, contempt of pain, love of work and the like.[40]

This attitude to philosophy may perhaps be ascribed not only to Shaftesbury's influence but to the joint influence of Shaftesbury and Socrates, who also made philosophy a matter of daily life and, with whom, as we have mentioned, Wieland became acquainted very early.[41] Socrates was certainly neither a pedant nor a solitary speculator nor a teacher that instructs *ex cathedra*. He did not even commit anything to writing, and what we know of his philosophy we gather from Plato's dialogues and Xenophon's remininscences. His philosophy was always unfolded in the course of a conversation which he was ever ready to begin with anybody that was inclined to it. Thus he introduced philosophy into the most common affairs of daily life; for any matter coming from daily observation or daily occupation gave him a subject for some philosophical discussion.

3. *The Virtuoso*

Wieland, as we have seen above, blended the Shaftesburian "virtuoso" with the Greek ideal of *kalokagathia*. It is, therefore, necessary to see what conception Wieland had of the Greek ideal. By the word *kalokagathia*, he says, the Greeks understood all perfections which distinguish a free and noble man from a slave and a man-like animal, all the qualities which enable one to play a noble part in life.[42] The usual meaning

[40] "Plan einer Akademie," III, 104–5.

[41] As early as 1752 he is impressed by the fact that

> Die Weisheit, die vor ihm die Himmel nur durchspürt,
> Hat Sokrates zuerst zur Erden abgeführt.

"Moralische Briefe," 9 Brief, lines 147–8, Gruber, I, 301.

[42] "Plan einer Akademie," III, 102.

of a *kaloskagathos,* as used in Athens, corresponded in general to what they call in England a *gentleman* and what they called in France under Louis XIV a *galant-homme* and later a *honnête-homme.*[43] Often the word signified nothing more than a person of prominent birth and education. In its moral meaning of "schöngut" or "gutedel," he adds, it seems first to have been taken from Socrates.[44] It came to designate a person who united in himself the good and the beautiful; a man with inner beauty and goodness, by which he is rendered amiable, noble-minded, benevolent and happy; an individual possessing all physical and spiritual excellences.[45]

It may be questioned whether all this covers exactly the same concept as is embraced by Shaftesbury's "virtuoso." Lessing objects very strongly to Wieland's identification of the two ideals. Lessing insists that with the Greeks *kaloskagathos* was no more than what we now call a "hübscher, guter, Mann"; that the Greek ideal has no connection whatever with Shaftesbury's "virtuoso"; that by trying to combine the two Wieland is "throwing dust into his readers' eyes."[46] Herder agrees neither with Lessing nor with Wieland. The Greek *kaloskagathos,* he claims, is much more than a "guter, hübscher Mann," as Lessing thinks, but much less than a Shaftesburian "virtuoso," as Wieland would have it. The Greeks, says Herder, taught their sons everything that cultivated the understanding and developed a fine taste and strong body. An Athenian *kaloskagathos,* while being neither of the three, possessed the ability of becoming a sage, poet and Olympic victor. The *kaloikagathoi,* however, Herder declares. in accordance with Shaftesbury's broad conception, never existed in Athens.[47]

The Shaftesburian ideal is, as we have mentioned above, the

[43] "Sokratische Gespräche," *Attisches Museum,* III[1], 146.

[44] "Aristipp," Göschen, XXIV, 292.

[45] "Theages," Göschen, XXXIII, 414. "Die Abderiten," *ibid.,* XIII, 14. *Teutscher Merkur,* Feb., 1777, p. 132. "Der neue Amadis," Göschen, XV, 306.

[46] "Briefe die neueste Litteratur betreffend," 10 Literaturbrief, Lachmann-Muncker edition, VIII, 22.

[47] "Fragmente zur deutschen Litteratur," 2 Sammlung, Suphan edition, I, 303 ff.

culmination of his moral-esthetic philosophy. Wieland himself considers the virtuoso-ideal as pervading all of Shaftesbury's philosophy, as something "que Shaftesbury peint si admirablement dans tous ses écrits."[48] He defines Shaftesbury's "virtuoso" as "a man reared by the Muses and Graces; a lover of nature and art; one who is acquainted with the masterpieces of human wit and diligence; who esteems every talent; who has studied the world, the character, constitutions, laws, manners, religion, arts and inventions of the various peoples; who knows in all this what is right and beautiful."[49] This definition corresponds almost entirely to Shaftesbury's own definition, which is found in the first chapter of the third Miscellany and to which Wieland refers in a foot-note. On another occasion we are referred to the virtuosi as men striving after the beautiful, and we are told that virtuosoship consists of a fine instinctive skill to avoid the two extremities of defect and excess.[50]

Cicero is spoken of as a man who, on account of the wealth of his natural gifts and the "greatness of his virtuosoship," holds one of the highest positions among the heroes of mankind.[51] And Danischmend defends the *virtuosi* against the attack of the hypocritical "Kalender." In a cynical tone the latter speaks of the *virtuosi* as enthusiasts of virtue who do no evil because they are inactive; who have fine sentiments and beautiful and lofty ideas of virtue, but can never have these ideas realized. In reply to the cynic, Danischmend asserts that at any rate the *virtuosi* preserve the ideals of the good and beautiful and perform an immense service thereby.[52]

Wieland then wishes to make Aedon, the hero of the sixth *Sympathie,* "zu einem gröszeren Virtuoso." He tells him to travel through the whole realm of beauty and to convince himself that there are higher beauties than rosy cheeks and white breasts; that there are higher joys than those coming from the lips of girls and from bubbling glasses; that virtue, wisdom and

[48] Letter to Zimmermann, March 12, 1758, "Ausgewählte Briefe," I, 259.
[49] "Plan einer Akademie," III, 112.
[50] "Horazens Briefe übersetzt" (1782), I, 295–6.
[51] "Ciceros sämmtliche Briefe übersetzt und erläutert," I (1808), Preface, p. xiii.
[52] "Danischmend," Göschen, IX, 70, 74.

innocence deserve our highest admiration and love.[53] He speaks in lofty terms of the character of La Roche, mentioning among his other qualities a knowledge of everything "was unser Shaftesbury zu seinem Virtuosen fordert."[54] And Nicias is introduced to us as a "Virtuoso nach den Begriffen unseres Shaftesbury." Nicias is a fine connoisseur of the beauty of nature and art. By means of the most perfect models Italy has cultivated his taste for music, painting and architecture; and owing to all this he esteems poetic art all the more.[55] Finally, Wieland himself, as he reports in 1758, "loves all perfections, esteems all arts, loves human nature, and aspires to the character of the virtuoso, which Shaftesbury portrays so admirably in all his writing." He is as yet, he tells us, far behind this kind of character, but he, nevertheless, strives to attain it.[56]

[53] "Sympathien," Göschen, XXIX, 24–5.
[54] Letter to Geszner, "Auswahl denkwürdiger Briefe," I, 94.
[55] "Theages," Göschen, XXXIII, 222.
[56] To Zimmermann, March 12, 1758, "Ausgewählte Briefe," I, 259.

CHAPTER V

WIT AND HUMOR

1. *The Gloomy and the Cheerful. Good Humor and Raillery. Enthusiasm and Fanaticism*

By *freedom of wit and humor* Shaftesbury means, as we have seen, complete freedom in investigating and perfect familiarity in treating even the most serious matters, questions of divinity not excepted. He employs the doctrine as a sort of antidote to exaggerated solemnity, unnecessary gravity and extravagant sobriety. In his capacity as a cheerful philosopher Shaftesbury fights against all these faults and very strongly urges jest, mirth and a good-humored view of things in general. So much for the doctrine in general, which has been somewhat elaborated above. But before Wieland's attitude to the Shaftesburian doctrine can be fully determined, it is necessary to explain Shaftesbury's manner of using the individual terms "wit and humor." He never intends to let the terms stand each for a specific notion. On the contrary, he uses the expression "wit and humor" as a whole for a certain concept, which becomes clear enough from the context. Without any intervening explanation Shaftesbury somehow shifts from "wit and humor" to the notion of raillery, which is described now as a "species of wit,"[1] now as a "kind of humor."[2] "Raillery" then becomes a close companion of "wit and humor." Thus, we are told that "wit can never have its liberty where the freedom of raillery is taken away," and that the Epicurean and other sects in Greece were allowed to use "the force of wit and raillery" against superstition.[3] It is this immediate transition from "wit and humor" to "raillery" which removes from the

[1] "Characteristics," I, 62.
[2] *Ibid.*, I, 61.
[3] *Ibid.*, I, 19 and 18.

latter the notion of mere ridicule and attaches to it the idea of jest, familiarity and good humor.[4]

Coming to Wieland, we find first of all frequent occurrence of the Shaftesburian terms. On several occasions the terms are used in the English original. He demands for the poet "so viel freedom of Wit and Humor" as is consistent with the laws of propriety.[5] Quoting the introductory part of a letter received from one of his readers, Wieland remarks that the author of the letter intended to convey at the very outset an excellent impression "von seinem belletristischen Wit and Humor."[6] And on another occasion he compliments Johann Heinrich Merck on being "ein Mann von Wit and Humor."[7] The expression "Witz und Laune" occurs a great number of times, apparently in the Shaftesburian sense of "wit and humor" or "raillery and humor." The Athenians are spoken of as being especially susceptible to "Witz und Laune." Krates, we are told, is admitted by all to be a man of ingenuity, a man "voll Witz und guter Laune und äuszerst angenehm im Umgang." Lucian is referred to as an author combining in himself genius, good taste, elegance, "Witz und Laune."[8] Lais is said to excel in the vivacity and multiformity "des Witzes und der Laune." In the philosophical gatherings of Athens

[4] This appears very clearly especially from the following passage: We should be considered very "morose and ill-humored, if instead of treating the matter in *raillery* we should think of revenging ourselves on the offending parties who out of their rustic ignorance, ill-judgment or incredulity had detracted from our renown" (I, 37).

[5] Quoted by J. Steinberger: "Lucians Einflusz auf Wieland," Göttingen, 1902, p. 139. Steinberger refers to the *Morgenblatt* for 1828, p. 497.

[6] *Teutscher Merkur*, June, 1776, p. 282.

[7] Letter to Merck, Apr. 16, 1780: Karl Wagner: "Briefe an J. H. Merck von Goethe, Herder, Wieland und anderen bedeutenden Zeitgenossen," Darmstadt, 1835, p. 235. In another letter, Aug. 29, 1781, Wieland asks Merck to contribute to the *Merkur* whatever he pleases, "es sei Wit oder Humor," *ibid.*, p. 306.

[8] *Attisches Museum*, II[1], p. vii. "Krates und Hipparchia," Letter XIII, Hempel, X, 109. "Lucians Lebensmittel, Character und Schriften" (1788), Hempel, XXXVII, 357. The phrase "Witz und Laune" occurs in many other instances, of which the following may be referred to: K. Wagner: "Briefe an Merk," etc., p. 307; "Ciceros Briefe übersetzt," I, 299; "Horazens Satiren übersetzt," II, 6 and 112; *Schnorrs Archiv*, XIII, 505; Göschen, XXIII, 193; XXXIII, 288; Hempel, XXXIII, 121; XXXVI, 175; XXXVII, 225, 365, 201; XXXII, 228.

Socrates is the animating spirit on account of his "treffender Witz und muntere Laune."[9] So Shaftesbury declares that "raillery and humor are the only thing which makes good company."[10] In the sense of "raillery" Wieland uses not only the term "Spott" but also "Witz." This is especially evident from a passage in "Der goldne Spiegel," where we are told that *Witz* is something "dessen wichtigster Gebrauch ist, alles, was in den Meinungen, Leidenschaften und Handlungen der Menschen mit der gesunden Vernunft und dem allgemeinen Gefühl des Wahren und Schönen einen Miszlaut macht, das ist, alles, was ungereimt ist, als belachenswürdig darzustellen."[11]

As early as Oct. 18, 1756, Wieland expresses his admiration for Shaftesbury's cheerful and serene view of life. "Hat Sie nicht eben Shaftesbury überzeugt," he writes to Zimmermann, "dasz wir alle schwermütige, traurige, finstere Betrachtungen, alle dunkle Empfindungen wie unsre ärgsten Feinde bestreiten sollen? Ohne Zweifel hat er Sie es gelehrt!" We must, he continues, be conscious of our faculties before we can act with courage. We must have cheerful thoughts in order to be successful. We must examine the human race from the better side in order to be favorably inclined to it, and in order to love God we must represent Him to ourselves as good. Many of the moralists, he continues, transgress against these rules. They do not realize that self-contempt, doubt, fear, melancholy, poison our souls, and that all things are to be looked at from the brightest and serenest side.[12] Wieland remains a life-long advocate of this cheerfulness and good humor. Like Shaftesbury, he contends against the notion of making virtue unduly solemn and objects to conceiving of it as opposed to joy. "What claims can we lay to happiness if we despise nature and consider virtue as a destroyer of joy?" This latter notion is held by the tyrant Dionysius, in whose court Agathon spends some time. Dionysius entertains "the wrong but very common prejudice that virtue must be a professed enemy of all the gods of joy."[13]

[9] "Aristipp," Göschen, XXII, 106, 185.

[10] "Characteristics," I, 76.

[11] "Der goldne Spiegel," VII, 181.

[12] "Ausgewählte Briefe," I, 223–4.

[13] "Gesicht von einer Welt unschuldiger Menschen" (1755), Göschen, XXIX, 87. "Agathon," Göschen, VI, 47.

"I do not confound wisdom with austerity," Wieland writes March 12, 1758, "I am not grateful to those authors who wish us to love a virtue as ugly and disgusting as they represent it to us."[14] Virtue, he insists, makes pleasure and joy a duty to us. "A cheerful heart and a rose-colored or sky-blue fancy" are indispensable in many activities if they are to prosper.[15]

Among the excellences, therefore, enabling the Scheschian priests to become worthy teachers of their nation is their constant cheerfulness. Out of Psyche's earnest features there smiles forth a "sanfte Heiterkeit."[16] So Clarisse is sedate without being melancholy, earnest but not gloomy. General benevolence seems to be the very element in which she breathes. Cheer and good humor are always diffused over her lovely face and present the same appearance as sunshine upon a charming valley. And Musarion's element is "heitre sanfte Freude." All things appear to her in a "rosy light"; she combines earnest thought with playful jest.[17] Only in a playful attitude the muses offer the best instruction.[18] All human beings are born with more or less proclivity for the wonderful. The history of nations begins with speaking animals and theophanies. Gods and demigods, genii and fairies, giants and dwarfs, play a prominent part in the earliest histories of nations. Each has its supply of stories, its mythology, which is strongly intertwined with its history, religion, moral and social constitution. Because the cheerful and good-humored way of presenting morality gives the best results, fables were the first method of teaching, allegory the earliest veil of philosophy, fairy-tales the material of the oldest and greatest poets. Kamchadales, Persians, Greeks and Icelanders all agree on this point.[19] It is for the same reason that Virgil and Homer are more than merely amusing poets, for while entertaining, Homer teaches more practical philosophy than Chrysippus and Kran-

[14] To Zimmermann, "Ausgewählte Briefe," I, 260.

[15] "Combabus," Göschen, X, 92. "Danischmend," IX, 18.

[16] "Der goldne Spiegel," VIII, 208. "Agathon," V, 27.

[17] "Das Hexameron von Rosenhain," Hempel, XIII, 102. "Musarion," lines 1150–1, 1406, Pröhle, I, 49 and 56.

[18] "Idris und Zenide" (1768), 1st Canto, 6th Stanza, Hempel, XVI, 8.

[19] "Aristipp," Göschen, XXIII, 124. "Dschinnistan" (Winterthur, 1786–9), preface, I, p. iii–iv.

tor.[20] And so Aesop is referred to as "der gröszte Philosoph und Sittendichter."[21]

The playful presentation of truth and wisdom becomes a very essential part of Wieland's philosophy. In spite of their wisdom and honesty the members of Schach-Gebal's divan fail to exert a sufficient influence on him on account of their lack of cheer, their inability to jest and "to give to wisdom a laughing appearance."[22] Wieland speaks of the large number of "poor and mediocre moralizing books which, under promising titles, oppress the world with commonplace observations and perverse thoughts of their tedious authors." Of much greater advantage to the common welfare are comical novels like "Gil Blas" or "Gargantua and Pantagruel." Much to be preferred are the books in which "truth is told with a laugh," which are the more successful in their instruction, the more they merely seem to entertain the reader. Even if such books did nothing else than to serve as recreation to busy persons in their hours of leisure, or give harmless occupation to idle persons; even if they accomplished nothing else than entertaining the good humor of a people, they would still be a thousand times more useful than that "moral straw thrashed out long ago," that "methodical mishmash of missshapen and variegated ideas," which may do more harm than good.[23] It is for this reason that he attaches special importance to making his "Beiträge zur geheimen Geschichte des menschlichen Verstandes und Herzens" not a gloomy but cheerful work. He prefers, as he says in the foreword, to be accused by "feeble-minded critics" of not having a serious purpose rather than to pose as a philosopher and to put the reader to sleep by a monotonous and didactic tone.[24]

Finally, we have a lengthy glorification of joy and good humor, which in every respect reminds one of Shaftesbury. A wise man, we read, is by no means a hater of joy. What better

[20] "Über das Verhältnis des Angenehmen und Nützlichen zum Schönen," Hempel, XXXII, 35.

[21] *Teutscher Merkur*, Feb., 1782, p. 99.

[22] "Der goldne Spiegel," VII, 10.

[23] "Don Sylvio von Rosalva" (1764), Part II, Göschen, II, 5–6.

[24] "Beiträge," etc., Leipzig, 1770, I, 10.

thing than joy have the gods granted us? The life they have given us would certainly have been a very insignificant gift if they had not intended us to enjoy it. Wisdom and virtue constitute the surest way to joy, and joy is the best manner of partaking of wisdom and virtue. When the authorities of a state have succeeded in promoting art and industry, in securing peace and safety for their people,—what else have they done than to place their people in a cheerful attitude? Without joy mankind would be very unfortunate. Whoever objects to worship of this beneficent goddess is a rascal. The best advice that can be given to a ruler is to place his people in a condition of good humor. Short-sighted persons, however, fail to realize the importance of such a condition. A cheerful people suffers much less and performs its duties much more willingly than a gloomy people. The former, therefore, is much more easily governed. Political and religious fanaticism have no access to a people which is susceptible to mirth and jest. Whenever troublesome whims arise they can be "jested away" by those possessing the gift of humor. On the contrary when similar whims arise among a melancholy people they lead to fatal disturbances. It is certainly a bad sign when virtue assumes an unduly sober and grave appearance; such a state of affairs leads to stupidity and barbarism. "Virtue, which is itself the mother of the best joys, is consistent with every blameless pleasure." Take away cheer and good humor and you may as well take life itself. Pericles, Socrates, and the other wisest and best Athenians used to gather in the home of the beautiful Aspasia and there they discussed important matters in a cheerful tone which drove away tediousness and monotony. Unimportant matters became interesting through "wit and humor" (Wieland unquestionably here uses the expression *Witz und Laune* in the Shaftesburian meaning of "wit and humor"). The finest thoughts were uttered and the wisest plans arranged in these gatherings, which had for their apparent purpose nothing but recreation and amusement. Here philosophy learned from the Graces the art of jesting, here expression was given to ideas worthy to be written by Xenophon; and this was kept up until the Muses, disguised as

lovely maidens, closed the gathering with song and dance. Do you suppose that Athens would have been in a better condition, if the beautiful Aspasia and her maidens had been sent away and if men like Socrates and Pericles had been compelled to spend their evenings in a more serious fashion?[25]

In close resemblance to Shaftesbury, Wieland then argues in favor of unlimited exercise of reason, perfect liberty of investigation and freedom of raillery. The freedom of authors and philosophers, he writes to Zimmermann Nov. 8, 1758, must be unlimited, provided they do not disturb the universally accepted principles of religion and morality. "Die Wahrheit, sagt unser Shaftesbury, gewinnt durch die Untersuchung, durch den Zweifel und selbst durch den Scherz. She may bear all lights."[26] Nothing in the world, however holy it may be, should be withdrawn from the tribunal of reason; everything must be investigated and tested. All follies from which the human mind suffers should be subjected to raillery. Even insignificant follies are often sources of the greatest evils. Hence no folly, however insignificant or innocent it may appear, is to be exempt from raillery (*Spott*); "which is almost the only efficacious preservative against its injurious influence."[27]

The limitation of the full exercise of reason and of the freedom of raillery (*Witz*), Wieland argues, is bound to have fatal consequences. Such limitation tends to perpetuate ignorance and folly and subjects the nation to the danger of falling back into that state of barbarism which puts man on a par with the lower animals. How shall we draw the line of demarcation limiting the free exercise of reason? What rules should be laid down and who is to determine whether these rules are observed or violated?—So Shaftesbury asks the same question: "But who shall be judge of what may be freely examined, and what not? What remedy shall we prescribe to this in general? (I, 10)—And how can we think, Wieland continues, without investigating and investigate without doubting? If this free

[25] "Nachlasz des Diogenes," Hempel, XXIV, 75–80.

[26] "Ausgewählte Briefe," I, 310. The special words of Shaftesbury quoted here occur in the "Characteristics," I, 61.

[27] "Gebrauch der Vernunft in Glaubenssachen," Hempel, XXXII, 336. "Peregrinus Proteus," Hempel, XXI, 27.

exercise of reason is prevented from being applied to all objects, certain doubts and investigations will always be forbidden by rulers in case they find these doubts and investigations disadvantageous to their interest. The same is also true of raillery (*Witz*). Every limitation of the use of raillery gives license to folly. Check the free course of reason and raillery, and as inevitable consequences you will have stupidity, superstition, fanaticism, tyranny, mental darkness, corruption, rudeness and general barbarism.[28]

It is true that the free exercise of reason and raillery and humor (*der Vernunft, des Witzes und der Laune*) is abused by some and is employed to place virtue in a false light and to impede the cause of truth. These evils, however, are rare, incidental, and very insignificant in comparison with the evils coming in consequence of the limitation of the exercise of reason and raillery.[29] In fact, the majority of moralists and theologians have done more harm to virtue and to Christianity than the whole crowd of railleurs and sceptics. The safest proposition, therefore, is to overlook occasional excesses that are likely to come from this freedom rather than to be deprived by a stern regulation of "the noblest prerogative of mankind."[30] All sensible persons have recognized as undeniable "the good effect of fine ridicule employed at the proper time and in the proper place, of irony, and of that which is called *das Licht des Lächerlichen* by Shaftesbury, whom the D.D.'s and M.A.'s among his fellow-countrymen are so fond of misunderstanding."[31]

But just as we saw Shaftesbury distinguishing sharply between true and false raillery, between proper jest and mere buffoonery, so we also find Wieland doing exactly the same thing. Just as Shaftesbury declares that "no one of the least justness of thought can endure a ridicule wrong placed," that "the vulgar, indeed, may swallow any sordid jest, any mere drollery or buffoonery," that "it must be a finer and truer wit

[28] "Der goldne Spiegel," VII, 179–181.
[29] *Ibid.*, p. 182.
[30] "Sympathien," Göschen, XXIX, 58. "Der goldne Spiegel," VII, 184.
[31] "Horazens Satiren übersetzt," 1786 (Leipzig, 1819, in 2 parts), I, 302.

which takes with men of sense and breeding" (I, 11); so Wieland expresses the same sentiment:

> Witz ohne Geist ist ein vergoldeter Narr.
> Nur die Vernunft, die Richterin der Dinge,
> Weisz Witz und Schönheit weislich zu gebrauchen,
> Zum äuszern Schmuck der Wahrheit und der Güte.
> Der falsche Witz begnügt sich, wenn wir lachen;
> Wir lachen auch, doch über ihn allein.
> Er will bewundert sein, nicht nützen,
> Und bei noch gröszeren Thoren als er selbst
> Gelingt es ihm.[82]

He wants the abuse of raillery (*Witz*) to cease and urges the proper use of it. It must be a servant of truth, otherwise it is "a devil disguised as an angel."[83] He hates the kind of *Witz* which undermines virtue and thereby becomes *Aberwitz*.[84] Some people, he says, employ this false raillery, for they make it perfectly clear that the main object of their ridicule is to attack virtue itself. On the other hand, whenever the wise Kador ridicules the fanatic, deceiver or self-deceived person, he does it in a manner which to people of sound judgment leaves no doubt as to his good intentions and his adherence to truth and virtue.[85] Wieland also objects to stern and harsh raillery. He praises the authors of the weekly journal, *Die Welt*, on account of their gift of entertaining while instructing and their ability to chastise and ridicule without giving offence.[86] And he asks Bodmer to be more sparing of Lessing, not because Lessing does not deserve the chastising rod, but because the purpose aimed at by censure is attained, not so much by the magisterial tone as by "die Shaftesburische Manier, fein und kaltsinnig zu spotten."[87]

On the basis of the distinction between the gloomy and melancholy, on one hand, and the cheerful and good-humored on the other, Wieland distinguishes together with Shaftesbury

[82] "Erinnerungen an eine Freundin," Göschen, XXVI, 286.
[83] "Sympathien," Göschen, XXIX, 61 and 25.
[84] Letter to Schinz, June, 1752. "Ausgewählte Briefe," I, 91.
[85] "Der goldne Spiegel," VIII, 17.
[86] *Teutscher Merkur*, June, 1780, p. 293.
[87] Letter to Bodmer, Jan. 30, 1760, "Ausgewählte Briefe," II, 119.

two kinds of enthusiasm, a false or gloomy enthusiasm and a true or cheerful one, mere fanaticism and divine inspiration. Political fanaticism and religious fanaticism, he says, are monsters capable of producing the most terrible catastrophes.[38] On the other hand, there is a sort of inspiration wherein the contemplation of the beautiful, perfect and divine seizes the soul, lifts it above all earthly and physical elements, transports and enraptures it.[39] When the love of virtue takes possession of all our proclivities, when the desire of the soul to model itself after the divine ideal of moral beauty becomes a real passion, then the soul may justly be said to be possessed by a deity; and what test is too hard, what sacrifice too great, for this enthusiasm of virtue?[40] Virtue is the "supreme height of the human soul, love, God in us." There is a kind of love "which Shaftesbury with perfect right construes as a sort of enthusiasm."[41] Here, of course, Wieland refers to Shaftesbury's doctrine that virtue is an enthusiasm for the good and the beautiful.

Finally, we have a somewhat elaborate discussion of the difference between fanaticism and enthusiasm, a discussion which from beginning to end reminds us of Shaftesbury. A very clear distinction, says Wieland, must be drawn between *Schwärmerei* on one hand and *Enthusiasmus* on the other. *Schwärmerei* is a passion caused by objects which either do not at all exist in nature, or at least are not such as they appear to the intoxicated mind. This, he says, is fanaticism. And now Wieland illustrates the point by exactly the same example which is used by Shaftesbury in his discussion of fanaticism and enthusiasm. "So far indeed," says Shaftesbury, "the innocent kind of enthusiasm extends itself that when the party is struck by the apparition there follows always an itch of imparting it and kindling the same fire in other breasts. For thus poets are fanatics too. And thus Horace either is or feigns himself lymphatic and shows what an effect the Nymphs

[38] "Nachlasz des Diogenes," Hempel, XXIV, 77.
[39] "Gespräche in Elysium" (about 1790), Göschen, XXVII, 408.
[40] "Agathon," Göschen, VI, 189.
[41] "Liebe um Liebe" (1776), Göschen, X, 161. "Agathon," IV, 206.

and Bacchus had on him," (I, 51). Shaftesbury then quotes the Horatian verses (Od. 19, lib. 2):

> Bacchum in remotis carmina rupibus
> Vidi docentem, credite posteri,
> Nymphasque discentes, etc.

The same example is used by Wieland to illustrate his definition of *Schwärmerei:* "So schwärmt, z. E. Horaz, wenn ihn Bacchus, von dessen Gottheit er voll ist, in unbekannte Hayne und Felsenhöhen fortreiszt." But, Wieland continues, there is also an excitement of the soul which is the effect of immediate contemplation of the good and beautiful, of the perfect and divine both in the outside world and in human nature. Such a condition of the soul is to be classed as enthusiasm. That which stirs our souls so passionately is a divine touch. This passionate love of the true, good and beautiful is nothing less than divine inspiration; it is *God in us.* Men who have never experienced this enthusiasm are gloomy, confused and inactive, while those that are always inspired with enthusiasm are ever cheerful, full of life, courage and power, attractive and instrumental in everything that is good and noble. The enthusiast, to be sure, frequently becomes a fanatic; nevertheless, this cannot prevent us from drawing a sharp line of distinction between the two. The enthusiast is inspired by God, the fanatic by a fetich. Fanaticism is a fever, a disease of the soul; but enthusiasm is its genuine life. Enthusiasm is the best, noblest and most amiable thing which a mortal is capable of possessing.[42]

This constitutes Wieland's supplementary remarks to an extract from a lecture on fanaticism published in the *Merkur.*[43] Wieland praises the author of this work, finds in it much that is good and true, but he also accuses the author of a somewhat desultory treatment of the subject. Then he adds the following significant remark, which is given here in substance: The subject is by no means as yet exhausted, but one must plunge deeper into it if he wishes to say something new about it, or

[42] *Teutscher Merkur,* Nov., 1775, 151–5.
[43] On pp. 134–51.

something better than has been said since the time of Shaftesbury.[44]

2. *Wieland's Poetry of the Graces*

Likewise Wieland's poetry of the Graces reflects the influence of Shaftesbury's *Wit and Humor*. What is this poetry of the Graces? We let Geszner answer the question. "Und du, Wieland! Oft besucht deine Muse ihre Schwester, die ernste Weltweisheit, und holt erhabenen Stoff aus ihren geheimen Kammern, und bildet ihn zu reizenden Grazien."[45] Wieland's poetry of the Graces, therefore, is another manifestation of the good-humored method of presenting the most serious matters, the playful way of telling the truth, the jolly manner of giving utterance to wisdom and philosophy, the cheerful attitude to life in general; all of which, as we have shown, are so characteristic of Shaftesbury's philosophy.

It has always been the function of wisdom, says Wieland, to give to beauty an attendance of Graces, by which the soul becomes more beautiful and more divine.[46] The Graces, therefore, are not only the "Kammermädchen der Schönheit" but also the "Aufwärterinnen der Weisheit."[47] Menander desires to have as his life-companion a maiden reared by the Muses and nursed by the Graces.[48] Agathon represents to himself the Graces as playmates of the Muses, both always accompanied by wisdom. And Aristippus has been taught in Athens to "combine the cheerfulness of the Graces with the earnestness of philosophy."[49]

Without the exhilarating influence of Amor and the Graces everything assumes a gloomy aspect, wisdom becomes pedantry, the gods fall into a state of rudeness and the Muses are unable to achieve anything worth while:

[44] *Ibid.*, the footnote on p. 134.

[45] "Der Wunsch," Salomon Geszner's "Schriften," Zürich, 1795, II, 280.

[46] "Erinnerungen an eine Freundin," the first 6 verses, Göschen, XXVI, 281.

[47] *Teutscher Merkur*, June, 1780, p. 292. "Sympathien," Göschen, XXIX, 61.

[48] "Menander und Glycerion," Letter I, Hempel, X, 8.

[49] "Agathon," IV, 58 and VI, 15.

Minerva, deren Ernst die milden Grazien
Sonst unvermerkt erheiterten,
Ist von Pedanterei nicht länger auszustehen.
Der schöne Bacchus wird, seit Amor sich verbannt,
Mit Satyrn stets bezecht gesehen;
Mars tobt und macht den Sakripant;
Die Musen krähen uns in fremden rauhen Tönen
Kamtschadalische Gesänge vor,
Entsagen, um neu zu sein, dem Schönen,
Betäuben den Verstand und martern unser Ohr.[50]

In the following we have a very emphatic glorification of the beneficial influence of the Graces. Before the time of the Graces, we are told, the Arcadians lacked refinement. Their youths were wild and stormy, their maidens bashful. Their festivals were characterized chiefly by noise and extravagant merriment, which usually ended in general intoxication. The finer feeling of propriety, the nobler love, which is alone worthy of the name, comely jest, witty laughter, lovely inebriation which instead of intoxicating the soul fills it with enthusiasm, lulls it to a sweet oblivion of all cares, makes it incapable of sadness—all these were unknown to the Arcadians before the time of the Graces. The Muses, to be sure, had begun to communicate their gifts to the people, but without the Graces even the Muses are unable to complete the embellishment of man. The Muses must join forces with the Graces before they can make a complete human being out of the creature which was merely started by nature. Through the influence of the Graces a general refinement spreads finally in Arcadia. The maidens are filled with a spirit of benevolence and of gentle cheerfulness. Entirely free from jealousy, each one of them seems to take greater pride in her companion's charms than in her own. Joy, innocence, harmony and love reign among the Arcadians, as long as they remain worthy of the protection of the Graces. Even in Olympus the Graces exert this beneficial influence. Through them the gods themselves lose their austerity and become more refined. Thus,

[50] "Der verklagte Amor" (1774), 5th Canto, lines 147–56, Gruber, XII, 214, or Göschen, III, 189.

Juno becomes "die angenehmste Frau," Jupiter becomes "der gefälligste Ehemann" and the gods in general "die beste Gesellschaft von der Welt."[51]

The sympathy which establishes a firm friendship between amiable creatures made the Muses and Graces the most intimate playmates. The former made an infinite gain thereby, for their earnestness was in need of being mitigated by the charm of the latter. Even the Muse of Philosophy learned from the Graces the art of pleasing and instructing at the same time, for:

> Aus ihrer schönen Hand
> Empfingen die Platon, die Humen
> Und Fontenellen die Blumen,
> Womit sie den steinigen Pfad der fliehenden Wahrheit
> bestreuen.[52]

The influence of the Graces extends also to virtue. The conduct and character of a good and wise man must receive from the Graces an appearance of unconstrained ease. A wise and good man's life, if it is to be a beautiful whole, must be endowed by the Graces with that splendor of consummation by which it seems to become more a gift of nature than a work of art. The virtue of Cato of Utica lacked this Grace, and it is this lack which gives an unpleasant and repulsive appearance to many other presumed virtues. Only under the influence of the Graces wisdom and virtue lose the exaggerated and extravagant, the harsh, the stiff and the awkward; in fact with all these faults virtue and wisdom are undeserving of their names. This is the doctrine, he adds, which Musarion wanted to teach her pupil and was it possible not to understand her?[53]

In "Musarion"[54] Wieland illustrates this philosophy by a living example. He announced the poem as "die Philosophie der Grazien," and such it really is. We must not look here,

[51] "Die Grazien" (1770), Göschen, III, 96, 97, 67, 110, 115, 120.

[52] *Ibid.*, pp. 121–2.

[53] *Ibid.*, pp. 125–6.

[54] Goethe was very much impressed by this work of Wieland. "Musarion," he says, "wirkte am meisten auf mich. Alles was in Wielands Genie plastisch ist, zeigte sich hier aufs Vollkommenste." See "Dichtung und Wahrheit," Hempel, XXI, 54.

however, for any direct didactic system of philosophy. Wieland himself refers only indirectly to the philosophical nature of the poem. On one occasion he calls it a "systematic mixture of philosophy, morality and satire."[55] On another occasion he describes the poem as "ein moralisch-metaphysisches komisches Ding" containing quite an agreeable system of morality.[56] Musarion, the heroine of the poem, teaches not directly through precepts and doctrines but indirectly and in a playful way, which is all the more effective. Musarion herself is a kind of Grace,[57] and love is the medium through which the teaching is done:

Die Liebe war's—Wer lehrt so gut wie sie?[58]

She is always pleasant, cheerful and full of grace; even her censure is charming, and the Muses and Graces form in her a most beautiful alliance:

Gefallend, wenn sie schwieg, bezaubernd, wenn sie sprach;
Darum hätt' ihr Witz auch Wangen ohne Rosen
Beliebt gemacht; ein Witz, dem's nie an Reiz gebrach,
Zu stechen oder liebzukosen
Gleich aufgelegt, doch lächelnd wenn er stach,
Und ohne Gift. Nie sahe man die Musen
Und Grazien in einem schönern Bund,
Nie scherzte die Vernunft aus einem schönern Mund,
Und Amor nie um einen schönern Busen.[59]

[55] Letter to Geszner, July 21, 1766: "Auswahl denkwürdiger Briefe," I, 33.

[56] Letter to Riedel, Feb. 4, 1768, *ibid.*, I, 184.

[57] J. G. Jacobi was also strongly impressed by Musarion's philosophy, which he describes as follows:

Die stille Weisheit, ohne Stolz,
An deren Hand sich Liebesgötter freuen,
Der sie, besteckt mit grünen Meyen,
In Tempelchen von Rosenholz
Den Bogen und den Köcher weihen:
Die feurig ohne Schwärmerei,
Nicht flatterhaft, und dennoch frei,
Wohlthätig unser Herz entzündet;
Mit einem Lächeln oft ergründet,
Was kühner Geister Neid erregt, etc.

See "An aglaja," J. G. Jacobi's "Werke" (Zürich), 1825, II, 22.

[58] "Musarion," line 1425, Pröhle, I, 57.

[59] *Ibid.*, lines 150–8, p. 19.

Musarion's constant cheerfulness and the grace which is spread upon all her words and acts soon dispel Phanias' gloom:

Allein der Dame Witz, die freie Munterkeit,
Die was sie spricht und tut mit Grazie bestreut,
Und dann und wann ein Blick voll Zärtlichkeit,
Den sie, als ob sie sich vergasz, erst auf ihn heftet,
Dann seitwarts glitschen läszt—entkräftet
Den Unmut bald, der seine Stirne kräuszt.[60]

Through her influence Phanias leads a wise and happy life, and his home becomes a genuine temple of the Graces:

Glückselig, weil er's war, nicht weil die Welt es wähnte,
Bringt Phanias in neidenswerter Ruh
Ein unbeneidet Leben zu;
In Freuden, die der unverfälschte Stempel
Der Unschuld und Natur zu echten Freuden prägt.
Der bürgerliche Sturm, der stets Athen bewegt,
Trifft seine Hütte nicht—den Tempel
Der Grazien seitdem Musarion sie ziert.
Bescheidene Gunst, durch ihren Witz geleitet,
Giebt der Natur, so weit sein Landgut sich verbreitet,
Den stillen Reiz, der ohne Schimmer rührt.
Ein Garten, den mit Zephyrn und mit Floren
Pomona sich zum Aufenthalt erkoren;
Ein Hain, worin sich Amor gern verliert,
Wo ernstes Denken oft mit leichtem Scherz sich gattet.[61]

This notion of coupling "ernstes Denken mit leichtem Scherz," the notion which constitutes the leading theme of Shaftesbury's "wit and humor" philosophy, underlies, as we just had occasion to see, Wieland's poetry of the Graces. Nobody else, he declares, loves "die mit den Grazien scherzende Philosophie" better than he.[62] And "Musarion," the leading representative of his *Grazien-Dichtung,* he describes as a work which more than any other of his works portrays his own taste and philosophy.[63] Shaftesbury's "wit and humor"

[60] *Ibid.*, lines 769–74, p. 38.
[61] *Ibid.*, lines 1392–1406, p. 56.
[62] *Teutscher Merkur,* Jan., 1773, p. 32.
[63] Letter to Riedel, June 2, 1768; "Auswahl denkwürdiger Briefe," I, 186.

philosophy is closely connected with a bright and cheerful attitude to life in general. This is also true of Wieland's *Grazien-Philosophie.* "Never," he declares "with the help of God and of my sound common sense, will I have any other philosophy than that of the Graces. I examine everything in the mildest light."[64]

This brings us to Wieland's life, which is a living example of the doctrines represented by him. Goethe's remark about Wieland, "Mensch und Schriftsteller hatten sich in ihm ganz durchdrungen: er dichtete als ein Lebender und lebte dichtend,"[65] is also justified in this case. Just as Wieland's poetry was a *Grazien-Dichtung,* so his life was a *Grazien-Leben,* if we may use such a term. It is precisely the kind of life which is led by his heroine, the serene and cheerful Musarion. Her philosophy, he says, her taste and principles, are those according to which he lives. The mild aspect in which she examines things, this equilibrium between enthusiasm and indifference, this playful pleasantry with which she distinguishes between the true on one hand and the exaggerated, improper and fantastic on the other, this indulgence toward the imperfections of human nature—"alle diese Züge sind die Lineamenten meines eigenen Geistes und Herzens."[66] To use the words of Wieland's biographer, J. G. Gruber, the Graces were "die steten Gefährtinnen seines Lebens."[67]

Finally we have Goethe's testimony in his memorial oration on Wieland. Wieland's life, says Goethe, had always been bright and serene. He not only lived, Goethe adds, but died in this serene and cheerful atmosphere. To make the memorial service more consistent with Wieland's life, Goethe then would make the occasion of Wieland's death an occasion of joy and cheer, in order that it may appear "so froh und klar als das Leben unseres Freundes."[68]

[64] Quoted by Heinrich Döring in "Chr. M. Wieland. Ein biographisches Denkmal" (Sangerhausen, 1840), p. 193. The words are quoted from a letter of Wieland, but Döring has no information as to when or to whom the letter is written.

[65] "Zum Andenken des edlen Dichters, Bruders und Freundes Wieland," Hempel, XXVII², 57.

[66] The Foreword to "Musarion," Pröhle, I, 10.

[67] "Wieland geschildert von Gruber," II, 536.

[68] Hempel, XXVII², 54–55.

CHAPTER VI

MISCELLANEOUS

1. *Optimism*

Shaftesbury's optimism is also reflected in Wieland, who is convinced that the good predominates; he is filled with admiration and enthusiasm for the beauty and harmony of the universe in general and of human life in particular. Nature, he says, has made our brains and senses instruments of pleasure. If it had only been possible nature would not have subjected us to any pain whatever. But even as matters stand now, pain has no access to us and our happiness is seldom interrupted, if we only obey nature's laws.[1] The good predominates in the world, for otherwise the creator would not tolerate the world a single moment.[2]

But the feature which above all stamps Wieland's optimism as Shaftesburian is his Shaftesbury-like enthusiasm for the beauty, order and harmony of the universe. The harmony of the universe is considered by Agathodämon as analogous to the harmony of charming music. The manifold relations of the various movements and the operations of the various creatures are all, in spite of so many real and apparent dissonances, most indissolubly combined and harmoniously united with one another. Charming music, therefore, gives to a noble soul a vivid conception of this perfect harmony of things, "von dieser aus unendlich vielfachen Tönen, Stimmen und Accorden durch den Geist der Ordnung und Liebe zusammengesetzten Symphonie des Weltalls."[3] So is Agathon convinced of the wisdom and goodness manifested in the individual parts of creation

[1] "Der goldne Spiegel," VII, 71.
[2] "Sympathien," Göschen, XXIX, 15.
[3] "Agathodämon," Hempel, XXIII, 191–2.

and in the plan and general economy[4] of the whole. He is also convinced that the stedfast contemplation of this wisdom and goodness is an unfailing means of becoming himself wise and good.[5]

The harmony found in the universe is manifested even to a higher degree in the fate and life of man. While beholding the beauty of nature we must remember that we are her children, that all the other works of nature seem to be merely the preliminary exercise by which she prepares herself for her masterpiece, *i. e.,* man; that in him she takes the deepest interest.[6] A superficial comparison of the various creatures may lead to the conclusion that nature takes the least care of the preservation of man. Thus, he is naturally unprotected against cold and heat and is incapable of supporting himself without long assistance from others. The instinct, which is the innate guide of the lower animals, is weak, unsteady and inadequate in man. But for all these apparent disadvantages man is sufficiently compensated by his reason and taste for beauty: "Warum alles das, als weil sie (nature) ihn durch die Vernunft und die Empfindung des Schönen, die er vor jenen (animals) voraus hat, fähig gemacht hat diesen Abgang zu ersetzen?" Nature has left to man himself the continuation of her work. Man, therefore, must in a way become his own "second creator," but his life acquires a greater splendor thereby.[7]

This reminds us directly of the conversation between Philocles and Theocles in Shaftesbury's "Moralists." Philocles there cites a few advantages which the lower animal has over man, but Theocles maintains his optimistic view by asserting that men are in no need of these advantages possessed by the

[4] Shaftesbury also employs the term economy in connection with the entire system of the universe or the general nature of a creature. Other instances where Wieland uses the Shaftesburian term are: "Agathon," VI, 152 and 308; "Aufsätze über die französische Revolution," Hempel, XXXIV, 103.

[5] "Agathon," V, 20.

[6] "Der goldne Spiegel," VII, 74.

[7] "Koxkox und Kikequetzel," Hempel, XXXI, 35 ff., or "Beiträge zur geheimen Geschichte des menschlichen Verstandes und Herzens" (of which "Koxkox und Kikequetzel" is a part), I, 91 ff.

animals: "Where was the occasion or use? Where the necessity? Have they (men) not what is better in another kind? Have they not reason and discourse? Does not this instruct them? What need of the other."[8]

2. *Doctrine of Divinity*

Also in the doctrine of divinity Wieland adheres to Shaftesbury. He also uses the teleological proof for the existence of a Supreme Being and likewise conceives of God as the world-soul. Thus Archytas who, as we have seen, is in many respects modelled after Shaftesbury, declares that a universe in which there is such excellent adaptation of means to ends, such beautiful simplicity in the midst of the most infinite variety, such harmony amidst so many different elements, such uniformity along with this everlasting change of things—that such a universe must be the city of God where justice and wisdom prevail, the lasting effect of an original and fundamental power, the visible manifestation of an unlimited mind.[9] Shaftesbury likewise declares that "having recognized this uniform consistent fabrick and owned the universal system we must of consequence acknowledge a universal mind."[10] Like Shaftesbury, Wieland is also filled with enthusiasm for the notion of the divine spirit. The soul, he declares, expands at the mere conception of the infinite spirit. This conception has and should have the same relation to our soul as the sun to the world. It should give light and warmth to the soul and bring into maturity every virtue and perfection.[11]

And then Wieland develops the Shaftesburian conception of God as the world-soul. The beauty of nature and the harmony of things, we are told, are manifestations of what we call the "being of beings, the king of spirits and the soul of the world."[12] The world is too excellent not to be the work of a Supreme Being. The Supreme Being, to be sure, is invisible to our physical eyes, but is seen by the mind's eye. For just

[8] "Characteristics," II, 300–308.
[9] "Agathon," VI, 313.
[10] "Characteristics," II, 290.
[11] "Der goldne Spiegel," VIII, 93.
[12] "Araspes und Panthea," Göschen, XXVII, 54.

as soon as a man is able to perceive the order and harmony, the wise laws and benevolent purposes of nature, he cannot doubt the existence of a supreme wisdom and goodness, or the "common soul of the whole," any more than he can doubt the existence of his own soul, which is no more visible to him than the *soul of the universe*.[13]

3. *Dialogue*

Wieland is interested in the technic and style of Shaftesbury's compositions and praises them again and again. Praising the systematic treatment of Shaftesbury's "Inquiry" and "Moralists," he says: "Shaftesbury hat gewuszt was Methode ist."[14] And his review of the German translation of Shaftesbury of 1776 contains the statement that "Shaftesbury bleibt uns allezeit ein Muster feiner Composition."[15] But above all Wieland is fond of Shaftesbury's form of the dialogue. K. A. Böttiger reports Wieland as saying—in a conversation of Feb. 6, 1799—that Plato's sophists reply like stupid fellows, that Lucian made an advance in the form of the dialogue, but that Shaftesbury attained the greatest proficiency in it; for with him every one of the speakers is in full earnest.[16] Again, in his review of Galliani's "Dialogues sur le commerce des blés," he regards the work as one of the most excellent masterpieces and models of dialogue and considers no other modern dialogue worthy of being ranked with Galliani's work, except Shaftesbury's "Moralists."[17] And he himself writes "Timoklea," his first dialogue, hoping that "das Beste wozu dieser miszlungene Versuch in der dialogistischen Schreibart dienen könnte, wäre, wenn er die Kenner veranlaszte, die Lehren des Shaftesbury über diese Art von Werken des Geistes unter den Deutschen bekannter zu machen."[18]

[13] "Der goldne Spiegel," VIII, 90.
[14] "Ausgewählte Briefe," I, 280–1.
[15] *Teutscher Merkur*, Feb., 1777, p. 202.
[16] "Literarische Zustände und Zeitgenossen," Leipzig, 1838, I, 239.
[17] *Teutscher Merkur*, Dec., 1800, p. 245 or Hempel, XXXVI, 182.
[18] Cf. Foreword to "Timoklea" in "Prosaische Schriften," III, 162.

4. *"Tablature of the Judgment of Hercules"*

Wieland did not speculate about art as such, and yet he was interested in Shaftesbury's "Tablature of the Judgment of Hercules," the work containing Shaftesbury's artistic speculations. In a note to "Der neue Amadis" (1771) he says: "As a commentary to the painting ('The Choice of Hercules') we have the 'Tablature of the Judgment of Hercules,' or the seventh treatise in the Earl of Shaftesbury's 'Characteristics,' of which Thurneisen and Le Grand in Basel have given us a beautiful new edition in their valuable collection of the best English authors."[19] And in one of the notes to his translation of the "Sokratische Gespräche" (1799), he speaks of Shaftesbury's "Judgment of Hercules" as being "in mehr als einer Rücksicht lesenswürdig."[20] And then he himself writes an operette "Die Wahl des Herkules" (1773), which is based on the same general episode as Shaftesbury's work.

5. *"Advice to an Author"*

Also in his capacity as author and literary critic Shaftesbury exerts an influence on Wieland. Shaftesbury's views on literary art are contained in his "Advice to an Author," and Wieland's interest in this work is attested, as we have already seen, by his frequent quotations from and allusions to it.[21] Undoubtedly he began the study of Shaftesbury with the "Advice to an Author," for there was a German translation of it as early as 1738. From Shaftesbury's "Advice" Wieland learns more than one valuable lesson. Thus, when he tells us, in 1758, that he had learned from Shaftesbury the significance of being an author,[22] he certainly refers to the inspiration received from the "Advice to an Author." On March 15, 1755, he writes to Schinz: "Meine Zeit wird wohl angewandt, wenn ich gleich nicht immer schreibe und drucken lasse. Musz man

[19] Göschen, XV, 293. This note must have been written by Wieland in the second edition of "Der neue Amadis" (1794). It could not have been written in the first edition of 1771, since Wieland refers to the Thurneisen edition of the "Characteristics," which did not appear until 1790.

[20] *Attisches Museum*, III, 131.

[21] Cf. Chap. I, p, 8, note 13; p. 9, note 16; p. 17, note 58; p. 18, notes 59 and 62.

[22] Cf. Chap. I, p. 7, note 4.

nicht wieder lesen und denken, Ideen sammeln und rangieren and bearbeiten, ehe man wieder schreiben kann? *Voyés Schaftesbury's Advice for an Author.*"[23] Here Wieland undoubtedly alludes to the emphasis laid by Shaftesbury upon the necessity of "that main preliminary of self-study and *inward converse,* which we have found so much wanting in the authors of our time. That their composition and vein of writing may be natural and free, they should settle matters, in the first place, with *themselves.* And having gained a mastery here they may easily with the help of their genius and a right use of *art* command their *audience* and establish a *good taste.*"[24]

Again, in one of the "Sympathien" he calls Amyntor's attention to the fact that nowadays the literary art has become considerably degraded; that whereas the literary profession was formerly practiced only by enlightened minds whose main purpose was to ascertain the true and noble and beautiful, people write nowadays either because they wish to see their names in print, or because it is fashionable, or for the purpose of earning a livelihood. The author then urges Amyntor to help to restore the noble profession to its proper position and to make it again only a prerogative of those who are by nature equipped to be oracles of truth. "Willst du nicht helfen, Amyntor, diesem erhabenen Beruf seinen alten Platz wieder zu verschaffen? Willst du nicht einer von den wenigen sein, für welche der weise Shaftesbury seine Erinnerungen nicht umsonst gegeben hat?"[25] To the word *Erinnerungen* Wieland attaches the following note: "*Advice to an Author,* im ersten Teile seiner *Characteristics.*"[26]

Oct. 18, 1756, Wieland suspects that Zimmermann must have read Shaftesbury's "Advice" and that he must have retained in his mind Shaftesbury's demands of symmetry, proportion, regular development and the like; that Zimmermann was displeased with his own work "Über die Einsamkeit," because he considered it as falling short of Shaftesbury's de-

[23] "Ausgewählte Briefe," I, 162–3. The italicized phrase is given as in Wieland.

[24] "Advice to an Author," I, 277.

[25] Göschen, XXIX, 55.

[26] *Ibid.,* p. 404.

mands.[27] And two years later he criticises Zimmermann's book on solitude and accompanies the criticism with the following remark: As for the rest I believe that an author can himself best judge the plan of his work and that he is justified in arranging his composition as he pleases, provided he is skillful enough to create well-shaped bodies and no abortions. "Sie," he continues, "kennen Shaftesburys *Advice to an Author;* dieser erschöpft meines Bedünkens alles, was sich davon sagen läszt."[28]

Finally, in 1780, Wieland himself writes in the *Merkur* "Noch ein kleiner *Advice to an Author.*"[29] He attacks here the habit acquired by German authors of misspelling well-known Greek names. The contents of this brief article, to be sure, have no connection with Shaftesbury's "Advice to an Author," but that Wieland certainly had Shaftesbury in mind at the time is quite obvious from the title of the article.

6. *Soliloquy*

We come finally to the so-called doctrine of soliloquy. Shaftesbury urges self-investigation or soliloquy, as he calls it, upon authors, orators, upon all men. Every man, he claims, has two souls, two natures, a reasonable and an unreasonable one. Man can and should divide himself into two and thus converse with himself. As an illustration Shaftesbury then, without mentioning any names, tells in brief the episode of Xenophon's Araspes and Panthea.[30] Shaftesbury's doctrine of soliloquy finds an exact parallel in Wieland. Thus he recognizes a proclivity "zum Forschen in sich selbst" as one of the necessary qualifications of a poet.[31] The wise and virtuous man likes to contemplate himself and to converse with his thoughts. He analyzes his ideas and studies his heart —and "c'est dans les entretiens solitaires qu'il découvre les enchantements trompeurs de l'imagination et les moyens de

[27] "Ausgewählte Briefe," I, 222–3.
[28] *Ibid.*, I, 282.
[29] July, pp. 45–8.
[30] "Characteristics," I, 176–84.
[31] "Sendschreiben an einen jungen Dichter" (1782), Göschen, XXXIII, 270.

s'en délivrer."[32] He makes his Agathon engage in frequent self-converse and compliments his hero on this habit of soliloquizing. We must not, he says, consider this as in any way improper, for no less a fine man of the world than Horace was accustomed to converse with himself. It is all the worse for us if on certain occasions we do not soliloquize as readily as Agathon. We should do very well to learn from him this habit.[33]

On another occasion we read that real men, such as we find them in daily life, will always have two souls, a selfish and an unselfish one. Then the author accompanies this remark by the following note: "S. Xenofons *Cyropädie* oder, wem es gelegner ist, Shaftesbury's *Characteristics,* Vol. I, page 152 u.f., in der neuen Baselschen Ausgabe," etc.[34]

In connection with the question of abolishing hereditary nobility in France, Wieland supports the affirmative side of the question by means of a soliloquy. We know, he says, from Shaftesbury's "Characteristics" that all soliloquies are based upon the fact that every man has two souls, a reasonable and an unreasonable, and that these two often conflict with each other.[35] I do not know, he continues, what Montmorency[36] had actually said in the national assembly, but if I had to settle the question I should converse with myself in the following manner. And then the author develops a conversation between the *vernünftige* and *unvernünftige Seele* and arrives in the end at the desirable conclusion.[37] He finally summarizes his approval of the Shaftesburian doctrine in the following terms: "Horaz war ein groszer Liebhaber von diesen Selbstgesprächen, und der sinnreichste und politeste Philosoph unseres Jahrhunderts, der Graf Anton Shaftesbury, empfiehlt sie mit Recht

[32] "Die Züricher Abschiedsrede" (1759), *Vierteljahrschrift für Literaturgeschichte,* 1889, II, 588.

[33] "Agathon," IV, 76; V, 167.

[34] Sendschreiben an Prof. Eggers (1792), Hempel, XXXIV, 169. The passage referred to is found in our edition of the "Characteristics," I, 184.

[35] "Über die Abschaffung des Erbadels in Frankreich" (1790), Hempel, XXXIV, 95.

[36] Montmorency was a French nobleman who was very active in behalf of abolishing hereditary titles of nobility. Cf. *ibid.,* p. 94.

[37] *Ibid.,* pp. 95–102.

als ein vortreffliches Hausmittel, unsere innerliche Oekonomie auf einen guten Fusz zu setzen und dem vernünftigen Teil unseres Selbst über den unvernünftigen das gehörige Übergewicht zu verschaffen."[88]

Conclusion

Shaftesbury's influence on Wieland begins as early as 1752 and extends through the entire life-work of the poet. His knowledge of Shaftesbury, at the beginning somewhat hazy and blended with Platonic philosophy, soon becomes clearer, so that by 1755 the English philosopher is a distinct factor in Wieland's intellectual life. Shaftesbury then figures very prominently in Wieland's transition from the first to the second period of his career. The large concentrated study of Shaftesbury seems to take place in 1758. But the Shaftesburian influence predominates above all in Wieland's works written after the first period of his career. It will be remembered that "Musarion" (1768), "Die Grazien" (1770), "Beiträge zur geheimen Geschichte des menschlichen Verstandes und Herzens" (1770), "Der goldne Spiegel" (1772), "Agathon" (1766–94), "Aristipp" (1800–2), are Wieland's great store-houses of Shaftesburian philosophy.

Wieland was a student of the English in general. He was interested in and influenced by Sterne, Fielding, Spenser and Richardson. To none other, however, he owed as much as to Shaftesbury, in whom he was able to find the healthy philosophy of the ancients and the *Aufklärung* of his own age. Goethe was right in finding Wieland and Shaftesbury "vollkommen ähnlich" and in declaring that "was der Engländer verständig lehrt und wünscht, das weisz der Deutsche in Versen und Prosa dichterisch und rednerisch auszuführen."[89]

[88] *Ibid.*, pp. 102–3.

[89] "Zum Andenken des edeln Dichters, Bruders und Freundes Wieland," Hempel edition, XXVII², 60–1.

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[1] For the bibliographical data I am indebted to P. Ziertmann "Beiträge zur Kenntnis Shaftesburys" (*Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*, XVII (neue Folge, X), 1904, pp. 483 ff.

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Horazens Briefe übersetzt; Leipzig, 1816, in 2 parts.

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Luciam from the Greek with comments and illustrations of Wieland and others, by William Tooke, London, 1820, 2 volumes.

Einige Nachrichten von den Lebens-Umständen des Herrn Wilhelm Shakespear. At the close of the 8th volume of Wieland's translation of Shakespear (Shake-

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C. Schüddekopf: Briefe Herders und Wielands, *ibid.,* XV, 254–64.

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Zimmermann, Robert: Geschichte der Aesthetik als philosophische Wissenschaft (in 2 parts, Wien, 1858). Part I, the sections entitled: Plato, Plotin, Die Engländer.

Chronological List of Wieland's Works

The following is by no means a complete list of the writings of our extremely prolific author. Some of the minor works, to which I had no occasion to refer, are excluded from the list.

1751 Die Natur der Dinge.
Lobgesang auf die Liebe.
Hermann.

1752 Moralische Briefe.
Anti-Ovid.
Erzählungen (Balsora, Zemin und Gulindy, Serena, Der Unzufriedene, Melinde, Selim und Selima).
Der Frühling.
Hymne (auf die Grösze und die Güte Gottes).
Schreiben an Herrn . . . von der Würde und der Bestimmung eines schönen Geistes.

1753 Briefe von Verstorbenen an hinterlassene Freunde.
Der geprüfte Abraham.
Plan von einer neuen Art von Privat-Unterweisung.
Hymne auf Gott.
Hymne auf die Sonne.
Erinnerungen an eine Freundin.

1754 Ode auf die Geburt des Erlösers.
Ode auf die Auferstehung des Erlösers.
Betrachtungen über den Menschen.

Gesicht des Mirza.
Philosophie als Kunst zu leben und Heilkunst der Seele betrachtet.

1755 Hymnen auf die Allgegenwart und Gerechtigkeit Gottes.
Empfindungen eines Christen.
Gesicht von einer Welt unschuldiger Menschen.
Theages oder Unterredung von Schönheit und Liebe.
(In his "Prolegomena zu einer Wieland-Ausgabe," 1904, p. 49, Seuffert puts the work "several years before 1758.")
Sympathien.
Timoklea. Ein Gespräch über scheinbare und wahre Schönheit.

1756 Plan einer Akademie zu Bildung des Verstandes und Herzens junger Leute.

1758 Lady Johanna Gray.

1759 Cyrus.
Rede beim Abschied von den Züricher Schülern.

1760 Araspes und Panthea.
Clementina von Porretta.
Eine Unterredung. Lysias und Eubulus.

1762–6 Shakespear Theatralische Werke. Aus dem Englischen übersetzt.

1764 Die Abenteuer des Don Sylvio von Rosalva.

1765 Komische Erzählungen.

1766–94 Geschichte des Agathon.

1768 Idris und Zenide.
Musarion.

1769–70 Die Dialogen des Diogenes von Sinope.

1770 Beiträge zur geheimen Geschichte des menschlichen Verstandes und Herzens.
Koxkox und Kikequetzel.
Combabus.
Die Grazien.

1771 Der neue Amadis.

1772 Gedanken über eine alte Aufschrift.
Der goldne Spiegel.
Aurora, ein Singspiel.

1773–89 *Der Teutsche Merkur.*
1773 Alceste. Ein Singspiel.
Die Wahl des Herkules. Ein lyrisches Drama.
1774 Der verklagte Amor.
1774–81 Die Abderiten.
1775 Der Mönch und die Nonne.
Das Urteil des Midas. Ein Komisches Singspiel.
Geschichte des weisen Danischmende.
Unterredungen zwischen W . . . und dem Pfarrer zu . . .
Das Verhältnis des Angenehmen und Schönen zum Nützlichen.
1776 Ein Wintermärchen.
Liebe um Liebe.
Was ist Wahrheit?
1777 Geron der Adelich.
Betrachtungen über die Abnahme des menschlichen Geschlechts.
Das Sommermärchen.
1778 Der Vogelsang, oder die drei Lehren.
Rosamund. Ein Singspiel.
Hann und Gulpenhee.
Schach Lolo.
1779 Pervonte oder die Wünsche.
Pandora.
1780 Oberon.
1782 Horazens Briefe übersetzt.
1782–4 Sendschreiben an einen jungen Dichter.
1783 Clelia und Sinibald.
Die Aeropatomanie.
1784 Die Aeronauten.
1786 Horazens Satyren übersetzt.
1786–9 Dschinnistan (select fairy tales, partly composed by Wieland, partly translated and remodelled).
1787 Eine Lustreise in die Unterwelt.
1788 Gedanken von der Freiheit über Gegenstände des Glaubens zu philosophiren.
1788–9 Lucians sämmtliche Werke. Aus dem Griechischen übersetzt.

1789 Moral der Natur.
1789–1800 Aufsätze über die französische Revolution.
1789–93 Göttergespräche.
1790 Geschichte der Troglodyten.
Gespräche in Elysium.
1790–1810 *Der Neue Teutsche Merkur.*
1791 Geheime Geschichte des Philosophen Peregrinus Proteus.
1795 Die Wasserkufe.
1797–1803 *Das Attische Museum.*
1798 Gespräche unter vier Augen.
1799 Sokratische Gespräche aus Xenofons denkwürdigen Nachrichten von Sokrates. (Translation in the *Attisches Museum.*)
Agathodämon.
1800–2 Aristipp und einige seiner Zeitgenossen.
1802 Xenofons Gastmahl. Übersetzt von dem Herausgeber des A. Museums. (Wieland's translations are published for the greater part in the *Attisches Museum* and *Neues Attisches Museum.*)
1803 Menander und Glycerion.
1804 Krates und Hipparchia.
1805–9 *Das Neue Attische Museum.*
1805 Euthanasia. Drei Gespräche über das Leben nach dem Tode.
Das Hexameron von Rosenhain.
1808–12 Ciceros sämmtliche Briefe übersetzt und erläutert.

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[1] Whenever the names Cleomenes and Horatio occur, they designate the two heroes of Mandeville's "Five Dialogues between Horatio and Cleomenes."

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

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